An infinitistic rule of proof

1968 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. B. Enderton

In this paper we consider a fonnal system of second-order Peano arithmetic with a rule of inference stronger than the ω-rule [3]. We also consider the relation to a class of models for analysis (i.e. second-order arithmetic) which lies between the class of ω-models and the class of β-models [5].The notation used is largely that of [3] and [5]. We assume that the reader has some familiarity with at least the ideas of the former. The formal system (A) of Peano arithmetic employed in [3] includes the comprehension axioms and the second-order induction axiom.

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Farida Kachapova

This paper describes axiomatic theories SA and SAR, which are versions of second order arithmetic with countably many sorts for sets of natural numbers. The theories are intended to be applied in reverse mathematics because their multi-sorted language allows to express some mathematical statements in more natural form than in the standard second order arithmetic. We study metamathematical properties of the theories SA, SAR and their fragments. We show that SA is mutually interpretable with the theory of arithmetical truth PATr obtained from the Peano arithmetic by adding infinitely many truth predicates. Corresponding fragments of SA and PATr are also mutually interpretable. We compare the proof-theoretical strengths of the fragments; in particular, we show that each fragment SAs with sorts <=s is weaker than next fragment SAs+1.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-815 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN FISCHER

In this paper we will investigate different axiomatic theories of truth that are minimal in some sense. One criterion for minimality will be conservativity over Peano Arithmetic. We will then give a more fine-grained characterization by investigating some interpretability relations. We will show that disquotational theories of truth, as well as compositional theories of truth with restricted induction are relatively interpretable in Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, we will give an example of a theory of truth that is a conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic but not interpretable in it. We will then use stricter versions of interpretations to compare weak theories of truth to subsystems of second-order arithmetic.


1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1039-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Ward Henson ◽  
Matt Kaufmann ◽  
H. Jerome Keisler

AbstractWe consider extensions of Peano arithmetic suitable for doing some of nonstandard analysis, in which there is a predicate N(x) for an elementary initial segment, along with axiom schemes approximating ω1-saturation. We prove that such systems have the same proof-theoretic strength as their natural analogues in second order arithmetic. We close by presenting an even stronger extension of Peano arithmetic, which is equivalent to ZF for arithmetic statements.


Author(s):  
Gerhard Jäger

AbstractThis short note is on the question whether the intersection of all fixed points of a positive arithmetic operator and the intersection of all its closed points can proved to be equivalent in a weak fragment of second order arithmetic.


2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1001-1019 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASHER M. KACH ◽  
ANTONIO MONTALBÁN

AbstractMany classes of structures have natural functions and relations on them: concatenation of linear orders, direct product of groups, disjoint union of equivalence structures, and so on. Here, we study the (un)decidability of the theory of several natural classes of structures with appropriate functions and relations. For some of these classes of structures, the resulting theory is decidable; for some of these classes of structures, the resulting theory is bi-interpretable with second-order arithmetic.


1993 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Friedman ◽  
Stephen G. Simpson ◽  
Xiaokang Yu

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