Rolf Schock. Contributions to syntax, semantics, and the philosophy of science. Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 5 no. 4 (for 1964, pub. 1965), pp. 241–289.

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-423
Author(s):  
Theodore Hailperin
1949 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Martin

The purpose of this note is (i) to point out an important similarity between the nominalistic system discussed by Quine in his recent paper On universals and the system of logic (the system н) developed by the author in A homogeneous system for formal logic, (ii) to offer certain corrections to the latter, and (iii) to show that that system (н) is adequate for the general theory of ancestrale and for the definition of any general recursive function of natural numbers.Nominalism as a thesis in the philosophy of science, according to Quine, is the view that it is possible to construct a language adequate for the purposes of science, which in no wise admits classes, properties, relations, or other abstract objects as values for variables.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1251-1258
Author(s):  
A. James Gregor

It is impossible to tender a reply to Professor Gunnell's essay, “Deduction, Explanation and Social Scientific Inquiry,” that would be both brief and adequate. It would be impossible to be brief because Gunnell conjures up a tagraggery of issues, none of which he seems prepared and/or disposed to resolve. But no matter how extensive a reply might be, it would still be impossible to conceive it as adequate for I am not sure that I, or anyone else, can determine precisely what he means to say in the essay before us. It is impossible for me to determine with any specificity whatsoever, for example, what it means to say:Logical empiricism as an approach to the philosophy of science has been concerned with developing formal representations or reconstructions of the logical structure of scientific explanation and with a meta-logical analysis of the language applied to science. In this view there is a very strict correlation between the philosophy of science and formal logic.I haven't the foggiest notion what a “metalogical analysis of the language applied to science” might mean. I had always understood “metalogic” to refer to discourse employing logic as its object language—just as metamathematics would be a language employed in the analysis of mathematics as an object language.


1990 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-275
Author(s):  
William Bechtel

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet R. Matthews

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