Some consequences of the axiom of power-set

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Abian ◽  
Samuel Lamacchia
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Binary Predicate ◽  
Definition Of

In this paper we prove:Theorem 1. Any finite model of the axiom of power-set also satisfies the axioms of extensionality, sum-set and choice.Clearly, it will follow from (2) below that in a finite model the axiom of power-set is satisfied if and only if every set is a power-set. Thus, Theorem 1 follows immediately from Theorem 2 below, where by a theory of sets we mean a first-order theory without identity and with only one binary predicate symbol ∈.Theorem 2. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set and if the axiom of power-set is valid, then the axioms of extensionality, sum-set and choice are valid.The proof of Theorem 2 will follow from the lemmas which we establish below.We mean by x = y that x and y have the same elements. We denote a power-set of x by P(x) when it exists; similarly, we denote a sum-set of x by Ux.Clearly, in every theory of sets we have:(1) (x ⊂ y) ↔ (P(x) ⊂ P(y)),(2) (x = y) ↔ (P(x) = P(y)),(3) (x = y) → ((x ∈ P(z)) → (y ∈ P(z))),(4) ⋃P(x) = x.In view of (2), (3) and the definition of equality, we have:Lemma 1. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set, then equal sets are elements of the same sets.We have also, in view of (4):Lemma 2. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set, then every set has a sum-set.

Gödel’s Proof Based on ω-Consistency

1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

The proof that we have just given of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic was based on the underlying assumption that Peano Arithmetic is correct—i.e., that every sentence provable in P.A. is a true sentence. Gödel’s original incompleteness proof involved a much weaker assumption—that of ω-consistency to which we now turn. We consider an arbitrary axiom system S whose formulas are those of Peano Arithmetic, whose axioms include all those of Groups I and II (or alternatively, any set of axioms for first-order logic with identity such that all logically valid formulas are provable from them), and whose inference rules are modus ponens and generalization. (It is also possible to axiomatize first-order logic in such a way that modus ponens is the only inference rule—cf. Quine [1940].) In place of the axioms of Groups III and IV, however, we can take a completely arbitrary set of axioms. Such a system S is an example of what is termed a first-order theory, and we will consider several such theories other than Peano Arithmetic. (For the more general notion of a first-order theory, the key difference is that we do not necessarily start with + and × as the undefined function symbols, nor do we necessarily take ≤ as the undefined predicate symbol. Arbitrary function symbols and predicate symbols can be taken, however, as the undefined function and predicate symbols—cf. Tarski [1953] for details. However, the only theories (or “systems”, as we will call them) that we will have occasion to consider are those whose formulas are those of P.A.) S is called simply consistent (or just “consistent” for short) if no sentence is both provable and refutable in S.

Prime e.c. commutative rings in characteristic n ≥ 2

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 629-633
Author(s):  
Dan Saracino
Keyword(s):  
Commutative Rings ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prime Model ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Building Models ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Mathematics Department

Let CR denote the first-order theory of commutative rings with unity, formulated in the language L = 〈 +, •, 0, 1〉. Virtually everything that is known about existentially complete (e.c.) models of CR is contained in Cherlin's paper [2], where it is shown, in particular, that the e.c. models are not first-order axiomatizable. The purpose of this note is to show that, in analogy with the case of fields, there exists a unique prime e.c. model of CR in each characteristic n > 2. As a consequence we settle Problem 8 in the list of open questions at the end of Hodges' book Building models by games ([5], p. 278).By a “prime” e.c. model of characteristic n ≥ 2 we mean one that embeds in every e.c. model of characteristic n. (The embedding is not always elementary, since [2] not all e.c. models of characteristic n are elementarily equivalent.) The prime model is characterized by the fact that it is the union of a chain of finite subrings each of which is an amalgamation base for CR. In §1 we describe the finite amalgamation bases for CR and show that every finite model embeds in a finite amalgamation base; in §2 we use this information to obtain prime e.c. models and answer Hodges' question.Our results on prime e.c. models were obtained some years ago, during the fall term of 1982, while the author was a visitor at Wesleyan University. The author wishes to take this opportunity to thank the mathematics department at Wesleyan for its hospitality during that visit, and subsequent ones.

