Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eli Talmor
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Information Signaling

scholarly journals Financial manager decisions in small and medium Tunisian firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-464
Author(s):  
Salah Ben Hamad
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Exploratory Analysis ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Financing Decision ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Behavioural Aspects ◽  
Medium Firms

The agency framework has shifted research in the theory of finance from the traditional quantitative analysis towards a richer analysis that incorporates the behavioural aspects. In this paper we implement an exploratory analysis in order to pick up the behaviour of the managers of small and medium firms (SMF) in financial decisions making. An Important finding in our research is that the traditional Modigliani and Miller framework cannot be merely translated to analyse the financing decision in a context of asymmetric information and agency conflicts among the different corporate actors. Empirical evidence is performed on a sample of Tunisian SMF

Choosing for you: Diminished self–other discrepancies in financial decisions under risk in the elderly.

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 871-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narun Pornpattananangkul ◽  
Bing Cai Kok ◽  
Jingwen Chai ◽  
Yi Huang ◽  
Lei Feng ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Elderly ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Decisions Under Risk

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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