Formalisations of further ℵ0-valued Łukasiewicz propositional calculi

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Rose

It has been shown that, for all rational numbers r such that 0≤ r ≤ 1, the ℵ0-valued Łukasiewicz propositional calculus whose designated truth-values are those truth-values x such that r ≤ x ≤ 1 may be formalised completely by means of finitely many axiom schemes and primitive rules of procedure. We shall consider now the case where r is rational, 0≥r≤1 and the designated truth-values are those truth-values x such that r≤x≤1.We note that, in the subcase of the previous case where r = 1, a complete formalisation is given by the following four axiom schemes together with the rule of modus ponens (with respect to C),the functor A being defined in the usual way. The functors B, K, L will also be considered to be defined in the usual way. Let us consider now the functor Dαβ such that if P, Dαβ take the truth-values x, dαβ(x) respectively, α, β are relatively prime integers and r = α/β thenIt follows at once from a theorem of McNaughton that the functor Dαβ is definable in terms of C and N in an effective way. If r = 0 we make the definitionWe note first that if x ≤ α/β then dαβ(x)≤(β + 1)α/β − α = α/β. HenceLet us now define the functions dnαβ(x) (n = 0,1,…) bySinceit follows easily thatand thatThus, if x is designated, x − α/β > 0 and, if n > − log(x − α/β)/log(β + 1), then (β + 1)n(x−α/β) > 1.

1953 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-376
Author(s):  
Alan Rose

In 1930 Łukasiewicz (3) developed an ℵ0-valued prepositional calculus with two primitives called implication and negation. The truth-values were all rational numbers satisfying 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 1 being the designated truth-value. If the truth-values of P, Q, NP, CPQ are x, y, n(x), c(x, y) respectively, then


1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branislav R. Boričić

This note is written in reply to López-Escobar's paper [L-E] where a “sequence” of intermediate propositional systems NLCn (n ≥ 1) and corresponding implicative propositional systems NLICn (n ≥ 1) is given. We will show that the “sequence” NLCn contains three different systems only. These are the classical propositional calculus NLC1, Dummett's system NLC2 and the system NLC3. Accordingly (see [C], [Hs2], [Hs3], [B 1], [B2], [Hs4], [L-E]), the problem posed in the paper [L-E] can be formulated as follows: is NLC3a conservative extension of NLIC3? Having in mind investigations of intermediate propositional calculi that give more general results of this type (see V. I. Homič [H1], [H2], C. G. McKay [Mc], T. Hosoi [Hs 1]), in this note, using a result of Homič (Theorem 2, [H1]), we will give a positive solution to this problem.NLICnand NLCn. If X and Y are propositional logical systems, by X ⊆ Y we mean that the set of all provable formulas of X is included in that of Y. And X = Y means that X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X. A(P1/B1, …, Pn/Bn) is the formula (or the sequent) obtained from the formula (or the sequent) A by substituting simultaneously B1, …, Bn for the distinct propositional variables P1, …, Pn in A.Let Cn(n ≥ 1) be the string of the following sequents:Having in mind that the calculi of sequents can be understood as meta-calculi for the deducibility relation in the corresponding systems of natural deduction (see [P]), the systems of natural deductions NLCn and NLICn (n ≥ 1), introduced in [L-E], can be identified with the calculi of sequents obtained by adding the sequents Cn as axioms to a sequential formulation of the Heyting propositional calculus and to a system of positive implication, respectively (see [C], [Ch], [K], [P]).


1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Rose

There has recently been developed a method of formalising any fragment of the propositional calculus, subject only to the condition that material implication is a primitive function of the fragmentary system considered. Tarski has stated, without proof, that when implication is the only primitive function a formulation which is weakly complete (i.e., has as theorems all expressible tautologies) is also strongly complete (i.e., provides for the deduction of any expressible formula from any which is not a tautology). The methods used by Henkin suggest the following proof of theTheorem. If in a fragment of the propositional calculus material implication can be defined in terms of the primitive functions, then any weakly complete formalisation of the fragmentary system which has for rules of procedure the substitution rule and modus ponens is also strongly complete.


1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alasdair Urquhart

In [1] Diego showed that there are only finitely many nonequivalent formulas in n variables in the positive implicational propositional calculus P. He also gave a recursive construction of the corresponding algebra of formulas, the free Hilbert algebra In on n free generators. In the present paper we give an alternative proof of the finiteness of In, and another construction of free Hilbert algebras, yielding a normal form for implicational formulas. The main new result is that In is built up from n copies of a finite Boolean algebra. The proofs use Kripke models [2] rather than the algebraic techniques of [1].Let V be a finite set of propositional variables, and let F(V) be the set of all formulas built up from V ⋃ {t} using → alone. The algebra defined on the equivalence classes , by settingis a free Hilbert algebra I(V) on the free generators . A set T ⊆ F(V) is a theory if ⊦pA implies A ∈ T, and T is closed under modus ponens. For T a theory, T[A] is the theory {B ∣ A → B ∈ T}. A theory T is p-prime, where p ∈ V, if p ∉ T and, for any A ∈ F(V), A ∈ T or A → p ∈ T. A theory is prime if it is p-prime for some p. Pp(V) denotes the set of p-prime theories in F(V), P(V) the set of prime theories. T ∈ P(V) is minimal if there is no theory in P(V) strictly contained in T. Where X = {A1, …, An} is a finite set of formulas, let X → B be A1 →····→·An → B (ϕ → B is B). A formula A is a p-formula if p is the right-most variable occurring in A, i.e. if A is of the form X → p.


