Elementary intuitionistic theories

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Smorynski
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
General Result ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Quantifier Elimination ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
Logic Model ◽  
Intuitionistic Theory ◽  
Classical Extension

The present paper concerns itself primarily with the decision problem for formal elementary intuitionistic theories and the method is primarily model-theoretic. The chief tool is the Kripke model for which the reader may find sufficient background in Fitting's book Intuitionistic logic model theory and forcing (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969). Our notation is basically that of Fitting, the differences being to favor more standard notations in various places.The author owes a great debt to many people and would particularly like to thank S. Feferman, D. Gabbay, W. Howard, G. Kreisel, G. Mints, and R. Statman for their valuable assistance.The method of elimination of quantifiers, which has long since proven its use in classical logic, has also been applied to intuitionistic theories (i) to demonstrate decidability ([9], [15], [17]), (ii) to prove the coincidence of an intuitionistic theory with its classical extension ([9], [17]), and (iii), as we will see below, to establish relations between an intuitionistic theory and its classical extension. The most general of these results is to be obtained from the method of Lifshits' quantifier elimination for the intuitionistic theory of decidable equality.Since the details of Lifshits' proof have not been published, and since the proof yields a more general result than that stated in his abstract [15], we include the proof and several corollaries.

An embedding of classical logic in S4

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin Fitting
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Barcan Formula ◽  
Complete Sequences

There are well-known embeddings of intuitionistic logic into S4 and of classical logic into S5. In this paper we give a related embedding of (first order) classical logic directly into (first order) S4, with or without the Barcan formula. If one reads the necessity operator of S4 as ‘provable’, the translation may be roughly stated as: truth may be replaced by provable consistency. A proper statement will be found below. The proof is based ultimately on the notion of complete sequences used in Cohen's technique of forcing [1], and is given in terms of Kripke's model theory [3], [4].

THE RELEVANCE OF PREMISES TO CONCLUSIONS OF CORE PROOFS

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEIL TENNANT
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Relevance Logic ◽  
Minimal Logic ◽  
Classical Extension ◽  
The One

AbstractThe rules for Core Logic are stated, and various important results about the system are summarized. We describe its relationship to other systems, such as Classical Logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Minimal Logic, and the Anderson–Belnap relevance logic R. A precise, positive explication is offered of what it is for the premises of a proof to connect relevantly with its conclusion. This characterization exploits the notion of positive and negative occurrences of atoms in sentences. It is shown that all Core proofs are relevant in this precisely defined sense. We survey extant results about variable-sharing in rival systems of relevance logic, and find that the variable-sharing conditions established for them are weaker than the one established here for Core Logic (and for its classical extension). Proponents of other systems of relevance logic (such as R and its subsystems) are challenged to formulate a stronger variable-sharing condition, and to prove that R or any of its subsystems satisfies it, but that Core Logic does not. We give reasons for pessimism about the prospects for meeting this challenge.

scholarly journals On Correspondence between Selective CPS Transformation and Selective Double Negation Translation

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 385
Author(s):  
Hyeonseung Im
Keyword(s):  
Programming Languages ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Proof System ◽  
Double Negation

A double negation translation (DNT) embeds classical logic into intuitionistic logic. Such translations correspond to continuation passing style (CPS) transformations in programming languages via the Curry-Howard isomorphism. A selective CPS transformation uses a type and effect system to selectively translate only nontrivial expressions possibly with computational effects into CPS functions. In this paper, we review the conventional call-by-value (CBV) CPS transformation and its corresponding DNT, and provide a logical account of a CBV selective CPS transformation by defining a selective DNT via the Curry-Howard isomorphism. By using an annotated proof system derived from the corresponding type and effect system, our selective DNT translates classical proofs into equivalent intuitionistic proofs, which are smaller than those obtained by the usual DNTs. We believe that our work can serve as a reference point for further study on the Curry-Howard isomorphism between CPS transformations and DNTs.

scholarly journals On density of truth of the intuitionistic logic in one variable

2008 ◽  
Vol DMTCS Proceedings vol. AI,... (Proceedings) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zofia Kostrzycka
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Propositional Variable ◽  
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic ◽  
International Audience

International audience In this paper we focus on the intuitionistic propositional logic with one propositional variable. More precisely we consider the standard fragment $\{ \to ,\vee ,\bot \}$ of this logic and compute the proportion of tautologies among all formulas. It turns out that this proportion is different from the analog one in the classical logic case.

