Soviet Military Policy Since World War II. By William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar. Foreword by William R. Van Cleave. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. xxii, 263 pp. Figures. Tables. $21.95, cloth. $10.95, 
paper.

This chapter is set during the September 22, 1993, Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing to review General John Shalikashvili’s nomination to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It first explores the development of a controversy that breaks out after General John Shalikashvili’s nomination when a Defense Daily report and a Simon Weisenthal Center press release, based on a reading of Dimitri Shalikashvili’s own memoirs housed at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, announce that Dimitri served under the Waffen-SS during World War II. This is followed by a flashback, from Dimitri’s point of view, of how and why he joined the German war cause and what he did while serving for them. The chapter ends with an overview of the Senate confirmation hearing where Shalikashvili denies knowledge of his father’s SS association and the committee okays Shalikashvili’s confirmation, subject to a suitable replacement being found to take over his current position as SACEUR.

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The Second Imperialist War

10.5149/northcarolina/9781469635941.003.0007 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Alan M. Wald

Keyword(s):

World War Ii ◽

Literary Criticism ◽

Military Policy ◽

World War ◽

New Developments ◽

Dwight Macdonald

This chapter explains the difficulties caused for the Trotskyist movement and like-thinking Marxists by World War II, due to its combination of vexing features. Writings by James P. Cannon on “the proletarian military policy” and by Albert Goldman in the pages of the Militant newspaper are used to explain the strategy by which resistance to fascism was theorized. The alternative thinking of Dwight Macdonald and the perspectives of Meyer Schapiro and Edmund Wilson are also discussed, as well as new developments in literary criticism.

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Ethics, Technology, and Nuclear War, II : How do nuclear weapons affect our military policy?

Worldview ◽

10.1017/s0084255900006239 ◽

1963 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 3-5

Author(s):

Joseph I. Coffey

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

World War Ii ◽

Soviet Union ◽

The United States ◽

Military Policy ◽

World War ◽

Nuclear War ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

Conventional Weapons ◽

The U.S

Since the end of World War II, the United States has aimed at deterring aggression against this country or its allies by a judicious combination of longlange nuclear striking forces and other forces armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons. (The verb "to deter" is defined as "to inhibit" or, in a more absolute usage, as "to prevent." One of the ambiguities of the concept of deterrence is that no one, including ourselves, is clear as to which usage is meant, much less which may prevail.) Of late years, as the Soviet Union achieved and developed a nuclear capability, deterrence has increasingly rested on the ability of the United States to launch a devastating retaliatory blow against anyone attacking the U.S. or, by extension, our allies.

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