Counting the maximal intermediate constructive logics

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 1365-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Ferrari ◽  
Pierangelo Miglioli

AbstractA proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise “constructively incompatible constructive logics”. We use a notion of “semiconstructive” logic and define wide sets of “constructive” logics by representing the “constructive” logics as “limits” of decreasing sequences of “semiconstructive” logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, “fitrations over rank formulas” are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of “constructive” logics are “constructively incompatible”.

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobu-Yuki Suzuki

We discuss relationships among the existence property, the disjunction property, and their weak variants in the setting of intermediate predicate logics. We deal with the weak and sentential existence properties, and the Z-normality, which is a weak variant of the disjunction property. These weak variants were presented in the author’s previous paper [16]. In the present paper, the Kripke sheaf semantics is used.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Emilie Pinard

This paper examines the transformation of the housing typology in informal neighbourhoods located on the periphery of Dakar, Senegal. More specifically, it documents the spatial logics and factors guiding the construction of new multi-storey houses called “villas”, which are significantly transforming the landscape of the city. Studies have thus far examined villas through the lenses of migrants’ investments and lifestyles, associating these houses with new functions and decorative elements and materials inspired by time spent abroad, with innovative ways of building and dwelling that disrupt more popular housing practices. Based upon an architectural survey of seventeen houses and the detailed stories of their construction, this paper argues that while the Senegalese villa is influenced by global networks and symbols of success, it is also deeply rooted in popular housing forms and building practices. Moreover, because house-building processes are predominantly incremental, the construction of this new house type is not limited to migrants and other privileged dwellers. Although at different speeds, most residents are building and transforming their houses according to spatial and constructive logics characteristic of villas. These results have implications for housing policies and programmes because they contribute to challenging assumptions about residential production, new housing typologies and the pivotal actors of these urban transformations.


1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 748-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Scedrov

Myhill [12] extended the ideas of Shapiro [15], and proposed a system of epistemic set theory IST (based on modal S4 logic) in which the meaning of the necessity operator is taken to be the intuitive provability, as formalized in the system itself. In this setting one works in classical logic, and yet it is possible to make distinctions usually associated with intuitionism, e.g. a constructive existential quantifier can be expressed as (∃x) □ …. This was first confirmed when Goodman [7] proved that Shapiro's epistemic first order arithmetic is conservative over intuitionistic first order arithmetic via an extension of Gödel's modal interpretation [6] of intuitionistic logic.Myhill showed that whenever a sentence □A ∨ □B is provable in IST, then A is provable in IST or B is provable in IST (the disjunction property), and that whenever a sentence ∃x.□A(x) is provable in IST, then so is A(t) for some closed term t (the existence property). He adapted the Friedman slash [4] to epistemic systems.Goodman [8] used Epistemic Replacement to formulate a ZF-like strengthening of IST, and proved that it was a conservative extension of ZF and that it had the disjunction and existence properties. It was then shown in [13] that a slight extension of Goodman's system with the Epistemic Foundation (ZFER, cf. §1) suffices to interpret intuitionistic ZF set theory with Replacement (ZFIR, [10]). This is obtained by extending Gödel's modal interpretation [6] of intuitionistic logic. ZFER still had the properties of Goodman's system mentioned above.


1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1099-1124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierluigi Minari ◽  
Mitio Takano ◽  
Hiroakira Ono

AbstractFor each ordinal α > 0, L(α) is the intermediate predicate logic characterized by the class of all Kripke frames with the poset α and with constant domain. This paper will be devoted to a study of logics of the form L(α). It will be shown that for each uncountable ordinal of the form α + η with a finite or a countable η(> 0), there exists a countable ordinal of the form β + η such that L(α + η) = L(β + η). On the other hand, such a reduction of ordinals to countable ones is impossible for a logic L(α) if α is an uncountable regular ordinal. Moreover, it will be proved that the mapping L is injective if it is restricted to ordinals less than ωω, i.e. α ≠ β implies L(α) ≠ L(β) for each ordinal α, β ≤ ωω.


1989 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierangelo Miglioli ◽  
Ugo Moscato ◽  
Mario Ornaghi ◽  
Silvia Quazza ◽  
Gabriele Usberti
Keyword(s):  

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay

The intuitionistic propositional logic I has the following disjunction property This property does not characterize intuitionistic logic. For example Kreisel and Putnam [5] showed that the extension of I with the axiomhas the disjunction property. Another known system with this propery is due to Scott [5], and is obtained by adding to I the following axiom:In the present paper we shall prove, using methods originally introduced by Segerberg [10], that the Kreisel-Putnam logic is decidable. In fact we shall show that it has the finite model property, and since it is finitely axiomatizable, it is decidable by [4]. The decidability of Scott's system was proved by J. G. Anderson in his thesis in 1966.


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