Behind the Scenes: How Ulysses Was Finally Published in the Soviet Union

Slavic Review ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-199
Author(s):  
Emily Tall

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost has resulted in an astounding flood of hitherto forbidden foreign classics. Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, George Orwell's 1984 and Animal Farm, Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, Isaac Bashevis Singer's short stories, and James Joyce's Ulysses were all published during 1988-1989, and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, Saul Bellow's Herzog, and the poetry of Ezra Pound, Chaim Nachum Bialik, and Czeslaw Milosz have all been promised for 1990.' It is as if permission were given, a list of forbidden books were consulted, translations were commissioned, and the books were published. In the case of Joyce, for example, Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and Ulysses was published in 1989. Surely, it would seem, the Russian Ulysses was a child of glasnost.

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 191-192
Author(s):  
Sally March

Well, I moved to London thirty years ago, and I joined a small American law firm that was about to open in Moscow, to take advantage of the new opportunities for foreign companies to invest in what was then the Soviet Union. And I was not a Russian lawyer, and I didn't have any particular expertise in this field, but I found myself playing the role of the bridge. I was the bridge between the needs of the Western client and the abilities of the local Russian lawyers, and they were a bridge, a cultural as well as a legal bridge, for the clients to understand this brave new world in which they were trying to do business.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stig A. Nohrstedt

Abstract How has war journalism changed since the end of the Cold War? After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was talk of a new world order. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s gave rise to the concept of “new wars”. The 1990-91 Gulf War was the commercial breakthrough for the around-the-clock news channel CNN, and the war in Afghanistan in 2001 for its competitor al-Jazeera. The 2003 Iraq war saw Internet’s great breakthrough in war journalism. A new world order, new wars, and new media – what impact is all this having on war journalism? This article outlines some important trends based on recent media research and discusses the new challenges as well as the consequences they entail for the conditions of war journalism, its professional reflexivity and democratic role.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bargatzky

In these days, we live in a new Cold War. On the side of Western elites, the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as representing the End of History and a permanent triumph of democratic values. American triumphalism, an expression of the idea of Manifest Destiny, believed that America was capable of reshaping the world in its image. According to this concept, the world was entering a New World Order in which international norms and transnational principles of human rights would prevail over the traditional prerogatives of sovereign governments. Promoting regime change was considered a legitimate act of foreign policy. In reality, all of this turned out to be illusionary. Instead of promoting peace, the attempt to usher in a New American Century resulted in international terrorism and endless wars in Afghanistan and the Near East. The eastward enlargement of NATO entails the risk of nuclear war. The New World Order turns out to be a big delusion, endangering the survival of humankind.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Shearmur

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that socialism is over. (It looks to me as if this is very much open for debate. In some respects, the collapse of the Soviet Union has given Marxist socialism a new lease on life. It is no longer stuck with the heritage of “actually existing socialism,” and can, instead, develop its more plausible, critical side and tell stories of the revolution betrayed.) Be that as it may, it is now widely accepted that socialism, understood as involving the social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of markets, faces real and perhaps insuperable difficulties. For without both markets and individual ownership, it is difficult to see how problems of individual motivation and information transmission are to be tackled—to say nothing of Ludwig von Mises's underlying concern with how to make economic (as opposed to purely technical) decisions about the utilization of resources within an economy.


1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97
Author(s):  
David Robie

Review of Whose Story? Reporting the Developing World After the Cold War, edited by Jill Spelliscy and Gerald B. Sperling, Calgary, Canada: Detselig Enterprises, 1993. 242 pp. 'I get terribly angry', remarks Daniel Nelson, editor of Gemini News Service, 'when journalists take the phrase, which is completly manufactured, "New World Order"—it's absolutely meaningless. Personally I don't think there is a New World Order. I think we have the same world order, but without the Soviet Union which was never a major part of the world economy. And if you live in Katmandu or Kampala, there is no change.'


1994 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cox

Like nuclear weapons, the literature on the end of the Cold War continues to proliferate. Much of this work it has to be said has been limited in its depth (if not range) by the simple fact that the structure of the new international order has yet to assume a finished form. Writing meaningfully about a constantly evolving subject is no easy undertaking. There is also the added problem of perspective. In many ways we are still living too close to recent events to say much that is particularly profound about them. Finally, understanding the new world has been made all the more difficult by the sheer scale of the changes that have occurred since 1989. Because of the triple collapse of communism as an ideology, the Soviet Union as a European power, and the USSR as a united country our known political universe has fallen apart. Making sense of the global results is no easy job; indeed it is turning out to be an extraordinarily difficult task—one for which we may not yet have the proper conceptual tools.


Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

The struggle for oil has been at the center of international politics since the beginning of the twentieth century. Securing oil—or, more precisely, access to it—has also been at the heart of many great powers’ grand strategies during that time, particularly those in oil-poor Europe. The Continent’s geographical and geological endowments, particularly its rich coal seams, had facilitated its rise to global predominance following the conquest of the New World and the start of the Industrial Revolution, but they conspired against it during the Age of Oil. Rather than accept their relegation to second-tier status, Britain and Germany developed elaborate strategies to restore their energy independence. These efforts wound up compromising their security by inducing strategic overextension—for Britain in the Middle East, and for Germany in the Soviet Union—thereby hastening their demise as great powers. For these reasons, the history of oil is also a chapter in the story of Europe’s geopolitical decline....


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-137
Author(s):  
Taha J. Al ‘Alwani

The year which has just ended has presented the Muslim world with a majorchallenge: the bipolar world order which provided some kind of balance betweenthe East and the West disintegrated and was replaced by a unipolar one.How will this affect us?The new world order is an order controlled by a single superpowex whichhas its own philosophy, thought, and culture. If we look closely, it seems thatits philosophy stands on a collection of what appears to be mutually opposeddualities which both necessitate the various elements of conflict and make allattempts to end the resulting polarization and conflict futile. But the recentdemise of the opposite pole and the end of the Cold War does not mean thatthe world is about to witness a period of peace, tranquility, and security in theshade of this so-called new world order. hther, the inherently belligerent natureof this entirely Western-controlled civilization precludes such a development,for such an order requires an opponent, either real or imagined. In other words,if one is not readily available it will have to be created, so that the fight canbe carried on elsewhere. While many are now saying that the nature ofthe conflictmay shift from military to economic power, this does not automaticallymean that positive developments will occur or that the world can expect trueand constant security, tranquility, or peace from this civilization.It is thus all the more disconcerting that the Islamic world finds itself ina state of unpreparedness and disarray unprecedented in all of its lox history,and that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the other Western pole, leaves therole of adversary to the Islamic world. All of this suggests that the Islamic world,which is now infirm, divided, and unable to protect its own resources, will befaced with the prospect of becoming a battleground over the course of the nextfew decades.It is therefore essential that Muslim scholars, thinkers, research institutes,universities, and enlightened political elites undertake the responsibility of ensuringthat the Islamic world passes through this coming period of crisis successfully ...


Author(s):  
Herman T. Salton

This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of the so-called ‘New World Order’ which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the chapter outlines the role of DPKO during the early reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and reviews several decisions taken by the peacekeeping department. These include the size of the mission and its troop levels, the so-called ‘genocide cable’ sent by Dallaire about forthcoming ethnic massacres, and the mandate and rules of engagement of the Rwandan operation. The chapter also introduces the phenomenon of the ‘anticipatory veto’, or a tendency on the part of Secretariat officials to recommend to the Security Council only what the latter is likely to endorse.


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