Equality and lyndon's interpolation theorem

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuyoshi Motohashi
Keyword(s):  
Interpolation Theorem ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Original Form ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
First Order ◽  
Classical Predicate

In this paper, we remark on some properties of equality that tend to be neglected and use them to give a proof of an extension of Lyndon's interpolation theorem. Let LK be a first order classical predicate calculus and LK= a first order classical predicate calculus with equality. We assume that LK and LK= have the propositional constant Τ (truth). For each formula F in LK=, let Rel+ (F), Rel− (F), Rel(F), and Fun(F) be the set of all the predicate symbols which occur in F positively, the set of all the predicate symbols which occur in F negatively, the set of all the predicate symbols which occur in F, and the set of all the function symbols which occur in F.Theorem A (Lyndon [5]). Suppose that A and B are sentences in LK such that A ⊃ B is provable in LK. Then there is a sentence C in LK such that:(i) A ⊃ C and C ⊃ B are provable in LK;(ii) and(iii) .The sentence C which satisfies (i), (ii), (iii) in Theorem A is said to be an interpolant for A ⊃ B in Theorem A. Note that condition (iii) is not included in the original form of Lyndon's interpolation theorem (cf. [5]), but we can easily add this condition. Also, there is some obscurity in the original formulation with regard to the equality symbol. For example, Lyndon writes: “The theorem takes the same form whether or not we admit a predicate denoting identity, with suitable axioms, to the predicate calculus” [5, p. 129].

Resolution systems and their applications I

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-268
Author(s):  
Ewa Orłowska
Keyword(s):  
Theorem Proving ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Resolution Method ◽  
First Order ◽  
Deductive Systems ◽  
Resolution System ◽  
Resolution Principle ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Classical Predicate

The central method employed today for theorem-proving is the resolution method introduced by J. A. Robinson in 1965 for the classical predicate calculus. Since then many improvements of the resolution method have been made. On the other hand, treatment of automated theorem-proving techniques for non-classical logics has been started, in connection with applications of these logics in computer science. In this paper a generalization of a notion of the resolution principle is introduced and discussed. A certain class of first order logics is considered and deductive systems of these logics with a resolution principle as an inference rule are investigated. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called resolution completeness of such systems are given. A generalized Herbrand property for a logic is defined and its connections with the resolution-completeness are presented. A class of binary resolution systems is investigated and a kind of a normal form for derivations in such systems is given. On the ground of the methods developed the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is described and the resolution systems for some non-classical logics are outlined. A method of program synthesis based on the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is presented. A notion of a resolution-interpretability of a logic L in another logic L ′ is introduced. The method of resolution-interpretability consists in establishing a relation between formulas of the logic L and some sets of formulas of the logic L ′ with the intention of using the resolution system for L ′ to prove theorems of L. It is shown how the method of resolution-interpretability can be used to prove decidability of sets of unsatisfiable formulas of a given logic.

scholarly journals Elementary-base cirquent calculus II: Choice quantifiers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgi Japaridze
Keyword(s):  
Proof Theory ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Complete Axiomatization ◽  
Calculus I ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Classical Predicate

Abstract Cirquent calculus is a novel proof theory permitting component-sharing between logical expressions. Using it, the predecessor article ‘Elementary-base cirquent calculus I: Parallel and choice connectives’ built the sound and complete axiomatization $\textbf{CL16}$ of a propositional fragment of computability logic. The atoms of the language of $\textbf{CL16}$ represent elementary, i.e. moveless, games and the logical vocabulary consists of negation, parallel connectives and choice connectives. The present paper constructs the first-order version $\textbf{CL17}$ of $\textbf{CL16}$, also enjoying soundness and completeness. The language of $\textbf{CL17}$ augments that of $\textbf{CL16}$ by including choice quantifiers. Unlike classical predicate calculus, $\textbf{CL17}$ turns out to be decidable.

