Inner models for set theory—Part II

1952 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 225-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson

In this paper we continue the study of inner models of the type studied inInner models for set theory—Part I.The present paper is concerned exclusively with a particular kind of model, the ‘super-complete models’ defined in section 2.4 of I (page 186). The condition (c) of 2.4 and the completeness condition 1.42 imply that such a model is uniquely determined when its universal class Vmis given. Writing condition (c) and the completeness conditions 1.41, 1.42 in terms of Vm, we may state the definition in the form:3.1. Dfn.A classVmis said to determine a super-complete model if the model whose basic notions are defined by,satisfies axiomsA, B, C.N. B. This definition is not necessarily metamathematical in nature. If desired, it could be written out quite formally as the definition of a notion ‘SCM(U)’ (‘Udetermines a super-complete model’) thus:whereψ(U) is the propositional function expressing in terms ofUthe fact that the model determined byUaccording to 3.1 satisfies the relativization of axioms A, B, C. E.g. corresponding to axiom A1m, i.e.,,ψ(U) contains the equivalent term. All the relativized axioms can be similarly expressed in this way by first writing out the relativized form (after having replaced all defined symbols which occur by the corresponding formulae in primitive notation) and then replacing ‘(Am)ϕ(Am) bywhich is in turn replaced by, and similarly replacing ‘(xm)ϕ(xm)’ by ‘(xm)ϕ(xm)’ by ‘(X)(X ϵ U ▪ ⊃ ▪ ϕ(X)), andThusψ(U) is obtained in primitive notation.

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson

In this third and last paper on inner models we consider some of the inherent limitations of the method of using inner models of the type defined in 1.2 for the proof of consistency results for the particular system of set theory under consideration. Roughly speaking this limitation may be described by saying that practically no further consistency results can be obtained by the construction of models satisfying the conditions of theorem 1.5, i.e., conditions 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.51, viz.:This applies in particular to the ‘complete models’ defined in 1.4. Before going on to a precise statement of these limitations we shall consider now the theorem on which they depend. This is concerned with a particular type of complete model examples of which we call “proper complete models”; they are those complete models which are essentially interior to the universe, those whose classes are sets of the universe constituting a class thereof, i.e., those for which the following proposition is true:The main theorem of this paper is that the statement that there are no models of this kind can be expressed formally in the same way as the axioms A, B, C and furthermore it can be proved that if the axiom system A, B, C is consistent then so is the system consisting of axioms A, B, C, plus this new hypothesis that there exist no proper complete models. When combined with the axiom ‘V = L’ introduced by Gödel in (1) this new hypothesis yields a system in which any normal complete model which exists has for its universal class V, the universal class of the original system.


1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang

In mathematics, when we want to introduce classes which fulfill certain conditions, we usually prove beforehand that classes fulfilling such conditions do exist, and that such classes are uniquely determined by the conditions. The statements which state such unicity and existence of classes are in mathematical logic consequences of the principles of extensionality and class existence. In order to illustrate how these principles enable us to introduce classes into systems of mathematical logic, let us consider the manner in which Gödel introduces classes in his book on set theory.For instance, before introducing the definition of the non-ordered pair of two classesGödel puts down as its justification the following two axioms:By A4, for every two classesyandzthere exists at least one non-ordered pairwof them; and by A3,wis uniquely determined in A4.


1967 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie H. Tharp

We are concerned here with the set theory given in [1], which we call BL (Bernays-Levy). This theory can be given an elegant syntactical presentation which allows most of the usual axioms to be deduced from the reflection principle. However, it is more convenient here to take the usual Von Neumann-Bernays set theory [3] as a starting point, and to regard BL as arising from the addition of the schema where S is the formal definition of satisfaction (with respect to models which are sets) and ┌φ┐ is the Gödel number of φ which has a single free variable X.


