Benson Mates. Stoic logic and the text of Sextus Empiricus. American journal of philology (Baltimore), vol. 70 (1949), pp. 290–298.

The article advances a hypothesis about the composition of Michel de Montaigne’s Essays. Specialists in the intellectual history of the Renaissance have long considered the relationship among Montaigne’s thematically heterogeneous thoughts, which unfold unpredictably and often seen to contradict each other. The waywardness of those reflections over the years was a way for Montaigne to construct a self-portrait. Spontaneity of thought is the essence of the person depicted and an experimental literary technique that was unprecedented in its time and has still not been surpassed. Montaigne often writes about freedom of reflection and regards it as an extremely important topic. There have been many attempts to interpret the haphazardness of the Essays as the guiding principle in their composition. According to one such interpretation, the spontaneous digressions and readiness to take up very different philosophical notions is a form of of varietas and distinguo, which Montaigne understood in the context of Renaissance philosophy. Another interpretation argues that the Essays employ the rhetorical techniques of Renaissance legal commentary. A third opinion regards the Essays as an example of sprezzatura, a calculated negligence that calls attention to the aesthetic character of Montaigne’s writing. The author of the article argues for a different interpretation that is based on the concept of idleness to which Montaigne assigned great significance. He had a keen appreciation of the role of otium in the culture of ancient Rome and regarded leisure as an inner spiritual quest for self-knowledge. According to Montaigne, idleness permits self-directedness, and it is an ideal form in which to practice the freedom of thought that brings about consistency in writing, living and reality, in all of which Montaigne finds one general property - complete inconstancy. Socratic self-knowledge, a skepticism derived from Pyrrho of Elis and Sextus Empiricus, and a rejection of the conventions of traditional rhetoric that was similar to Seneca’s critique of it were all brought to bear on the concept of idleness and made Montaigne’s intellectual and literary experimentation in the Essays possible.

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Part Eight

10.1093/oso/9780190673505.003.0008 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Robert J. Fogelin

Keyword(s):

Cloud Formation ◽

Striking Similarity ◽

Common Life ◽

Natural Religion ◽

Sextus Empiricus ◽

Argument From Design

Philo expands on the nature of his objections to the natural religion of Cleanthes: far-fetched comparisons are dismissed in matters of common life, but are appropriate objections when we rise to the level of abstruse and remote reasoning. He offers a counterargument to the design-designer hypothesis, citing Epicurus. Constancy and change are discussed; cloud formation is one example. Philo’s critique of Cleanthes’ argument from design moves through stages, with striking similarity to Agrippa’s suspension of belief as presented by Sextus Empiricus.

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Five Modes of Scepticism

10.1093/oso/9780198798361.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Stefan Sienkiewicz

Keyword(s):

Sextus Empiricus ◽

Theoretical Assumptions ◽

Limiting Case ◽

Do So

This book offers an account of the functioning of the five Agrippan modes of scepticism as presented in the works of Sextus Empiricus. These five modes (of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity, and relativity) are analysed, individually, in the book’s first five chapters, and, collectively, in its sixth. Two perspectives on these modes are distinguished from one another—a dogmatic perspective which considers how a dogmatic philosopher might come to suspend judgement on the basis of these modes and a sceptical perspective which considers how a sceptic might come to do so. It is argued that the standard way in which these modes have been understood has been from a dogmatic perspective. The book opens up an alternative sceptical perspective on the modes according to which mode of disagreement (or one version of it) is equivalent to the sceptic’s method of equipollence, and the modes of hypothesis, infinite regression, and reciprocity are different instances of that method (with the mode of hypothesis being a limiting case of the method). It is also argued that the mode of relativity is inconsistent with the mode of disagreement and should be discarded when considering how the modes work together in a combined sceptical strategy. The final chapter offers an account of four different ways in which the modes might be combined together and concludes that each of these ways turns on a number of theoretical assumptions which the sceptic is not in a position to make.

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