Ehud Hrushovski. Unidimensional theories are superstable. Annals of pure and applied logic, vol. 50 (1990), pp. 117–138. - Ehud Hrushovski. Almost orthogonal regular types. Annals of pure and applied logic, vol. 45 (1989), pp. 139–155.

1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 762-763
Author(s):  
Frank Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Applied Logic

Basic Problems of Logic in Drug Investigations

1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 248-253
Author(s):  
H. Röpke
Keyword(s):  
Animal Experiments ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Applied Logic ◽  
Clinical Investigations

The basic problems of the theory of cognition when extrapolating the results of animal experiments to man and the limitations of inferences from clinical investigations of drugs are discussed from the point of view of applied logic.

What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trudy Govier
Keyword(s):  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Applied Logic ◽  
Slippery Slope Arguments ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Logical Error

Slippery slope arguments are commonly thought to be fallacious. But is there a single fallacy which they all commit? A study of applied logic texts reveals competing diagnoses of the supposed error, and several recent authors take slippery slope arguments seriously. Clearly, there is room for comment. I shall give evidence of divergence on the question of what sort of argument constitutes a slippery slope, distinguish four different types of argument which have all been deemed to be slippery slopes, and contend that two of these types need involve no logical error.We find in textbook accounts three quite differently oriented treatments of slippery slope: conceptual — relating to vagueness and the ancient sorites paradox; precedential — relating to the need to treat similar cases consistently; and causal — relating to the avoidance of actions which will, or would be likely to, set off a series of undersirable events.

Applied logic--Method.

2009 ◽  
pp. 184-221
Author(s):  
Lyman H. Atwater
Keyword(s):  
Applied Logic ◽  
Logic Method

Common-sense reasoning, theories of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Horty
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Reasoning ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
Applied Logic ◽  
Common Sense Reasoning ◽  
New Information ◽  
Logical Study ◽  
Reasoning Agent

The task of formalizing common-sense reasoning within a logical framework can be viewed as an extension of the programme of formalizing mathematical and scientific reasoning that has occupied philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century. The most significant progress in applying logical techniques to the study of common-sense reasoning has been made, however, not by philosophers, but by researchers in artificial intelligence, and the logical study of common-sense reasoning is now a recognized sub-field of that discipline. The work involved in this area is similar to what one finds in philosophical logic, but it tends to be more detailed, since the ultimate goal is to encode the information that would actually be needed to drive a reasoning agent. Still, the formal study of common-sense reasoning is not just a matter of applied logic, but has led to theoretical advances within logic itself. The most important of these is the development of a new field of ‘non-monotonic’ logic, in which the conclusions supported by a set of premises might have to be withdrawn as the premise set is supplemented with new information.

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