Modality and quantification in S5

1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. N. Prior
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Strict Implication ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
Normal Bases ◽  
Complete Basis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Barcan Marcus

In the first of her papers on functional calculi based on strict implication, Ruth Barcan Marcus takes as her starting point the Lewis systems S2 and S4, supplemented by one of the normal bases for quantification theory, and by one special axiom for the mixture, asserting that if possibly something φ's then something possibly φ's. In the symbolism of Łukasiewicz, which will be used here, this axiom is expressible as CMΣxφxΣxMφx. In the present note I propose to show that if S5 had been taken as a startingpoint rather than S2 or S4, this formula need not have been laid down as an axiom but could have been deduced as a theorem.It has been shown by Gödel that a system equivalent to S5 may be obtained if we add to any complete basis for the classical propositional calculus a pair of symbols for ‘Necessarily’ and ‘Possibly,’ which here will be ‘L’ and ‘M’; the axiomsthe ruleRL: If α is a thesis, so is Lα;and the definitionDf. M: M = NLN.

Tense logic for discrete future time

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Schindler
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Tense Logic ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Future Time ◽  
Finite Model Property ◽  
Complete Basis ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus

Prior has conjectured that the tense-logical system Gli obtained by adding to a complete basis for the classical propositional calculus the primitive symbol G, the definitionsDf. F: Fα = NGNαDf. L: Lα = KαGα,and the postulatesis complete for the logic of linear, infinite, transitive, discrete future time. In this paper it is demonstrated that that conjecture is correct and it is shown that Gli has the finite model property: see [4]. The techniques used are in part suggested by those used in Bull [2] and [3]:Gli can be shown to be complete for the logic of linear, infinite, transitive, discrete future time in the sense that every formula of Gli which is true of such time can be proved as a theorem of Gli. For this purpose the notion of truth needs to be formalized. This formalization is effected by the construction of a model for linear, infinite, transitive, discrete future time.

New foundations for Lewis modal systems

1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Lemmon
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal System ◽  
New Foundations ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal Systems

The main aims of this paper are firstly to present new and simpler postulate sets for certain well-known systems of modal logic, and secondly, in the light of these results, to suggest some new or newly formulated calculi, capable of interpretation as systems of epistemic or deontic modalities. The symbolism throughout is that of [9] (see especially Part III, Chapter I). In what follows, by a Lewis modal system is meant a system which (i) contains the full classical propositional calculus, (ii) is contained in the Lewis system S5, (iii) admits of the substitutability of tautologous equivalents, (iv) possesses as theses the four formulae:We shall also say that a system Σ1 is stricter than a system Σ2, if both are Lewis modal systems and Σ1 is contained in Σ2 but Σ2 is not contained in Σ1; and we shall call Σ1absolutely strict, if it possesses an infinity of irreducible modalities. Thus, the five systems of Lewis in [5], S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, are all Lewis modal systems by this definition; they are in an order of decreasing strictness from S1 to S5; and S1 and S2 alone are absolutely strict.

A note on some intermediate propositional calculi

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branislav R. Boričić
Keyword(s):  
Positive Solution ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Conservative Extension ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Propositional Calculi

