Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church

1936 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barkley Rosser

We shall say that a logic is “simply consistent” if there is no formula A such that both A and ∼ A are provable. “ω-consistent” will be used in the sense of Gödel. “General recursive” and “primitive recursive” will be used in the sense of Kleene, so that what Gödel calls “rekursiv” will be called “primitive recursive.” By an “Entscheidungsverfahren” will be meant a general recursive function ϕ(n) such that, if n is the Gödel number of a provable formula, ϕ(n) = 0 and, if n is not the Gödel number of a provable formula, ϕ(n) = 1. In specifying that ϕ must be general recursive we are following Church in identifying “general recursiveness” and “effective calculability.”First, a modification is made in Gödel's proofs of his theorems, Satz VI (Gödel, p. 187—this is the theorem which states that ω-consistency implies the existence of undecidable propositions) and Satz XI (Gödel, p. 196—this is the theorem which states that simple consistency implies that the formula which states simple consistency is not provable). The modifications of the proofs make these theorems hold for a much more general class of logics. Then, by sacrificing some generality, it is proved that simple consistency implies the existence of undecidable propositions (a strengthening of Gödel's Satz VI and Kleene's Theorem XIII) and that simple consistency implies the non-existence of an Entscheidungsverfahren (a strengthening of the result in the last paragraph of Church).

1954 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 267-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. L. Goodstein

A primitive-recursive sequence of rational numbers sn is said to be primitive-recursively irrational, if there are primitive recursive functions n(k), i(p, q) > 0 and N(p, q) such that:1. (k)(n ≥ n(k) → ∣sn – sn(k)∣ < 2−k).2. (p)(q)(q > 0 & n ≥ N(p, q) → ∣sn ± p/q∣ > 1/i(p, q)).The object of the present note is to establish the primitive-recursive irrationality of a sequence which converges to π. In a previous paper we proved the primitive-recursive irrationality of the exponential series Σxn/n!, for all rational values of x, and showed that a primitive-(general-) recursively irrational sequence sn is strongly primitive-(general-)recursive convergent in any scale, where a recursive sequence sn is said to be strongly primitive-(general-)recursive convergent in the scale r (r ≥ 2), if there is a non-decreasing primitive-(general-) recursive function r(k) such that,where [x] is the greatest integer contained in x, i.e. [x] = i if i ≤ x < i + 1, [x] = —i if i ≤ —x < i+1, where i is a non-negative integer.A rational recursive sequence sn is said to be recursive convergent, if there is a recursive function n(k) such that.If a sequence sn is strongly recursive convergent in a scale r, then it is recursive convergent and its limit is the recursive real number where, for any k ≥ 0,.


1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael M. Robinson

A set S of natural numbers is called recursively enumerable if there is a general recursive function F(x, y) such thatIn other words, S is the projection of a two-dimensional general recursive set. Actually, it is no restriction on S to assume that F(x, y) is primitive recursive. If S is not empty, it is the range of the primitive recursive functionwhere a is a fixed element of S. Using pairing functions, we see that any non-empty recursively enumerable set is also the range of a primitive recursive function of one variable.We use throughout the logical symbols ⋀ (and), ⋁ (or), → (if…then…), ↔ (if and only if), ∧ (for every), and ∨(there exists); negation does not occur explicitly. The variables range over the natural numbers, except as otherwise noted.Martin Davis has shown that every recursively enumerable set S of natural numbers can be represented in the formwhere P(y, b, w, x1 …, xλ) is a polynomial with integer coefficients. (Notice that this would not be correct if we replaced ≤ by <, since the right side of the equivalence would always be satisfied by b = 0.) Conversely, every set S represented by a formula of the above form is recursively enumerable. A basic unsolved problem is whether S can be defined using only existential quantifiers.


1959 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-148
Author(s):  
Alan Rose

It has been shown that every general recursive function is definable by application of the five schemata for primitive recursive functions together with the schemasubject to the condition that, for each n–tuple of natural numbers x1,…, xn there exists a natural number xn+1 such that


1970 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank B. Cannonito ◽  
Mark Finkelstein

It has been known for some time that there is a primitive recursive permutation of the nonnegative integers whose inverse is recursive but not primitive recursive. For example one has this result apparently for the first time in Kuznecov [1] and implicitly in Kent [2] or J. Robinson [3], who shows that every singularly recursive function ƒ is representable aswhere A, B, C are primitive recursive and B is a permutation.