1955 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 109-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bolesław Sobociński

In this Journal, vol. 18 (1953), p. 350 (Problem 7), Prof. P. Bernays proposed the following problem on propositional calculus: What is the smallest number n such that the propositional calculus, formulated with substitution and modus ponens as the only rules of inference, can be based on a set of initial formulas each of which contains at most n propositional letters (counted with multiplicity) ? In this note I give a solution to this problem, viz., that this number n = 5. For a system of propositional calculus in which the primitive functors are “C” (implication) and “N” (negation) and in which there are only two rules of inference, i.e. the rules of substitution and detachment (modus ponens), the following can be proved. (1) A set of propositional theses each of which contains at most 4 propositional letters is inadequate to give the complete bi-valued calculus of propositions. (2) There are axiom systems for this calculus in which each axiom contains at most 5 propositional letters. § 1. Consider the following normal metrix, in which the designated value is I: This satisfies the two rules of inference, and the following. (a) The law of commutation, i.e. the thesis CCpCqrCqCpr. (b) The following theses: Furthermore, in this matrix “N” is defined in such a way that: (c) For any well-formed formula α and any value m of this matrix, α = m if and only if NNα = m.


1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. F. Bausch

The Stoic “indemonstrables” were inference rules; a rule about rules was the synthetic theorem: if from certain premisses a conclusion follows and from that conclusion and certain further premisses a second conclusion follows, then the second conclusion follows from all the premisses together. Similar things occur as medieval “rules of consequence”, although not usually on a metametalevel; and (with the same proviso) the following might be deemed a contemporary avatar of that Stoic theorem.If every formula which occurs once or more often in the list A1, A2, …, An, B1, B2, …, Bm occurs also at least once in the list C1, C2, …, Cr then:This rule [Church: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 1956, pp. 94, 165], which may be called the rule of modus ponens under hypotheses (MPH), is worthy of attention for the following reasons:A. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ A yield precisely the positive implicative calculus (and very easily, too).B. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ f ⊃ f ⊃ A yield a new formulation of the full classical propositional calculus (in terms of f and ⊃).C. MPH and the axioms ∼A ⊃ A ⊃ A and A ⊃. ∼A ⊃ B yield the classical calculus in terms of ∼ and ⊃.


1945 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. B. Rosser ◽  
A. R. Turquette

In an m-valued propositional calculus, or a formalization of such a calculus, truth-value functions are allowed to take any truth-value t where 1 ≦ t ≦ m and m ≧ 2. In working with such calculi, or formalizations thereof, it has been decided to distinguish those truth-values which it is desirable for provable formulas to have from those which it is not desirable for provable formulas to have. The first class of truth-values is called designated and the second undesignated. This specification of certain of the m truth-values as designated and the remainder as undesignated is one of the distinguishing characteristics of m-valued propositional calculi, and it should be observed at the outset that two m-valued propositional calculi will be considered to differ even if they differ only in respect to the number of truth-values which are taken as designated.


1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Segerberg

Let ⊥, →, and □ be primitive, and let us have a countable supply of propositional letters. By a (modal) logic we understand a proper subset of the set of all formulas containing every tautology and being closed under modus ponens and substitution. A logic is regular if it contains every instance of □A ∧ □B ↔ □(A ∧ B) and is closed under the ruleA regular logic is normal if it contains □⊤. The smallest regular logic we denote by C (the same as Lemmon's C2), the smallest normal one by K. If L and L' are logics and L ⊆ L′, then L is a sublogic of L', and L' is an extension of L; properly so if L ≠ L'. A logic is quasi-regular (respectively, quasi-normal) if it is an extension of C (respectively, K).A logic is Post complete if it has no proper extension. The Post number, denoted by p(L), is the number of Post complete extensions of L. Thanks to Lindenbaum, we know thatThere is an obvious upper bound, too:Furthermore,.


Author(s):  
Ronald Harrop

In this paper we will be concerned primarily with weak, strong and simple models of a propositional calculus, simple models being structures of a certain type in which all provable formulae of the calculus are valid. It is shown that the finite model property defined in terms of simple models holds for all calculi. This leads to a new proof of the fact that there is no general effective method for testing, given a finite structure and a calculus, whether or not the structure is a simple model of the calculus.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document