This note is written in reply to López-Escobar's paper [L-E] where a “sequence” of intermediate propositional systems NLCn (n ≥ 1) and corresponding implicative propositional systems NLICn (n ≥ 1) is given. We will show that the “sequence” NLCn contains three different systems only. These are the classical propositional calculus NLC1, Dummett's system NLC2 and the system NLC3. Accordingly (see [C], [Hs2], [Hs3], [B 1], [B2], [Hs4], [L-E]), the problem posed in the paper [L-E] can be formulated as follows: is NLC3a conservative extension of NLIC3? Having in mind investigations of intermediate propositional calculi that give more general results of this type (see V. I. Homič [H1], [H2], C. G. McKay [Mc], T. Hosoi [Hs 1]), in this note, using a result of Homič (Theorem 2, [H1]), we will give a positive solution to this problem.NLICnand NLCn. If X and Y are propositional logical systems, by X ⊆ Y we mean that the set of all provable formulas of X is included in that of Y. And X = Y means that X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X. A(P1/B1, …, Pn/Bn) is the formula (or the sequent) obtained from the formula (or the sequent) A by substituting simultaneously B1, …, Bn for the distinct propositional variables P1, …, Pn in A.Let Cn(n ≥ 1) be the string of the following sequents:Having in mind that the calculi of sequents can be understood as meta-calculi for the deducibility relation in the corresponding systems of natural deduction (see [P]), the systems of natural deductions NLCn and NLICn (n ≥ 1), introduced in [L-E], can be identified with the calculi of sequents obtained by adding the sequents Cn as axioms to a sequential formulation of the Heyting propositional calculus and to a system of positive implication, respectively (see [C], [Ch], [K], [P]).

scholarly journals Sobre a lógica deôntica não-clássica

1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (55) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
Leila Z. Puga ◽  
Newton C.A. Da Costa
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Classical System ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
First Order ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Expository Paper ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus

Our starting point, in this basically expository paper, is the study of a classical system of deontic propositional logic, classical in the sense that it constitutes an extension of the classical propositional calculus. It is noted, then, that the system excludes ab initio the possibility of the existence of real moral dilemmas (contradictory obligations and prohibitions), and also can not cope smoothly with the so-called prima facie moral dilemmas. So, we develop a non-classical, paraconsistent system of propositional deontic logic which is compatible with such dilemmas, real or prima facie. In our paraconsistent system one can handle them neatly, in particular one can directly investigate their force, operational meaning, and the most important consequences of their acceptance as not uncommon moral facts. Of course, we are conscious that other procedures for dealing with them are at hand, for example by the weakening of the specific deontic axioms. It is not argued that our procedure is the best, at least as regards the present state of the issue. We think only that owing, among other reasons, to the circumstance that the basic ethical concepts are intrinsically vague, it seems quite difficult to get rid of moral dilemmas and of moral deadlocks in general. Apparently this speaks in favour of a paraconsistent approach to ethics. At any rate, a final appraisal of the possible solutions to the problem of dilemmas and deadlocks, if there is one, constitutes a matter of ethical theory and not only of logic. On the other hand, the paraconsistency stance looks likely to be relevant also in the field of legal logic. It is shown, in outline, that the systems considered are sound and complete, relative to a natural semantics. All results of this paper can be extended to first-order and to higher-order logics. Such extensions give rise to the question of the transparency (or oppacity) of the deontic contexts. As we shall argue in forthcoming articles, they normally are transparent. [L.Z.P., N.C.A. da C.] (PDF en portugués)

scholarly journals COMPLETE ADDITIVITY AND MODAL INCOMPLETENESS

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-535
Author(s):  
WESLEY H. HOLLIDAY ◽  
TADEUSZ LITAK
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Provability Logic ◽  
Modal Algebras ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Bimodal Logic ◽  
Incompleteness Theorems ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Open Question

AbstractIn this article, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together an article of van Benthem (1979), “Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,” and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class ofcompletely additivemodal algebras, or as we call them,${\cal V}$-baos. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem’s article resolves the open question in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to${\cal V}$-baos, namely the provability logic$GLB$(Japaridze, 1988; Boolos, 1993). We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is${\cal V}$-complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy (Blok, 1978) to degrees of${\cal V}$-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem’s theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness.