Partially ordered interpretations

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-93
Author(s):  
Nobuyoshi Motohashi
Keyword(s):  
Basic Result ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Consistent Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
Partially Ordered ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Special Case

In this paper, we shall define the “partially ordered interpretation” of a first order theory in another first order theory and state some recent results. Although an exact definition will be given in §4 below, we now give a brief outline. First of all, let us recall the “interpretations” defined by A. Tarski et al. in [17] and the “parametrical interpretations” defined by P. Hájek in [6], [7] and U. Felgner in [3]. Since “interpretations” can be considered as a special case of “parametrical interpretations”, we consider only the latter type of “interpretations”. A parametrical interpretation I of a first order language L in a consistent theory T′ (formulated in another first order language L′) consists of the following formulas:(i) a unary formula C(p) (i.e. a formula with one designated free variable p), which is used to denote the range of parameters,(ii) a binary formula U(p, x), which is intended to denote the pth universe for each parameter p,(iii) an (n + 1)-ary formula Fp(p, x1 …, xn) for each n-ary predicate symbol P in L,such that the formulas (∃p)C(p) and (∀p)(C(p)→(∃x)U(p, x)) are provable in T". Then, given a formula A in L and a parameter p, we define the interpretation Ip (A ) of A by I at p to be the formula which is obtained from A by replacing every atomic subformula P(*, …, *) in A by Fp(p, *,…,*), and relativizing every occurrence of quantifiers in A by U(p, * ). A sentence A in L is said to be I-provable in T′ if the sentence (∀p) (C(p)→ Ip(A)) is provable in T′. Then, it is obvious that every provable sentence in L is I-provable in T′. This is a basic result of “parametrical interpretations” and is used to prove the “consistency” of a theory T in L by showing that every axiom of T is I-provable in T′ when I is said to be a parametrical interpretation of T in T′. As is shown above, the word “interpretation” is used in the following three senses: interpretations of languages, interpretations of formulas and interpretations of theories. So, in this introduction we let the word “interpretation” denote “interpretation of languages”, for short.

Locally finite theories

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Mycielski
Keyword(s):  
Main Idea ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Interpolation Theorem ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Consistent Theory ◽  
Locally Finite ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Finite Theory

We say that a first order theoryTislocally finiteif every finite part ofThas a finite model. It is the purpose of this paper to construct in a uniform way for any consistent theoryTa locally finite theory FIN(T) which is syntactically (in a sense) isomorphic toT.Our construction draws upon the main idea of Paris and Harrington [6] (I have been influenced by some unpublished notes of Silver [7] on this subject) and generalizes the syntactic aspect of their result from arithmetic to arbitrary theories. (Our proof is syntactic, and it is simpler than the proofs of [5], [6] and [7]. This reminds me of the simple syntactic proofs of several variants of the Craig-Lyndon interpolation theorem, which seem more natural than the semantic proofs.)The first mathematically strong locally finite theory, called FIN, was defined in [1] (see also [2]). Now we get much stronger ones, e.g. FIN(ZF).From a physicalistic point of view the theorems of ZF and their FIN(ZF)-counterparts may have the same meaning. Therefore FIN(ZF) is a solution of Hilbert's second problem. It eliminates ideal (infinite) objects from the proofs of properties of concrete (finite) objects.In [4] we will demonstrate that one can develop a direct finitistic intuition that FIN(ZF) is locally finite. We will also prove a variant of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for the theory FIN and for all its primitively recursively axiomatizable consistent extensions.The results of this paper were announced in [3].

Logic

2021 ◽  
pp. 230-282
Author(s):  
A. J. Cotnoir ◽  
Achille C. Varzi
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Definite Answer ◽  
Binary Predicate ◽  
Different Parts

This chapter considers whether mereology should rightly be thought of as a first-order theory with parthood as a binary predicate. It considers extensions of classical mereology aimed at overcoming the expressive limits of standard first-order languages, focusing on second-order and plural formulations. Relatedly, Lewis’s megethology and applications to the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Then, several ways of modifying the framework to make room for mereological considerations involving time and modality are presented, such as the possibility that an object may have different parts at different times, or that it could have had different parts from the ones it actually has. Finally, a number of theories are expounded that can be developed in order to deal with the phenomenon of mereological indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that in some cases the very question of whether something is part of something else does not appear to have a definite answer.

scholarly journals A first-order theory of Ulm type

Computability ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 347-358
Author(s):  
Matthew Harrison-Trainor
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

scholarly journals Quasi-decidability of a Fragment of the First-Order Theory of Real Numbers

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Franek ◽  
Stefan Ratschan ◽  
Piotr Zgliczynski
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory
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