Undecidability of modal and intermediate first-order logics with two individual variables

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 800-823 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. Gabbay ◽  
V. B. Shehtman
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
First Order ◽  
Short Summary ◽  
Binary Predicate ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Predicate

The interest in fragments of predicate logics is motivated by the well-known fact that full classical predicate calculus is undecidable (cf. Church [1936]). So it is desirable to find decidable fragments which are in some sense “maximal”, i.e., which become undecidable if they are “slightly” extended. Or, alternatively, we can look for “minimal” undecidable fragments and try to identify the vague boundary between decidability and undecidability. A great deal of work in this area concerning mainly classical logic has been done since the thirties. We will not give a complete review of decidability and undecidability results in classical logic, referring the reader to existing monographs (cf. Suranyi [1959], Lewis [1979], and Dreben, Goldfarb [1979]). A short summary can also be found in the well-known book Church [1956]. Let us recall only several facts. Herein we will consider only logics without functional symbols, constants, and equality.(C1) The fragment of the classical logic with only monadic predicate letters is decidable (cf. Behmann [1922]).(C2) The fragment of the classical logic with a single binary predicate letter is undecidable. (This is a consequence of Gödel [1933].)(C3) The fragment of the classical logic with a single individual variable is decidable; in fact it is equivalent to Lewis S5 (cf. Wajsberg [1933]).(C4) The fragment of the classical logic with two individual variables is decidable (Segerberg [1973] contains a proof using modal logic; Scott [1962] and Mortimer [1975] give traditional proofs.)(C5) The fragment of the classical logic with three individual variables and binary predicate letters is undecidable (cf. Surańyi [1943]). In fact this paper considers formulas of the following typeφ,ψ being quantifier-free and the set of binary predicate letters which can appear in φ or ψ being fixed and finite.

scholarly journals An elimination theorem of uniqueness conditions in the intuitionistic predicate calculus

1982 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 223-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuyoshi Motohashi
Keyword(s):  
Free Variable ◽  
The Other ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Classical Predicate

This paper is a sequel to Motohashi [4]. In [4], a series of theorems named “elimination theorems of uniqueness conditions” was shown to hold in the classical predicate calculus LK. But, these results have the following two defects : one is that they do not hold in the intuitionistic predicate calculus LJ, and the other is that they give no nice axiomatizations of some sets of sentences concerned. In order to explain these facts more explicitly, let us introduce some necessary notations and definitions. Let L be a first order classical predicate calculus LK or a first order intuitionistic predicate calculus LJ. n-ary formulas in L are formulas F(ā) in L with a sequence ā of distinct free variables of length n such that every free variable in F occurs in ā.

Two interpolation theorems for a predicate calculus

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-270
Author(s):  
Shoji Maehara ◽  
Gaisi Takeuti
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Interpolation Theorem ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Cut Elimination ◽  
First Order ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

A second order formula is called Π1 if, in its prenex normal form, all second order quantifiers are universal. A sequent F1, … Fm → G1 …, Gn is called Π1 if a formulais Π1If we consider only Π1 sequents, then we can easily generalize the completeness theorem for the cut-free first order predicate calculus to a cut-free Π1 predicate calculus.In this paper, we shall prove two interpolation theorems on the Π1 sequent, and show that Chang's theorem in [2] is a corollary of our theorem. This further supports our belief that any form of the interpolation theorem is a corollary of a cut-elimination theorem. We shall also show how to generalize our results for an infinitary language. Our method is proof-theoretic and an extension of a method introduced in Maehara [5]. The latter has been used frequently to prove the several forms of the interpolation theorem.

