Evolutionarily Stable Selfing Rates of Hermaphroditic Plants in Competing and Delayed Selfing Modes with Allocation to Attractive Structures

Abstract The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) predicts the long-term evolutionary outcome of frequency-dependent selection by making a number of simplifying assumptions about the genetic basis of inheritance. I use a symmetrized multilocus model of quantitative inheritance without mutation to analyze the results of interactions between pairs of related individuals and compare the equilibria to those found by ESS analysis. It is assumed that the fitness changes due to interactions can be approximated by the exponential of a quadratic surface. The major results are the following. (1) The evolutionarily stable phenotypes found by ESS analysis are always equilibria of the model studied here. (2) When relatives interact, one of the two conditions for stability of equilibria differs between the two models; this can be accounted for by positing that the inclusive fitness function for quantitative characters is slightly different from the inclusive fitness function for characters determined by a single locus. (3) The inclusion of environmental variance will in general change the equilibrium phenotype, but the equilibria of ESS analysis are changed to the same extent by environmental variance. (4) A class of genetically polymorphic equilibria occur, which in the present model are always unstable. These results expand the range of conditions under which one can validly predict the evolution of pairwise interactions using ESS analysis.

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Cultural diversity and wisdom of crowds are mutually beneficial and evolutionarily stable

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/s41598-021-95914-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Benoît de Courson ◽

Léo Fitouchi ◽

Jean-Philippe Bouchaud ◽

Michael Benzaquen

Keyword(s):

Social Learning ◽

Information Seeking ◽

Information Quality ◽

Evolutionary Model ◽

Division Of Labour ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Wisdom Of Crowds ◽

Human Species ◽

Evolutionarily Stable ◽

Individual Information

AbstractThe ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning’s efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality—allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning’s higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionarily-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria.

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SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

International Journal of Modern Physics C ◽

10.1142/s0129183103005091 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 14 (07) ◽

pp. 963-971 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

E. AHMED ◽

A. S. HEGAZI ◽

A. S. ELGAZZAR

Keyword(s):

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Initial Conditions ◽

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Theoretical Explanation ◽

Battle Of The Sexes ◽

Different Types ◽

Evolutionarily Stable ◽

Rules Of The Game

The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.

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