The Humanization of Humanitarian Law

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

The centennial of the Hague Convention (No. II; No. IV in the 1907 version) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the fiftieth anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of August 12, 1949, present an opportunity to reflect on the direction in which the law of war, or international humanitarian law, has been evolving. This essay focuses on the humanization of that law, a process driven to a large extent by human rights and the principles of humanity. As the subject is vast, major issues must inevitably be left out of my discussion, including the impact of the prohibitions on unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate warfare on the regulation of weapons, the proscription of antipersonnel land mines and blinding laser weapons, and the progression of international humanitarian law from largely protecting noncombatants to protecting combatants as well.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 299-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Banu Bargu

International humanitarian law strictly prohibits the use of human shields and, through a well-known genealogy of supranational efforts that passes through the Hague Convention IV (1907), the Geneva Conventions III and IV (1949), the Additional Protocol I (1977), and, more recently, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), has sought to prevent this practice. However, both states and nonstate belligerents have deployed human shields in order to gain military advantages—to ward off attacks by placing civilians close to military targets or hiding military targets within areas inhabited by civilians. This is especially the case in asymmetric conflict, where the weaker party can use human shields to protect fighters, weapons, strategic sites, and critical infrastructures, and to delay, deter, and even discourage attackers from direct engagement that might lead to a high number of civilian casualties. On the other hand, the attacking party can allege that the “other” party is using civilians as human shields. Even in the absence of actual evidence, such an allegation has come to constitute a convenient excuse for attackers to justify civilian casualties and to relegate the responsibility for their deaths to the party that endangered them in the first place. In asymmetric conflict, therefore, parties are incentivized to resort to a politics of human shielding.


Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K ◽  
von Heinegg Wolff Heintschel

This chapter studies the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. The definition of persons protected under the various treaties for the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked evolved constantly from the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Convention, which only applied to ‘combatants’. The 1906 Geneva Convention subsequently broadened the scope of application to add ‘other persons officially attached to the armed forces’, and the 1929 Geneva Convention similarly referred to ‘officers and soldiers and other persons officially attached to the armed forces’. As far as warfare at sea was concerned, the Hague Convention (III) of 1899 applied to ‘sailors and soldiers who are taken on board’, while the 1907 Hague Convention (X) added to this definition ‘other persons officially attached to fleets or armies’ in analogy to the 1906 Geneva Convention. The chapter then looks at the protection of medical personnel and the rules of international humanitarian law on the dead and missing persons. It also details the development which has led to the adoption of a new protective emblem: the Red Crystal.


1989 ◽  
Vol 29 (269) ◽  
pp. 111-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Françoise J. Hampson

It is commonly accepted that education in human rights may be one of the most effective tools in promoting the observance of those rights. Those whose profession entails the exercise of power over others have an obvious need to know the limits of their power and members of the armed forces represent just such a group. Their acts engage the responsibility of their State under human rights treaties, wherever those acts are committed. Some instruction in human rights law, particularly non-derogable rights, is therefore necessary but the body of rules which imposes the greatest prohibitions and restraints on the conduct of armed forces is humanitarian law. That term is used here as including both “The Hague law”, which imposes limits on the means and methods of warfare, and “Geneva law”, which seeks to protect certain victims of the conflict, such as the wounded and sick in the field, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war and civilians living under belligerent occupation. The latter body of rules was updated in 1977 by the addition of two Protocols which extended the range of protection by incorporating elements of “The Hague law”. The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 166 States and Hague Convention IV, with which we shall principally be dealing, was held by the Nuremberg Tribunal to represent customary international law. To all intents and purposes then, every State is bound by the two bodies of rules. In addition, the 1977 Protocols are binding on those States which have ratified them.


Author(s):  
Matthew Evangelista

This chapter offers an assessment of the status of the Geneva Conventions as a normative regime and how it matters. The book’s case studies support the intuition that states fighting guerrilla insurgencies and terrorists face challenges in adhering to the laws of war. Yet many cases exhibit more compliance than the rationalist accounts would anticipate. In exploring mechanisms of noncompliance as well as compliance, the chapter highlights the importance of disaggregating the process—from leaders to individual soldiers—and highlights some of the counterintuitive insights that emerge. The international system—powerful states and institutions—serves not only as a constraint on human-rights abuses and war crimes but also sometimes as an enabler. Courts play less of a role than expected in the process of socialization and internalization of norms. The chapter concludes with reflections on the methodological challenges facing scholars who seek to assess the impact of international humanitarian law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-178
Author(s):  
Daniela Vetina Ene

The civil war in Syria, triggered by the pro-democracy demonstrations of the "Arab Spring", was a complicated combination of religious, cultural and ethnic-identity contradictions. The non-international conflict was turned into a "battlefield" for foreign powers, which led to the transformation of a civil war into a "war with multiple proxies". The United Nations' efforts to mediate the conflict, based on a six-point plan, remained in the draft phase. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have denounced flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the al-Assad regime, which has widely used non-discriminatory weapons banned in violation of the Geneva Conventions, 1949. The Bashār al-Assad regime is accused by the international community of being guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but attempts to incriminate it have failed.


1972 ◽  
Vol 12 (131) ◽  
pp. 96-103

The ICRC has on various occasions drawn the attention of National Red Cross Societies to the importance of an ever wider dissemination of the Geneva Conventions. In March 1971, it sent them a letter relating to the teaching of international humanitarian law in universities. Recently it reverted to the subject in a circular which we publish below, followed by the outline of a course on international humanitarian law which Mr. Jean Pictet, Vice-President of the ICRC, is giving at the University of Geneva, and which he has authorized us to reproduce.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.


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