1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 354-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Warren D. Goldfarb

The Gödel Class is the class of prenex formulas of pure quantification theory whose prefixes have the form ∀y1∀y2∃x1 … ∃xn. The Gödel Class with Identity, or GCI, is the corresponding class of formulas of quantification theory extended by inclusion of the identity-sign “ = ”. Although the Gödel Class has long been kndwn to be solvable, the decision problem for the Gödel Class with Identity is open. In this paper we prove that there is no primitive recursive decision procedure for the GCI, or, indeed, for the subclass of the GCI containing just those formulas with prefixes ∀y1∀y2∃x.Throughout this paper we take quantification theory to include, aside from logical signs, infinitely many k-place predicate letters for each k > 0, but no function signs or constants. Moreover, by “prenex formula” we include only those without free variables. A decision procedure for a class of formulas is a recursive function that carries a formula in the class to 0 if the formula is satisfiable and to 1 if not. A class is solvable iff there exists a decision procedure for it. A class is finitely controllable iff every satisfiable formula in the class has a finite model. Since we speak only of effectively specified classes, finite controllability implies solvability (but not conversely).The GCI has a curious history. Gödel showed the Gödel Class (without identity) solvable in 1932 [4] and finitely controllable in 1933 [5].


1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hartley Rogers

In § 1 we present conceptual material concerning the notion of a Gödel numbering of the partial recursive functions. § 2 presents a theorem about these concepts. § 3 gives several applications. The material in § 1 and § 2 grew out of attempts by the author to find routine solutions to some of the problems discussed in § 3. The author wishes to acknowledge his debt in § 2 to the fruitful methods of Myhill in [M] and to thank the referee for an abbreviated and improved version of the proof for Lemma 3 in § 2.In the literature of mathematical logic, “Gödel numbering” usually means an effective correspondence between integers and the well-formed formulas of some logical calculus. In recursive function theory, certain such associations between the non-negative integers and instructions for computing partial recursive functions have been fundamental. In the present paper we shall be concerned only with numberings of the latter, more special, sort. By numbers and integers we shall mean non-negative integers. Our notation is, in general, that of [K]. If ϕ and ψ are two partial functions, ϕ = ψ shall mean that (∀x)[ϕ(x)≃(ψx)], i.e., that ϕ and ψ are defined for the same arguments and are equal on those arguments. We consider partial recursive functions of one variable; applications of the paper to the case of several variables, or to the case of all partial recursive functions in any number of variables, can be made in the usual way using the coordinate functions (a)i of [K, p. 230]. It will furthermore be observed that we consider only concepts that are invariant with respect to general recursive functions; more limited notions of Gödel numbering, taking into account, say, primitive recursive structure, are beyond the scope of the present paper.


2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilfried Sieg

AbstractTwo young logicians, whose work had a dramatic impact on the direction of logic, exchanged two letters in early 1931. Jacques Herbrand initiated the correspondence on 7 April and Kurt Gödel responded on 25 July, just two days before Herbrand died in a mountaineering accident at La Bérarde (Isère). Herbrand's letter played a significant role in the development of computability theory. Gödel asserted in his 1934 Princeton Lectures and on later occasions that it suggested to him a crucial part of the definition of a general recursive function. Understanding this role in detail is of great interest as the notion is absolutely central. The full text of the letter had not been available until recently, and its content (as reported by Gödel) was not in accord with Herbrand's contemporaneous published work. Together, the letters reflect broader intellectual currents of the time: they are intimately linked to the discussion of the incompleteness theorems and their potential impact on Hilbert's Program.


1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Terlouw

It is known that every < ε0-recursive function is also a primitive recursive functional. Kreisel has proved this by means of Gödel's functional-interpretation, using that every < ε0-recursive function is provably recursive in Heyting's arithmetic [2, §3.4]. Parsons obtained a refinement of Kreisel's result by a further examination of Gödel's interpretation with regard to type levels [3, Theorem 5], [4, §4]. A quite different proof is provided by the research into extensions of the Grzegorczyk hierarchy as done by Schwichtenberg and Wainer: this yields another characterization of the < ε0-recursive functions from which easily appears that these are primitive recursive functionals (see [5] in combination with [6, Chapter II]).However, these proofs are indirect and do not show how, in general, given a definition tree of an ordinal recursive functional, transfinite recursions can be replaced (in a straightforward way) by recursions over wellorderings of lower order types. The argument given by Tait in [9, pp. 189–191] seems to be an improvement in this respect, but the crucial step in it is (at least in my opinion) not very clear.


1949 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Martin

The purpose of this note is (i) to point out an important similarity between the nominalistic system discussed by Quine in his recent paper On universals and the system of logic (the system н) developed by the author in A homogeneous system for formal logic, (ii) to offer certain corrections to the latter, and (iii) to show that that system (н) is adequate for the general theory of ancestrale and for the definition of any general recursive function of natural numbers.Nominalism as a thesis in the philosophy of science, according to Quine, is the view that it is possible to construct a language adequate for the purposes of science, which in no wise admits classes, properties, relations, or other abstract objects as values for variables.


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