Self-Selection and the Pricing of Bank Services: An Analysis of the Market for Loan Commitments and the Role of Compensating Balance Requirements

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 725 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher James
Author(s):  
Elliot B. Weininger ◽  
Annette Lareau

Decades after the publication of his key works, Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of education remains the object of persistent misunderstanding. A coherent account of this work must distinguish, at minimum, two phases to Bourdieu’s thoughts on education. During the early period, Bourdieu asserted the salience of both self-selection and institutional selection in shunting students into class destinations that echoed their class origins. However, these works were uniformly devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the (then) contemporary French system, considered to be an exemplar of a distinct (“traditionalistic”) institutional form. In contrast, Bourdieu’s later work sought to develop a model of the relation between education and social inequality that had significant cross-national scope. This work de-emphasized the role of self-selection, and developed a substantially more nuanced account of the relation between education and social mobility. What Bourdieu terms the “scholastic mode of reproduction” in this period denotes a system in which children from the upper reaches of the class structure are systematically advantaged in the pursuit of social rewards by virtue of their inherited cultural capital, yet nevertheless face a real risk of downward mobility. For this reason, we term it a theory of “imperfect social reproduction.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Guan ◽  
Donggen Wang ◽  
Xinyu Jason Cao
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  

1986 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria G. Miller ◽  
Joseph F. Teates
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 1953-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald J. Schepker ◽  
Won-Yong Oh ◽  
Pankaj C. Patel

Signaling theory suggests that firms send signals to stakeholders to reduce information asymmetry. Research, however, has rarely examined how investors interpret signals that are equivocal. We suggest that sensemaking serves as an important process by which investors interpret firm signals, and salient contextual cues influence the sensemaking process. We examine an equivocal signal, the adoption of a poison pill, as a means of examining investor interpretation of the signal and the role of contextual cues in influencing interpretation. Using a sample of 578 poison pill adoptions and controlling for self-selection, we find that investors react negatively to poison pills adopted to protect net operating losses (NOL poison pills) but positively to poison pills adopted when the firm is in receipt of a takeover offer (in-play poison pills). Assessing the role of contextual cues, our results suggest that CEO duality, the proportion of inside directors on the firm’s board, the firm’s R&D investments, and industry concentration also condition investor response to specific-purpose poison pill adoption. Our study contributes to research on signaling theory, sensemaking, and corporate governance by examining how investors interpret a firm’s equivocal governance decisions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 96-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Barfort ◽  
Nikolaj A. Harmon ◽  
Frederik Hjorth ◽  
Asmus Leth Olsen

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social versus pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark. (JEL D73, H83, J31, J45)


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janne Boone-Heinonen ◽  
Penny Gordon-Larsen ◽  
David K. Guilkey ◽  
David R. Jacobs ◽  
Barry M. Popkin

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document