A logical analysis of some value concepts

1963 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

The purpose of this paper is to provide a partial logical analysis of a few concepts that may be classified as value concepts or as concepts that are closely related to value concepts. Among the concepts that will be considered are striving for, doing, believing, knowing, desiring, ability to do, obligation to do, and value for. Familiarity will be assumed with the concepts of logical necessity, logical possibility, and strict implication as formalized in standard systems of modal logic (such as S4), and with the concepts of obligation and permission as formalized in systems of deontic logic. It will also be assumed that quantifiers over propositions have been included in extensions of these systems.

Georg Henrik von Wright. Form and content in logic. A revised reprint of XV 58(2), 199(2), 280(2). Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 1–21. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On the idea of logical truth (I). A revised reprint of XV 58(1), 199(1), 280(1). Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 22–43. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On double quantification. A revised reprint of XVII 201. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 44–57. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Deontic logic. A revised reprint of XVII 140. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 58–74. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Interpretations of modal logic. A revised reprint of XVIII 176. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 75–88. - Georg Henrik von Wright. A new system of modal logic. A revised version of XIX 66. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 89–126. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On conditionals. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 127–165. - Georg Henrik von Wright. The concept of entailment. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 166–191.

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-462
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

Author(s):  
Ilkka Niiniluoto

G.H. von Wright was one of the most influential analytic philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in Helsinki, Finland, von Wright did his early work on logic, probability and induction under the influence of logical empiricism. In 1948–51 he served as Ludwig Wittgenstein’s successor at Cambridge, but returned to his homeland and later became a member of the Academy of Finland. He did pioneering work on the new applications of logic: modal logic, deontic logic, the logic of norms and action, preference logic, tense logic, causality and determinism. In the 1970s his ideas about the explanation and understanding of human action helped to establish new links between the analytic tradition and Continental hermeneutics. Von Wright’s later works, which are eloquent books and essays written originally in his two native languages (Swedish and Finnish), deal with issues of humanism and human welfare, history and future, technology and ecology.


Mind ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol LXVII (265) ◽  
pp. 100-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN ROSS ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Silvia Jonas

Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics and theism, this chapter offers a structuralist account that implicitly defines theism in terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epistemic superiority. On this view, statements like “God is omniscient” have a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The categorical component asserts the logical possibility of the theism structure on the basis of uncontroversial facts about the physical world. This structuralist reading of theism preserves objective truth-values for theistic statements while remaining neutral on the question of ontology. Thus, it offers a way of understanding theism to which a naturalist cannot object, and it accommodates the fact that religious belief, for many theists, is an essentially relational matter.


Author(s):  
Farshad Badie

In his “Time and Modality”, based on his own philosophical motivations, Arthur Norman Prior proposed the modal logic Q as a correct modal logic in 1957. Prior developed Q in order to offer a logic for contingent beings, in which one could rationally state that some beings are contingent and some are necessary. One may say that Q is an actualist modal logic with a natural semantics. This review article is a developed description/discussion of/on “The System Q” that is the fifth chapter of “Time and Modality”. I have attempted to analyse the logical structure of system Q in order to provide a more understandable description as well as logical analysis for today’s logicians, philosophers, and information-computer scientists. In the paper, the Polish notations are translated into modern notations in order to be more comprehensible and to support the developed formal descriptions and semantic analysis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Cresswell

In the early days of the semantics for modal logic the `possible worlds' were thought of as models or interpretations. This was particularly so when the interpretation was of \emph{logical} necessity or possibility, where this was understood in terms of validity. Arnould Bayart in 1958 may have been the first modal logician to argue explicitly against the identification of necessity and validity. This note contrasts his semantics with that provided by Rudolf Carnap in 1946, and examines Bayart's proof that if you identify necessity with validity then certain theorems of S5 are not valid. The proof is then examined using Carnap's semantics.


Author(s):  
Efstratios Kontopoulos ◽  
Nick Bassiliades ◽  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Grigoris Antoniou

Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic formalism that deals with incomplete and conflicting information, whereas modal logic deals with the concepts of necessity and possibility. These types of logics play a significant role in the emerging Semantic Web, which enriches the available Web information with meaning, leading to better cooperation between end-users and applications. Defeasible and modal logics, in general, and, particularly, deontic logic provide means for modeling agent communities, where each agent is characterized by its cognitive profile and normative system, as well as policies, which define privacy requirements, access permissions, and individual rights. Toward this direction, this article discusses the extension of DR-DEVICE, a Semantic Web-aware defeasible reasoner, with a mechanism for expressing modal logic operators, while testing the implementation via deontic logic operators, concerned with obligations, permissions, and related concepts. The motivation behind this work is to develop a practical defeasible reasoner for the Semantic Web that takes advantage of the expressive power offered by modal logics, accompanied by the flexibility to define diverse agent behaviours. A further incentive is to study the various motivational notions of deontic logic and discuss the cognitive state of agents, as well as the interactions among them.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen

A highly technical defense of a standard interpretation of “possible” and of “necessary” is given. Specifically, arguments are made for the S5 system of modal logic as background for many of the arguments in the rest of the book. These begin with arguments against analyzing metaphysical necessity in terms of narrow logical necessity (or provability). It is shown, for example, that if metaphysical necessity were narrow logical necessity, then, given Gödel's incompleteness theorems, you get absurd possibilities, like the possibility that 1 = 0 is necessary. Independent arguments are also supplied for the characteristic axioms of S4 and S5. All these arguments help motivate the minimal claim that S5 implicitly defines a coherent concept of “possibility” and of “necessity” relevant to the arguments presented.


Semantic Web ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 140-167
Author(s):  
Efstratios Kontopoulos ◽  
Nick Bassiliades ◽  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Grigoris Antoniou

Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic formalism that deals with incomplete and conflicting information, whereas modal logic deals with the concepts of necessity and possibility. These types of logics play a significant role in the emerging Semantic Web, which enriches the available Web information with meaning, leading to better cooperation between end-users and applications. Defeasible and modal logics, in general, and, particularly, deontic logic provide means for modeling agent communities, where each agent is characterized by its cognitive profile and normative system, as well as policies, which define privacy requirements, access permissions, and individual rights. Toward this direction, this article discusses the extension of DR-DEVICE, a Semantic Web-aware defeasible reasoner, with a mechanism for expressing modal logic operators, while testing the implementation via deontic logic operators, concerned with obligations, permissions, and related concepts. The motivation behind this work is to develop a practical defeasible reasoner for the Semantic Web that takes advantage of the expressive power offered by modal logics, accompanied by the flexibility to define diverse agent behaviours. A further incentive is to study the various motivational notions of deontic logic and discuss the cognitive state of agents, as well as the interactions among them.


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