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1967 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-250
Author(s):  
David Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Background Knowledge

scholarly journals Scientific Practice and the Epistemology of Governing Laws

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
TYLER HILDEBRAND
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.

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