Logic and Philosophical Methodology

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Burgess
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Proof Theory ◽  
Recursion Theory ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Paraconsistent Logics ◽  
Philosophical Logic

This article explores the role of logic in philosophical methodology, as well as its application in philosophy. The discussion gives a roughly equal coverage to the seven branches of logic: elementary logic, set theory, model theory, recursion theory, proof theory, extraclassical logics, and anticlassical logics. Mathematical logic comprises set theory, model theory, recursion theory, and proof theory. Philosophical logic in the relevant sense is divided into the study of extensions of classical logic, such as modal or temporal or deontic or conditional logics, and the study of alternatives to classical logic, such as intuitionistic or quantum or partial or paraconsistent logics. The nonclassical consists of the extraclassical and the anticlassical, although the distinction is not clearcut.

On epistemic and ontological interpretations of intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Carnielli ◽  
Abilio Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
Technical Point ◽  
Preservation Of Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Approach ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Excluded Middle

Abstract From the technical point of view, philosophically neutral, the duality between a paraconsistent and a paracomplete logic (for example intuitionistic logic) lies in the fact that explosion does not hold in the former and excluded middle does not hold in the latter. From the point of view of the motivations for rejecting explosion and excluded middle, this duality can be interpreted either ontologically or epistemically. An ontological interpretation of intuitionistic logic is Brouwer’s idealism; of paraconsistency is dialetheism. The epistemic interpretation of intuitionistic logic is in terms of preservation of constructive proof; of paraconsistency is in terms of preservation of evidence. In this paper, we explain and defend the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. We argue that it is more plausible than dialetheism and allows a peaceful and fruitful coexistence with classical logic.

Sufficient conditions for the undecidability of intuitionistic theories with applications

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Problem ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Symmetric Relation ◽  
Undecidable Theory ◽  
Classical Models ◽  
Classical Predicate

Let Δ be a set of axioms of a theory Tc(Δ) of classical predicate calculus (CPC); Δ may also be considered as a set of axioms of a theory TH(Δ) of Heyting's predicate calculus (HPC). Our aim is to investigate the decision problem of TH(Δ) in HPC for various known theories Δ of CPC.Theorem I(a) of §1 states that if Δ is a finitely axiomatizable and undecidable theory of CPC then TH(Δ) is undecidable in HPC. Furthermore, the relations between theorems of HPC are more complicated and so two CPC-equivalent axiomatizations of the same theory may give rise to two different HPC theories, in fact, one decidable and the other not.Semantically, the Kripke models (for which HPC is complete) are partially ordered families of classical models. Thus a formula expresses a property of a family of classical models (i.e. of a Kripke model). A theory Θ expresses a set of such properties. It may happen that a class of Kripke models defined by a set of formulas Θ is also definable in CPC (in a possibly richer language) by a CPC-theory Θ′! This establishes a connection between the decision problem of Θ in HPC and that of Θ′ in CPC. In particular if Θ′ is undecidable, so is Θ. Theorems II and III of §1 give sufficient conditions on Θ to be such that the corresponding Θ′ is undecidable. Θ′ is shown undecidable by interpreting the CPC theory of a reflexive and symmetric relation in Θ′.

On the intuitionistic strength of monotone inductive definitions

2004 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 790-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Tupailo
Keyword(s):  
Classical Logic ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Double Negation ◽  
Inductive Definitions ◽  
Intuitionistic Theory

Abstract.We prove here that the intuitionistic theory T0↾ + UMIDN. or even EETJ↾ + UMIDN, of Explicit Mathematics has the strength of –CA0. In Section 1 we give a double-negation translation for the classical second-order μ-calculus, which was shown in [Mö02] to have the strength of –CA0. In Section 2 we interpret the intuitionistic μ-calculus in the theory EETJ↾ + UMIDN. The question about the strength of monotone inductive definitions in T0 was asked by S. Feferman in 1982, and — assuming classical logic — was addressed by M. Rathjen.

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