George Boole. Of syllogisms. Reprinted from 191. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 177–191. - Rudolf Carnap. Elementary and abstract terms. Reprinted from IV 117. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 221–229. - Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson). The bilateral diagram. Reprinted from 674. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 230–233. - Gottlob Frege. Definitions. Reprinted from XVIII 92(12). Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 329–342. - John Neville Keynes. Propositions. Reprinted from 631. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 453–470. - Augustus De Morgan. On the syllogism. Reprinted from 201. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 556–578. - Josiah Royce. The principles of logic. Reprinted from 1403. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 654–683. - Bertrand Russell. Definition of pure mathematics. Reprinted from 1116. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 684–692. - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Facts. Reprinted from 2812. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 791–793.

This chapter provides an overview of the life of Charles Sander Peirce—philosopher, logician, scientist, and father of American pragmatism. This man, unappreciated in his lifetime, virtually ignored by the academic world of his day, is now recognized as perhaps America's most original philosopher and her greatest logician. Indeed, on the latter score, he is surely one of the logical giants of the nineteenth century, which produced such geniuses as Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead. Today, more than eighty years after his death, another generation of scholars is beginning to pay him the attention he deserves. The chapter shows the brilliant and tragic career of Peirce. Though he never published a book on philosophy, his articles and drafts fill volumes.

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Readings in philosophical analysis. Selected and edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1949, x + 626 pp. - W. V. Quine. Designation and existence, pp. 44–51. - Alfred Tarski. The semantic conception of truth, pp. 52–84. - Gottlob Frege. On sense and nominatum, pp. 85–102. - Bertrand Russell. On denoting, pp. 103–115. - Ernest Nagel. Logic without ontology, pp. 191–210. - Carl G. Hempel. On the nature of mathematical truth, pp. 222–237. - Rudolf Carnap. The two concepts of probability, pp. 330–348. - Roderick M. Chisholm. The contrary-to-fact conditional, pp. 482–497.

Journal of Symbolic Logic ◽

10.2307/2267059 ◽

1949 ◽

Vol 14 (3) ◽

pp. 184-185

Author(s):

Max Black

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

Philosophical Analysis ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Mathematical Truth ◽

Wilfrid Sellars ◽

Rudolf Carnap ◽

Semantic Conception ◽

Alfred Tarski

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The Vienna Circle

Routledge Encyclopedia of Modernism ◽

10.4324/9781135000356-rem1718-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Peter Murray

Keyword(s):

Vienna Circle ◽

Logical Positivism ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Rudolf Carnap ◽

Ernst Mach ◽

Kurt Gödel ◽

The World ◽

Recent Developments ◽

Scientific Worldview

In 1922 Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) transformed the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society), a weekly reading group concerned with logical positivism, into an international assembly of academics known as der Weiner Kreis, or the Vienna Circle, which responded to recent developments within analytic philosophy by leading thinkers Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Early members included Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) and Otto Neurath (1882–1945). In 1929, Neurath published Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle), a pamphlet delineating the group’s rejection of metaphysics in favour of a scientific worldview predicated upon empirical phenomena.

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Introduction

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198829751.003.0009 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 1-12

Author(s):

Oskari Kuusela

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Logic ◽

Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽

Analytic Philosophy ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Rudolf Carnap ◽

Peter Strawson ◽

The Future ◽

History Of ◽

Further Development ◽

Philosophical Progress

Gottlob Frege and Bertand Russell are widely regarded as the founders of analytic philosophy. A longer list also includes G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is not because analytic philosophers subscribe to Frege’s and Russell’s views about particular philosophical matters. It is hard to think of examples of such agreed-upon views. Rather, Frege’s and Russell’s role as founders is due, before all, to certain methodological ideas which they introduced. Especially important in this regard is the idea that philosophical progress could be achieved by means of the methods of symbolic or mathematical logic to whose development both contributed in important ways. This book, in essence, is an examination of Frege’s and Russell’s methodological and logical ideas and their further development and transformation by certain other philosophers, especially Ludwig Wittgenstein, but also Rudolf Carnap and Peter Strawson. It is in this sense a book on methodology in analytic philosophy. And although the book assumes the form of the examination of the history of analytic philosophy, especially the work of Wittgenstein, it is just as much—or more—about the future of analytic philosophy. The underlying question that motivates this book is what analytic philosophy could be or become, and whether it is possible for it to redeem its original promise of progress. For it seems fair to say that progress has been less impressive than Russell promised and more controversial than he may have expected (see ...

