The Complexity of intrinsically r.e. subsets of existentially decidable models

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1213-1232 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Chisholm

Recursive model theory involves the study of relationships between recursion theory and model theory. One direction this often takes is to study the effectiveness of various aspects of model theory. This paper examines such questions by examining some properties of recursive models; that is, models whose basic relations, functions, and constants are all uniformly recursive (and whose universe is the set of natural numbers). Somewhat more precisely:Let be a model whose universe is N, and let (θ())i be an effective enumeration of all quantifier-free formulas of the language of . Then is recursive if {〈, i〉: satisfies (θ())i, in } is a recursive subset of N. (Here and throughout the paper, 〈 〉 denotes an effective pairing function, or an effective coding of sequences, as required.) Similarly, let (ϕ())i be an effective enumeration of all existential formulas of the language of . Then is existentially decidable if {〈, i〉: satisfies (ϕ())i in } is a recursive subset of N.It is clear that if is recursive and is a model isomorphic to , then may lose many of the recursive properties of . In the simplest example, could easily fail to be a recursive model. But even if we require that be a recursive model, it could still fail to retain other recursive properties of . An example of the sort of property which can be studied in this vein is the following notion, introduced by Ash and Nerode in [2].

2011 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uri Andrews

AbstractWe employ an infinite-signature Hrushovski amalgamation construction to yield two results in Recursive Model Theory. The first result, that there exists a strongly minimal theory whose only recursively presentable models are the prime and saturated models, adds a new spectrum to the list of known possible spectra. The second result, that there exists a strongly minimal theory in a finite language whose only recursively presentable model is saturated, gives the second non-trivial example of a spectrum produced in a finite language.


1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1168-1191 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Chisholm

Recursive model theory is supposed to be the study of the effectiveness of constructions and theorems in model theory. This often involves getting “effective” versions of various classical model-theoretic notions. The traditional way of doing this is to restrict attention to recursive models, and recursive isomorphisms between them, etc. Thus for example the following definition appears in the literature (in [3] and [1]).Definition. Given a recursive model A and an n Є ω, a subset R ⊆ An is called intrinsically r.e. provided that for every recursive model B ≈ A, the isomorphic image in B of R is an r.e. subset of Bn.It is clear that if R is definable by a (recursive, infinitary) Σ10 formula (with finitely many parameters from A), then R is intrinsically r.e. It seems natural for the converse to be true. Indeed, provided that (A, R) is sufficiently “regular” in a sense made precise in a theorem of Ash and Nerode (see [3]), the converse is true. However, if we drop the (rather strong) regularity conditions, there exist “pathological” examples of intrinsically r.e. relations which are not definable by a Σ10 formula (see [7]).In this paper, we suggest a rather different approach to studying the effectiveness of model theory, an approach we have dubbed “effective model theory”. The basic idea is to allow arbitrary nonrecursive models, but to require all notions to be relativized to the complexity of the models involved. (Much the same notion has been used in [2] under the name “relatively recursive model theory”.) Thus for example we have the following effective model theory version of the property of being intrinsically r.e.


1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 824-832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Hay ◽  
Douglas Miller

Ever since Craig-Beth and Addison-Kleene proved their versions of the Lusin-Suslin theorem, work in model theory and recursion theory has demonstrated the value of classical descriptive set theory as a source of ideas and inspirations. During the sixties in particular, J.W. Addison refined the technique of “conjecture by analogy” and used it to generate a substantial number of results in both model theory and recursion theory (see, e.g., Addison [1], [2], [3]).During the past 15 years, techniques and results from recursion theory and model theory have played an important role in the development of descriptive set theory. (Moschovakis's book [6] is an excellent reference, particularly for the use of recursion-theoretic tools.) The use of “conjecture by analogy” as a means of transferring ideas from model theory and recursion theory to descriptive set theory has developed more slowly. Some notable recent examples of this phenomenon are in Vaught [9], where some results in invariant descriptive set theory reflecting and extending model-theoretic results are obtained and others are left as conjectures (including a version of the well-known conjecture on the number of countable models) and in Hrbacek and Simpson [4], where a notion analogous to that of Turing reducibility is used to study Borel isomorphism types. Moschovakis [6] describes in detail an effective descriptive set theory based in large part on classical recursion theory.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 268-286
Author(s):  
YONG CHENG

AbstractIn this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem ($\textsf {G1}$ for short). We first define the notion “$\textsf {G1}$ holds for the theory $T$”. This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory T such that Robinson’s $\mathbf {R}$ interprets T but T does not interpret $\mathbf {R}$ (i.e., T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation) and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Jeřábek’s work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle $, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf {0}< \mathbf {d}<\mathbf {0}^{\prime }$, there is a theory T with Turing degree $\mathbf {d}$ such that $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T and T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds.


Author(s):  
Harold Hodes

A reducibility is a relation of comparative computational complexity (which can be made precise in various non-equivalent ways) between mathematical objects of appropriate sorts. Much of recursion theory concerns such relations, initially between sets of natural numbers (in so-called classical recursion theory), but later between sets of other sorts (in so-called generalized recursion theory). This article considers only the classical setting. Also Turing first defined such a relation, now called Turing- (or just T-) reducibility; probably most logicians regard it as the most important such relation. Turing- (or T-) degrees are the units of computational complexity when comparative complexity is taken to be T-reducibility.


Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

This article explores the role of logic in philosophical methodology, as well as its application in philosophy. The discussion gives a roughly equal coverage to the seven branches of logic: elementary logic, set theory, model theory, recursion theory, proof theory, extraclassical logics, and anticlassical logics. Mathematical logic comprises set theory, model theory, recursion theory, and proof theory. Philosophical logic in the relevant sense is divided into the study of extensions of classical logic, such as modal or temporal or deontic or conditional logics, and the study of alternatives to classical logic, such as intuitionistic or quantum or partial or paraconsistent logics. The nonclassical consists of the extraclassical and the anticlassical, although the distinction is not clearcut.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document