Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings

1994 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randolph P. Beatty ◽  
Edward J. Zajac
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Public Offerings

scholarly journals The two-tier board system and underpricing of initial public offerings: Evidence from Austria

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 352-362
Author(s):  
Lalith P. Samarakoon ◽  
Palani-Rajan Kadapakkam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Board System

We study the relation between initial IPO underpricing and two-tier board structure in the Vienna Stock Exchange of Austria, where a two-tier board is mandatory for listed companies. The board ratio, defined as the size of the supervisory board to the management board, is used to capture the effect of two-tiered board on underpricing. The results show that the board ratio is negatively related with underpricing, consistent with the agency theory which predicts that more effective monitoring implied in a relatively larger supervisory board will lead to lower agency costs, and thus lower underpricing. The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and suggest that firms seeking to raise external capital will be helped by adopting strong corporate governance standards.

scholarly journals Do Private Firms Outperform SOE Firms after Going Public in China Given their Different Governance Characteristics?

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenghui Tong ◽  
Eddy Junarsin
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Business Climate ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Government

This study examines the characteristics of board structure that affect Chinese public firm’s financial performance. Using a sample of 871 firms with 699 observations of previously private firms and 1,914 observations of previously state-owned enterprise (SOE) firms, we investigate the differences in corporate governance between publicly listed firms that used to be pure private firms before going public and listed firms that used to be SOEs before their initial public offerings (IPOs). Our main finding is that previously private firms outperform previously SOE firms in China after IPOs. In the wake of becoming listed firms, previously SOE firms might be faced with difficulties adjusting to professional business practices to build and extend competitive advantages. In addition, favorable policies and assistance from the government to the SOE firms might have triggered complacency, especially in early years after getting listed. On the other hand, professional savvy and acumen, combined with efficiency and favorable business climate created by the government have probably led the previously private firms to improve their values stronger and faster.          

IPOs and Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Douglas Michael Wright ◽  
Garry D. Bruton
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firms ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Ipo Performance ◽  
The Impact

This article discusses various aspects of corporate governance and initial public offerings (IPOs). It begins with an analysis of agency theory that addresses IPOs and corporate governance research, together with the impact of governance on investors. It then considers three aspects of corporate governance that are relevant to outside investors to the IPO: the IPO firm’s board of directors, executive compensation, and ownership concentration. It also examines how national institutions affect corporate governance worldwide and looks at two types of IPOs backed by private equity (PE): venture capital backed IPOs of entrepreneurial firms and PE-backed buyouts of companies that subsequently launch an IPO. The article also analyzes the link between information asymmetries and IPO performance before concluding with an outline of directions for future research that focus on important issues relating to IPOs and corporate governance.

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