Haim Gaifman. Models and types of Peano's arithmetic. Annals of mathematical logic, vol. 9(1976), pp. 223–306. - Julia F. Knight. Omitting types in set theory and arithmetic. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 41 (1976), pp. 25–32. - Julia F. Knight. Hanf numbers for omitting types over particular theories. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 41 (1976), pp. 583–588. - Fred G. Abramson and Leo A. Harrington. Models without indiscernibles. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 41 (1976), vol. 43 (1978), pp. 572–600.

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 484-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Ressayre
10.1142/12456 ◽  
2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cenzer ◽  
Jean Larson ◽  
Christopher Porter ◽  
Jindrich Zapletal

Author(s):  
John Stillwell

This chapter prepares the reader's mind for reverse mathematics. As its name suggests, reverse mathematics seeks not theorems but the right axioms to prove theorems already known. Reverse mathematics began as a technical field of mathematical logic, but its main ideas have precedents in the ancient field of geometry and the early twentieth-century field of set theory. In geometry, the parallel axiom is the right axiom to prove many theorems of Euclidean geometry, such as the Pythagorean theorem. Set theory offers a more modern example: base theory called ZF, a theorem that ZF cannot prove (the well-ordering theorem) and the “right axiom” for proving it—the axiom of choice. From these and similar examples one can guess at a base theory for analysis, and the “right axioms” for proving some of its well-known theorems.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-726
Author(s):  
Alexander Roberts

AbstractFollowing Smiley’s (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, 113–134 1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Humberstone (Reports on Mathematical Logic, 13, 33–42 1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s now standard account of relative necessity. In their recent article, Hale and Leech (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 1–26 2017) propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless, the current article argues that Hale & Leech’s account suffers from its own defects, some of which Hale & Leech are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an alternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet several desiderata of an account of relative necessity.


1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang

In mathematics, when we want to introduce classes which fulfill certain conditions, we usually prove beforehand that classes fulfilling such conditions do exist, and that such classes are uniquely determined by the conditions. The statements which state such unicity and existence of classes are in mathematical logic consequences of the principles of extensionality and class existence. In order to illustrate how these principles enable us to introduce classes into systems of mathematical logic, let us consider the manner in which Gödel introduces classes in his book on set theory.For instance, before introducing the definition of the non-ordered pair of two classesGödel puts down as its justification the following two axioms:By A4, for every two classesyandzthere exists at least one non-ordered pairwof them; and by A3,wis uniquely determined in A4.


10.1142/11324 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cenzer ◽  
Jean Larson ◽  
Christopher Porter ◽  
Jindrich Zapletal

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