Decidability of some intuitionistic predicate theories

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Reduction Method ◽  
Abelian Groups ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Classical Counterpart ◽  
First Order ◽  
Intuitionistic Theory ◽  
Classical Predicate

Suppose T is a first order intuitionistic theory (more precisely, a theory of Heyting's predicate calculus, e.g., abelian groups, one unary function, dense linear order, etc.) presented to us by a set of axioms (denoted also by) T.Question. Is T decidable?One knows that if the classical counterpart of T (i.e., take the same axioms but with the classical predicate calculus as the underlying logic) is not decidable, then T cannot be decidable. The problem remains for theories whose classical counterpart is decidable. In [8], sufficient conditions for undecidability were given, and several intuitionistic theories such as abelian groups and unary functions (both with decidable equality) were shown to be undecidable. In this note we show decidability results (see Theorems 1 and 2 below), and compare these results with the undecidability results previously obtained. The method we use is the reduction-method, described fully in [12] and widely applied in [3], which is applied here roughly as follows:Let T be a given theory of Heyting's predicate calculus. We know that Heyting's predicate calculus is complete for the Kripke-model type of semantics. We choose a class M of Kripke models for which T is complete, i.e., all axioms of T are valid in any model of the class and whenever φ is not a theorem of T, φ is false in some model of M.

scholarly journals On the Definitional Embeddability of the Combinatory Logic Theory into the First-Order Predicate Calculus

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-14
Author(s):  
В. И. Шалак
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Computability Theory ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Combinatory Logic ◽  
Applied Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
Computable Functions ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus ◽  
Classical Predicate

In this article we prove a theorem on the definitional embeddability of the combinatory logic into the first-order predicate calculus without equality. Since all efficiently computable functions can be represented in the combinatory logic, it immediately follows that they can be represented in the first-order classical predicate logic. So far mathematicians studied the computability theory as some applied theory. From our theorem it follows that the notion of computability is purely logical. This result will be of interest not only for logicians and mathematicians but also for philosophers who study foundations of logic and its relation to mathematics.

APC: The Algorithmic Predicate Calculus

1981 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-367
Author(s):  
Wojciech Przyłuski
Keyword(s):  
Time Scale ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Algorithmic Logic ◽  
Classical Predicate

The paper presents a logic which is an algorithmic extension of the classical predicate calculus and is based on the ideas given by F. Kröger. The programs and the effects of their execution are the formulas of this logic which are considered at any time scale. There are many interesting properties of the logic which are connected with the notion of time scale. These properties are examined in the paper. Moreover the problem of the formulas normalization is presented. Our logic is compared with the algorithmic logic introduced by A. Salwicki. Next, the usefulness of a new logic in the theory of programs is shown.

A reduction class containing formulas with one monadic predicate and one binary function symbol

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Charles E. Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Conjunctive Normal Form ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Binary Function ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Reduction Class ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

AbstractA new reduction class is presented for the satisfiability problem for well-formed formulas of the first-order predicate calculus. The members of this class are closed prenex formulas of the form ∀x∀yC. The matrix C is in conjunctive normal form and has no disjuncts with more than three literals, in fact all but one conjunct is unary. Furthermore C contains but one predicate symbol, that being unary, and one function symbol which symbol is binary.

scholarly journals On an interpretation of second order quantification in first order intuitionistic propositional logic

1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Pitts
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Heyting Algebra ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Interpolation Theorem ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Heyting Algebras ◽  
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus ◽  
Algebraic Counterpart

AbstractWe prove the following surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. Consider the collection of formulas, ϕ, built up from propositional variables (p, q, r, …) and falsity (⊥) using conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) and implication (→). Write ⊢ϕ to indicate that such a formula is intuitionistically valid. We show that for each variable p and formula ϕ there exists a formula Apϕ (effectively computable from ϕ), containing only variables not equal to p which occur in ϕ, and such that for all formulas ψ not involving p, ⊢ψ → Apϕ if and only if ⊢ψ → ϕ. Consequently quantification over propositional variables can be modelled in IpC, and there is an interpretation of the second order propositional calculus, IpC2, in IpC which restricts to the identity on first order propositions.An immediate corollary is the strengthening of the usual interpolation theorem for IpC to the statement that there are least and greatest interpolant formulas for any given pair of formulas. The result also has a number of interesting consequences for the algebraic counterpart of IpC, the theory of Heyting algebras. In particular we show that a model of IpC2 can be constructed whose algebra of truth-values is equal to any given Heyting algebra.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document