Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills

1998 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 499 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Bizjak ◽  
Christopher J. Marquette
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Duarte Pitta Ferraz ◽  
Ilídio Tomás Lopes ◽  
Simon Hitzelberger

Author(s):  
Nickolay Gantchev ◽  
Mariassunta Giannetti

Abstract We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to receive majority support, but they occasionally pass if shareholders mistakenly support them and may even be implemented due to directors’ career concerns. While gadfly proposals destroy shareholder value if they pass, shareholder proposals on average are value enhancing in firms with more informed shareholders. We conclude that more informed voting could increase the benefits associated with shareholder proposals.


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