2012 ◽  
Vol 96 (536) ◽  
pp. 213-220
Author(s):  
Harlan J. Brothers

Pascal's triangle is well known for its numerous connections to probability theory [1], combinatorics, Euclidean geometry, fractal geometry, and many number sequences including the Fibonacci series [2,3,4]. It also has a deep connection to the base of natural logarithms, e [5]. This link to e can be used as a springboard for generating a family of related triangles that together create a rich combinatoric object.2. From Pascal to LeibnizIn Brothers [5], the author shows that the growth of Pascal's triangle is related to the limit definition of e.Specifically, we define the sequence sn; as follows [6]:


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 545-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE C. PAULSON

A special final coalgebra theorem, in the style of Aczel (1988), is proved within standard Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Aczel's Anti-Foundation Axiom is replaced by a variant definition of function that admits non-well-founded constructions. Variant ordered pairs and tuples, of possibly infinite length, are special cases of variant functions. Analogues of Aczel's solution and substitution lemmas are proved in the style of Rutten and Turi (1993). The approach is less general than Aczel's, but the treatment of non-well-founded objects is simple and concrete. The final coalgebra of a functor is its greatest fixedpoint.Compared with previous work (Paulson, 1995a), iterated substitutions and solutions are considered, as well as final coalgebras defined with respect to parameters. The disjoint sum construction is replaced by a smoother treatment of urelements that simplifies many of the derivations.The theory facilitates machine implementation of recursive definitions by letting both inductive and coinductive definitions be represented as fixed points. It has already been applied to the theorem prover Isabelle (Paulson, 1994).


10.29007/39jj ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Wegner ◽  
Eugene Eberbach ◽  
Mark Burgin

In the paper we prove in a new and simple way that Interactionmachines are more powerful than Turing machines. To do thatwe extend the definition of Interaction machines to multiple interactivecomponents, where each component may perform simple computation.The emerging expressiveness is due to the power of interaction and allowsto accept languages not accepted by Turing machines. The mainresult that Interaction machines can accept arbitrary languages over agiven alphabet sheds a new light to the power of interaction. Despite ofthat we do not claim that Interaction machines are complete. We claimthat a complete theory of computer science cannot exist and especially,Turing machines or Interaction machines cannot be a complete model ofcomputation. However complete models of computation may and shouldbe approximated indefinitely and our contribution presents one of suchattempts.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawkat Alkhazaleh ◽  
Abdul Razak Salleh

In 1999 Molodtsov introduced the concept of soft set theory as a general mathematical tool for dealing with uncertainty. Alkhazaleh et al. in 2011 introduced the definition of a soft multiset as a generalization of Molodtsov's soft set. In this paper we give the definition of fuzzy soft multiset as a combination of soft multiset and fuzzy set and study its properties and operations. We give examples for these concepts. Basic properties of the operations are also given. An application of this theory in decision-making problems is shown.


1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-704
Author(s):  
Donald Perlis

Ackermann's set theory [1], called here A, involves a schemawhere φ is an ∈-formula with free variables among y1, …, yn and w does not appear in φ. Variables are thought of as ranging over classes and V is intended as the class of all sets.S is a kind of comprehension principle, perhaps most simply motivated by the following idea: The familiar paradoxes seem to arise when the class CP of all P-sets is claimed to be a set, while there exists some P-object x not in CP such that x would have to be a set if CP were. Clearly this cannot happen if all P-objects are sets.Now, Levy [2] and Reinhardt [3] showed that A* (A with regularity) is in some sense equivalent to ZF. But the strong replacement axiom of Gödel-Bernays set theory intuitively ought to be a theorem of A* although in fact it is not (Levy's work shows this). Strong replacement can be formulated asThis lack of A* can be remedied by replacing S above bywhere ψ and φ are ∈-formulas and x is not in ψ and w is not in φ. ψv is ψ with quantifiers relativized to V, and y and z stand for y1, …, yn and z1, …, zm.


1963 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. J. Hancock

SummaryThe validity and applicability of the static margin (stick fixed) Kn,where as defined by Gates and Lyon is shown to be restricted to the conventional flexible aircraft. Alternative suggestions for the definition of static margin are put forward which can be equally applied to the conventional flexible aircraft of the past and the integrated flexible aircraft of the future. Calculations have been carried out on simple slender plate models with both linear and non-linear aerodynamic forces to assess their static stability characteristics.


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