Market Structure and Corporate Behaviour. Theory and Empirical Analysis of the Firm.

1973 ◽  
Vol 83 (331) ◽  
pp. 1004
Author(s):  
T. M. Rybczynski ◽  
Keith Cowling
1970 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-45
Author(s):  
Richard A. King

In spite of the volume of literature produced over the years reflecting concern over the present state of the arts, the situation is likely to continue. However, there are several new ideas that offer some promise for improving our understanding and ability to project new relationships in the agribusiness sector of the Southern region.Although the title of this article implies a one-way set of forces working from agricultural industrialization to market structure, some of our colleagues regard this relationship as a two way process with forces at work in each sector having strong impacts on the other. It is these interdependencies that make the task of model building so difficult and empirical analysis so complex.


1977 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Frass ◽  
Douglas F. Greer

2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 563-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie X. Cai ◽  
David Hillier ◽  
Robert Hudson ◽  
Kevin Keasey

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-112
Author(s):  
Joshua S. Gans ◽  
Avi Goldfarb ◽  
Mara Lederman

Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty highlights the role of “voice” when individuals confront an unexpected deterioration in quality. Yet, voice has received little attention. To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of voice as the equilibrium of a relational contract between customers and firms. We use data on 4 million tweets to or about US airlines to study the relationship between quality, voice, and market structure. Voice increases when quality deteriorates. This relationship is greater for airlines that operate a large share of flights in a market. Supplemental analyses support a relational contracting role for voice. (JEL D83, L15, L82, L93)


2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanjib Bhuyan

The issue of whether vertical integration can raise market power is hotly debated because firms have a market power-related incentive to integrate vertically. Using a sample of U.S. food manufacturing industries, this “market power” motive is empirically tested in this study. Empirical analysis shows that forward vertical ownership integration (or vertical mergers) did not increase food manufacturers' market power in the final product market. The study, however, shows that both market structure and conduct significantly influenced market power in the food industries.


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