A quasi-intumonistic set theory

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 456-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie H. Tharp
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Obvious Candidate ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Basic Philosophy ◽  
The Universe

It is natural, given the usual iterative description of the universe of sets, to investigate set theories which in some way take account of the unfinished character of the universe. We do not here consider any arguments aimed at justifying one system over another, or at clarifying the basic philosophy. Rather, we look at an obvious candidate which is similar to a system discussed by L. Pozsgay in [1]. Pozsgay sketched the development of the ordinary theorems in such a system and attempted to show it equiconsistent with ZF. In this paper we show that the consistency of the system we call IZF can be proved in the usual ZF set theory.

Category theory, introduction to

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McLarty
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Category Theory ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe

A ‘category’, in the mathematical sense, is a universe of structures and transformations. Category theory treats such a universe simply in terms of the network of transformations. For example, categorical set theory deals with the universe of sets and functions without saying what is in any set, or what any function ‘does to’ anything in its domain; it only talks about the patterns of functions that occur between sets. This stress on patterns of functions originally served to clarify certain working techniques in topology. Grothendieck extended those techniques to number theory, in part by defining a kind of category which could itself represent a space. He called such a category a ‘topos’. It turned out that a topos could also be seen as a category rich enough to do all the usual constructions of set-theoretic mathematics, but that may get very different results from standard set theory.

Natural internal forcing schemata extending ZFC: Truth in the universe?

1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 461-472
Author(s):  
Garvin Melles
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Mathematical Truth ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Survey Article ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Independence Results ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe

Mathematicians have one over on the physicists in that they already have a unified theory of mathematics, namely, set theory. Unfortunately, the plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians. Will man's knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC? This author does not think so, he feels that set theorists' intuition about the universe of sets is stronger than ZFC. Here in this paper, using part of this intuition, we introduce some axiom schemata which we feel are very natural candidates for being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. These schemata assert the existence of many generics over simple inner models. The main purpose of this article is to present arguments for why the assertion of the existence of such generics belongs to the axioms of set theory.Our central guiding principle in justifying the axioms is what Maddy called the rule of thumb maximize in her survey article on the axioms of set theory, [8] and [9]. More specifically, our intuition conforms with that expressed by Mathias in his article What is Maclane Missing? challenging Mac Lane's view of set theory.

scholarly journals AN ORDINAL ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBLE SET THEORY USING RECURSION ON ORDINAL NOTATIONS

2002 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 91-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEREMY AVIGAD
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Proof Theory ◽  
Admissible Set ◽  
Ordinal Analysis ◽  
Rate Of Growth ◽  
Ordinal Notations ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe

The notion of a function from ℕ to ℕ defined by recursion on ordinal notations is fundamental in proof theory. Here this notion is generalized to functions on the universe of sets, using notations for well orderings longer than the class of ordinals. The generalization is used to bound the rate of growth of any function on the universe of sets that is Σ1-definable in Kripke–Platek admissible set theory with an axiom of infinity. Formalizing the argument provides an ordinal analysis.

Gödel and Set Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihiro Kanamori
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Continuum

Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) with his work on the constructible universeLestablished the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). More broadly, he ensured the ascendancy of first-order logic as the framework and a matter of method for set theory and secured the cumulative hierarchy view of the universe of sets. Gödel thereby transformed set theory and launched it with structured subject matter and specific methods of proof. In later years Gödel worked on a variety of set theoretic constructions and speculated about how problems might be settled with new axioms. We here chronicle this development from the point of view of the evolution of set theory as a field of mathematics. Much has been written, of course, about Gödel's work in set theory, from textbook expositions to the introductory notes to his collected papers. The present account presents an integrated view of the historical and mathematical development as supported by his recently published lectures and correspondence. Beyond the surface of things we delve deeper into the mathematics. What emerges are the roots and anticipations in work of Russell and Hilbert, and most prominently the sustained motif of truth as formalizable in the “next higher system”. We especially work at bringing out how transforming Gödel's work was for set theory. It is difficult now to see what conceptual and technical distance Gödel had to cover and how dramatic his re-orientation of set theory was.

The Problem of Conceptual Understanding

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós
Keyword(s):  
Real Number ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Conceptual Understanding ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
The Real ◽  
Iterative Conception ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Web

This chapter considers one of the most intriguing questions that philosophy of mathematics in practice must, sooner or later, confront: how understanding of mathematics is obtained. In particular, it examines how issues of meaning and understanding in relation to practice and use relate to the question of the acceptability of “classical” or postulational mathematics, a question usually formulated in terms of consistency. The chapter begins with a discussion of the iterative conception of the universe of sets and its presuppositions, analyzing it from the standpoint of the web of practices. It then addresses the issue of conceptual understanding in mathematics, as exemplifid by the theory Zermelo–Fraenkel axiom system (ZFC). Finally, it looks at arguments based on the idea of the real-number continuum as a source of justification for the axioms of set theory.