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The Ship of Logic on the High Seas of Discourse

Linguistic Turns, 1890-1950 ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198745778.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 53-104

Author(s):

Ken Hirschkop

Keyword(s):

Public Sphere ◽

Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽

Analytic Philosophy ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Linguistic Turn ◽

The Public ◽

The Public Sphere ◽

Linguistic Philosophy ◽

High Seas

Chapter 3 looks at the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy as it emerges from Gottlob Frege, gains momentum in Bertrand Russell, and finds elaboration in the early and middle work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The characteristic move of linguistic philosophy will be the clarification of presumably ‘muddled’ ordinary statements: the bringing to the surface a lucidity that is lurking within language, needing only to be coaxed out. The author shows how in the works of Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein, the drive to clarity entails a stripping away of every intersubjective, rhetorical element in discourse. He then argues that a language clarified by professional philosophers is a substitute for the objectivity of the public sphere. The chapter concludes by showing how intersubjectivity returns first as irony in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and then as the belief that language always ‘works’: that it fails only when external circumstances disturb its inner workings.

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Introduction

Necessity Lost ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199228645.003.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 1-14

Author(s):

Sanford Shieh

Keyword(s):

Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽

Analytic Philosophy ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Philosophy Of Logic ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

Philosophical Issue

This chapter presents the principal philosophical issue of the book: is the nature of logic specified by the concepts of necessity and possibility? According to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, the answer is no, because these concepts of modality are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible and the actual. The upshot for Frege and Russell is that logic is fundamental, and modality is to be reconstructed from logical notions. This chapter continues with a brief outline of Volume II of this work: how C. I. Lewis and Ludwig Wittgenstein argued against the anti-modal stance of Frege and Russell. I conclude with a note on the significance of this aspect of early analytic philosophy for contemporary philosophy of logic and modality.

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Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short introduction

10.1093/actrade/9780198778028.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Michael Beaney

Keyword(s):

Critical Thinking ◽

20Th Century ◽

Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽

Analytic Philosophy ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Short Introduction ◽

Philosophical Questions

Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction introduces some of the key ideas of the founders of analytic philosophy—Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Susan Stebbing around the turn of the 20th century—by exploring certain fundamental philosophical questions and showing how those ideas can be used in offering answers. Considering the work of Susan Stebbing, it also explores the application of analytic philosophy to critical thinking, and emphasizes the conceptual creativity that lies at the heart of fruitful analysis. Throughout, this VSI illustrates why clarity of thinking, precision of expression, and rigour of argumentation are rightly seen as virtues of analytic philosophy.

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Frege and Wittgenstein: The Limits of the Analytic Style

Elements ◽

10.6017/eurj.v6i1.9022 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 6 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Christopher Sheridan

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Logical Analysis ◽

Linguistic Meaning ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Gottlob Frege ◽

Symbolic Logic ◽

Scientific Language ◽

German Mathematician ◽

Broad Application ◽

Analytic Tradition

The analytic tradition in philosophy stems from the work of German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege. Bertrand Russell brough Frege's program to render language-particularly scientific language-in formal logical terms to the forefront of philosophy in the early twentieth century. The quest to clarify language and parse out genuine philosophical problems remains a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, but investigative programs involving the broad application of formal symbolic logic to language have largely been abandoned due to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. This article identifies the key philosophical moves that must be performed successfully in order for Frege's "conceptual notation" and other similar systems to adequately capture syntax and semantics. These moves ultimately fail as a result of the nature of linguistic meaning. The shift away from formal logical analysis of language and the emergence of the current analytic style becomes clearer when this failure is examined critically.

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