Support structures for the axiom of choice

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Pincus

The notion of “support” was introduced by Mostowski in [4] in order to prove that a certain universe satisfied the ordering principle but not the axiom of choice. The notion was refined in [3] and in [1] it was shown to be satisfied in a certain Cohen model of full ZF set theory. This paper is an axiomatic study of universes whose undefined relations are ∈ and a “support structure”, T.In §2 the general theory is introduced and the universes of [4] and [1] are characterized. §3 examines a more complicated universe which will be used in [5] to show that in many cases a consistency in full ZF set theory may be proven directly by the methods of [4]. The embedding theorems of §4 are crucial to this application.

1978 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.L. Hickman

Let p be a prime and let (mk)k<ω be a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers such that m0 = 1 and mk divides mk+1. A field F is said to be of type (p, (mk)k<ω) if it is the union of an increasing sequence (Fk)k<ω of fields such that Fk has pmk elements. A set X is called “finite” if it has n elements for some nonnegative integer n, and “Dedekind-finite” if every injection f: X → X is a bijection. If the Axiom of Choice is rejected, then it is relatively consistent to assume the existence of medial (that is, infinite, Dedekind-finite) sets. In this paper it is shown that given any type (p, (mk)k<ω) as above, it is relatively consistent with the usual axioms of set theory (minus Choice) to assume the existence of a medial field of type (p, (mk)k<ω). Conversely, it is shown that any medial field must be of type (p, (mk)k<ω) for some (p, (mk)k<ω) as above. The paper concludes with a few observations on Dedekind-finite rings. In the first part of the paper, a general knowledge of Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory and of the Jech-Sochor Embedding Theorems is assumed.


1988 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1208-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Spector

AbstractA new method is presented for constructing models of set theory, using a technique of forming pseudo-ultrapowers. In the presence of the axiom of choice, the traditional ultrapower construction has proven to be extremely powerful in set theory and model theory; if the axiom of choice is not assumed, the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers may fail, causing the ultrapower to lose almost all of its utility. The pseudo-ultrapower is designed so that the fundamental theorem holds even if choice fails; this is arranged by means of an application of the omitting types theorem. The general theory of pseudo-ultrapowers is developed. Following that, we study supercompactness in the absence of choice, and we analyze pseudo-ultrapowers of models of the axiom of determinateness and various infinite exponent partition relations. Relationships between pseudo-ultrapowers and forcing are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


Axioms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitri Shakhmatov ◽  
Víctor Yañez

We give a “naive” (i.e., using no additional set-theoretic assumptions beyond ZFC, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory augmented by the Axiom of Choice) example of a Boolean topological group G without infinite separable pseudocompact subsets having the following “selective” compactness property: For each free ultrafilter p on the set N of natural numbers and every sequence ( U n ) of non-empty open subsets of G, one can choose a point x n ∈ U n for all n ∈ N in such a way that the resulting sequence ( x n ) has a p-limit in G; that is, { n ∈ N : x n ∈ V } ∈ p for every neighbourhood V of x in G. In particular, G is selectively pseudocompact (strongly pseudocompact) but not selectively sequentially pseudocompact. This answers a question of Dorantes-Aldama and the first listed author. The group G above is not pseudo- ω -bounded either. Furthermore, we show that the free precompact Boolean group of a topological sum ⨁ i ∈ I X i , where each space X i is either maximal or discrete, contains no infinite separable pseudocompact subsets.


1962 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 105-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katuzi Ono

The theory of mathematical objects, developed in this work, is a trial system intended to be a prototype of set theory. It concerns, with respect to the only one primitive notion “proto-membership”, with a field of mathematical objects which we shall hereafter simply call objects, it is a very simple system, because it assumes only one axiom scheme which is formally similar to the aussonderung axiom of set theory. We shall show that in our object theory we can construct a theory of sets which is stronger than the Zermelo set-theory [1] without the axiom of choice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 1234-1256 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS STREICHER

In a sequence of papers (Krivine 2001; Krivine 2003; Krivine 2009), J.-L. Krivine introduced his notion of classical realisability for classical second-order logic and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Moreover, in more recent work (Krivine 2008), he has considered forcing constructions on top of it with the ultimate aim of providing a realisability interpretation for the axiom of choice.The aim of the current paper is to show how Krivine's classical realisability can be understood as an instance of the categorical approach to realisability as started by Martin Hyland in Hyland (1982) and described in detail in van Oosten (2008). Moreover, we will give an intuitive explanation of the iteration of realisability as described in Krivine (2008).


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