Self-reference with negative types

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 754-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Hiller ◽  
J. Zimbarg
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Formal Language ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
The One ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Self Reference ◽  
The Continuum

The universe of sets, V, is usually seen as an entity structured in successive levels, each level being made up of objects and collections of objects belonging to the previous levels. This process of obtaining sets and axioms for set theory can be seen in Scott [74] and Shoenfield [77].The approach we want to take differs from the previous one very strongly: the seeds from which we want to generate our universe of classes are to be the one-variable predicates (given by one-free-variable formulas) of the formal language we shall be using. In other words, any one-variable predicate of the language is to be represented as a class in our universe. In this sense, we view our theory as being about a self-referential language, a language whose predicates refer to objects which are predicates of the language itself.We want, in short, a system such that: (i) any predicate may be represented by an object to be studied by the theory itself; (ii) the axioms for the theory may be derived from the general principle that we are dealing with a language that aims at describing its own predicates; and (iii) the theory should be strong enough to derive ZFC and suggest answers to the existence of large cardinals and to the continuum hypothesis.An objection to such a project arises immediately: in view of the Russell-Zermelo paradox, how is it possible to have all predicates of the language as elements of the universe? This objection will be easy to deal with: we shall provide our language with a type structure to avoid paradox.

INNER MODEL THEORETIC GEOLOGY

2016 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 972-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUNTER FUCHS ◽  
RALF SCHINDLER
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Solid Core ◽  
Strong Cardinal ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Woodin Cardinal ◽  
The Universe

AbstractOne of the basic concepts of set theoretic geology is the mantle of a model of set theory V: it is the intersection of all grounds of V, that is, of all inner models M of V such that V is a set-forcing extension of M. The main theme of the present paper is to identify situations in which the mantle turns out to be a fine structural extender model. The first main result is that this is the case when the universe is constructible from a set and there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal. The second situation like that arises if L[E] is an extender model that is iterable in V but not internally iterable, as guided by P-constructions, L[E] has no strong cardinal, and the extender sequence E is ordinal definable in L[E] and its forcing extensions by collapsing a cutpoint to ω (in an appropriate sense). The third main result concerns the Solid Core of a model of set theory. This is the union of all sets that are constructible from a set of ordinals that cannot be added by set-forcing to an inner model. The main result here is that if there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal, then the solid core is a fine-structural extender model.

Global quantification in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-301
Author(s):  
John Mayberry
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Local Theory ◽  
Axiom Schema ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Universe Of Sets

My aim here is to investigate the role of global quantifiers—quantifiers ranging over the entire universe of sets—in the formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The use of such quantifiers in the formulas substituted into axiom schemata introduces, at least prima facie, a strong element of impredicativity into the thapry. The axiom schema of replacement provides an example of this. For each instance of that schema enlarges the very domain over which its own global quantifiers vary. The fundamental question at issue is this: How does the employment of these global quantifiers, and the choice of logical principles governing their use, affect the strengths of the axiom schemata in which they occur?I shall attack this question by comparing three quite different formalizations of the intuitive principles which constitute the Zermelo-Fraenkel system. The first of these, local Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (LZF), is formalized without using global quantifiers. The second, global Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (GZF), is the extension of the local theory obtained by introducing global quantifiers subject to intuitionistic logical laws, and taking the axiom schema of strong collection (Schema XII, §2) as an additional assumption of the theory. The third system is the conventional formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel as a classical, first order theory. The local theory, LZF, is already very strong, indeed strong enough to formalize any naturally occurring mathematical argument. I have argued (in [3]) that it is the natural formalization of naive set theory. My intention, therefore, is to use it as a standard against which to measure the strength of each of the other two systems.

Reduction to a symmetric predicate

1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-59
Author(s):  
Alan Cobham
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
The Universe

It has been shown by Quine that an interpreted theory Θ, formulated in the notation of quantification theory, is translatable into a theory Θ′ in which the only primitive predicate is a dyadic F. In establishing this result Quine takes for the universe of Θ′ a set which comprehends the universe of Θ and has the property that if x and y are members then so is {x, y}. For this fragmentary set theory the distinctness of x from {x, y} and {{x}} is assumed. It will be shown here that, if a pair of somewhat more stringent restrictions are assumed for the set theory, then there is a symmetric dyadic predicate G definable within Θ′, i.e., in terms of F alone, in terms of which F is in turn definable. It follows from this extended result that the theory Θ is translatable into a theory in which the only primitive predicate is symmetric and dyadic.

A proof-theoretic characterization of the primitive recursive set functions

1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 954-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Rathjen
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Elementary Proof ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Definable Set ◽  
Set Functions ◽  
Theoretic Characterization ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Set Function ◽  
Primitive Recursive

AbstractLet KP− be the theory resulting from Kripke-Platek set theory by restricting Foundation to Set Foundation. Let G: V → V (V ≔ universe of sets) be a Δ0-definable set function, i.e. there is a Δ0-formula φ(x, y) such that φ(x, G(x)) is true for all sets x, and V ⊨ ∀x∃!yφ(x, y). In this paper we shall verify (by elementary proof-theoretic methods) that the collection of set functions primitive recursive in G coincides with the collection of those functions which are Σ1-definable in KP− + Σ1-Foundation + ∀x∃!yφ(x, y). Moreover, we show that this is still true if one adds Π1-Foundation or a weak version of Δ0-Dependent Choices to the latter theory.

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