Modus ponens under hypotheses

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. F. Bausch
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Classical Calculus ◽  
New Formulation ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus

The Stoic “indemonstrables” were inference rules; a rule about rules was the synthetic theorem: if from certain premisses a conclusion follows and from that conclusion and certain further premisses a second conclusion follows, then the second conclusion follows from all the premisses together. Similar things occur as medieval “rules of consequence”, although not usually on a metametalevel; and (with the same proviso) the following might be deemed a contemporary avatar of that Stoic theorem.If every formula which occurs once or more often in the list A1, A2, …, An, B1, B2, …, Bm occurs also at least once in the list C1, C2, …, Cr then:This rule [Church: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 1956, pp. 94, 165], which may be called the rule of modus ponens under hypotheses (MPH), is worthy of attention for the following reasons:A. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ A yield precisely the positive implicative calculus (and very easily, too).B. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ f ⊃ f ⊃ A yield a new formulation of the full classical propositional calculus (in terms of f and ⊃).C. MPH and the axioms ∼A ⊃ A ⊃ A and A ⊃. ∼A ⊃ B yield the classical calculus in terms of ∼ and ⊃.

scholarly journals On certain infinite integrals involving Struve functions and parabolic cylinder functions

1946 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. C. Mitra
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Parabolic Cylinder ◽  
Parabolic Cylinder Functions ◽  
Struve Functions ◽  
Image Position

The object of the present note is to obtain a number of infinite integrals involving Struve functions and parabolic cylinder functions. 1. G. N. Watson(1) has proved thatFrom (1)follows provided that the integral is convergent and term-by-term integration is permissible. A great many interesting particular cases of (2) are easily deducible: the following will be used in this paper.

On the logic of incomplete answers

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Cresswell
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Complete List ◽  
Strict Implication ◽  
Complete Answer ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Image Position

I have argued in [1] that a concept bearing some resemblance to ‘p is the answer to d’ (p a proposition and d a question) can be defined wherever d has the form,‘For which a's is it the case that A (a)?’ (Qa)A(a)where a is a variable and A a wff containing a. To say that p is the true and complete answer to (Qa)A(a) is expressed as saying that p is logically equivalent to the true conjunction of A(a) or ~A(a) for each a. It is defined as;Such a concept of answer is like Belnap's [2] direct true answer to a complete list question, or like Harrah's use [3] (p. 43) of the notion of a state description. The main difference between my approach and that of Belnap and Harrah is that while they are concerned to develop a formal metalanguage for discussion of questions and answers I am concerned to express, as far as possible in existing systems, certain interrogative statements; in particular statements of the form ‘— is the (an) answer to —’.While the account in [1] does give a formal analysis of one ‘answer’ concept there are respects in which it is inadequate.1. Since it uses entailment (or strict implication) to define the relation between p the answer and d the question we can shew that if p is the answer to d and q is logically equivalent to p then q is the answer to d.

Sophocles, ‘Electra’ 1205–10

1973 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 45-46
Author(s):  
R. D. Dawe
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Greek Tragedy ◽  
Image Position

The attribution of lines to different speakers in Greek tragedy is a matter on which MSS have notoriously little authority. As for Electra itself, there are at least three places where the name of the heroine has been incorrectly added in some or all MSS. In my Studies in the Text of Sophocles, I, 198, I list these places and suggest that the same error has happened at a fourth place, viz. 1323. The purpose of the present note is to suggest that at El. 1205–10 the same mistake has happened yet again.The situation is that Electra is holding the urn which she falsely believes to contain the ashes of her dead brother, Orestes. But Orestes is alive, and before her at this very moment. He is trying to persuade her to give up the urn. If the text before us had been preserved in a MS devoid of ascriptions to speakers, no one would have been so perverse as to do what all MSS and editors do in fact do, namely attribute the words οὔ φημ᾿ ἐάσειν to Orestes.

scholarly journals On general curves lying on a quadric

1927 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. F. Baker
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Rational Curves ◽  
Stationary Points ◽  
Image Position

Introduction. The present note, though in continuation of the preceding one dealing with rational curves, is written so as to be independent of this. It is concerned to prove that if a curve of order n, and genus p, with k cusps, or stationary points, lying on a quadric, Ω, in space of any number of dimensions, is such that itself, its tangents, its osculating planes, … , and finally its osculating (h – 1)-folds, all lie on the quadric Ω, then the number of its osculating h-folds which lie on the quadric isTwo proofs of this result are given, in §§ 4 and 5.

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