Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?

1995 ◽  
Vol 105 (432) ◽  
pp. 1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Rationality ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Famous Theorem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Natural Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.

‘Decolonising’ the clinical encounter via multi-criteria decision support (Preprint)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Dowie ◽  
Mette Kjer Kaltoft
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Decision Support ◽  
Health Service ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Public Health Service ◽  
Communicative Action ◽  
Clinical Encounter ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Decision Support Framework ◽  
Strategic Rationality

UNSTRUCTURED According to researchers drawing on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, Canadian patients and Danish General Practitioners are experiencing ‘colonisation’ of their ‘lifeworlds’ by ‘the system’, Their suggested remedy is to ensure that the clinical encounter, freed of strategic rationality, re-prioritises Habermasian ‘communicative action’ aimed at mutual understanding. However, Blau shows that such communicative action is, and should be, inextricably interwoven into means-end rationality, when Habermas’ caricature of the latter is rejected. We argue that the decision support framework provided by Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis can help produce the ‘communicative means-end rationality’ essential in a public health service based on role-respecting sincerity and autonomy. No ‘positivistic reduction’ is involved in the technique.

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