A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism

1993 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Devitt
Keyword(s):  
Studia Logica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuel D Belnap ◽  
Gerald J. Massey
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Dominik Perler

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This chapter argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism, and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism, and naturalism. This crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The chapter examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies.


1994 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-60
Author(s):  
Michael Devitt
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 524-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Andreas

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 255-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ryba

AbstractThis paper examines some of the interpretations of the insider/outsider distinction as it is understood in the study of religion but in light of Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's arguments about semantic holism and atomism. It argues that this application shows that if the outsider/insider distinction is approached as a form of global holism coupled with linguistic determinism, then it is a pseudo-problem and no further energy ought to be wasted on it. Also argued is that radically exclusive insidership or radically inclusive insidership are indefensible positions. Instead, this paper proposes that access to the inside of a worldview is, in principle, no different for a insider than for an outsider; it is a matter of degree and not kind. No variety of religious information is, per se, incommunicable, except that of the individual subject's existential subjecthood. Insidership and outsidership in the academic study of religion indicate positions with respect to agency, thematization, and explanation and should not be defined, primarily, by occupation, material, or methods.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajiba Lochan Behera
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Søren Rosendal

AbstractIn this article I argue that Hegel and Saussure both discovered a new mode of theorization that I propose to call ‘structural explication’. This is distinct from the generally dominant ‘linear’ mode of theorization—i.e., causal and quasi-causal explanations. I also argue that the standard criticisms usually directed against Hegel and Saussure stem from a failure to appreciate the nature of structural explication. For example, both Hegel and Saussure argue that—in some deep sense—form can generate content. But this must be comprehended in a strictly non-linear way. A linear interpretation of such arguments will lead to absurdities. I propose to call such deep generative structures (with a nod to Kant) the ‘necessary structures of possibility’. By comparing Hegel's thoughts on the science of a philosophical logic and Saussure's thoughts on the science of a general linguistics it is possible to discern a deep ‘scientific’ affinity. Furthermore, I argue that the structural level cannot be accounted for in any linear way. On the contrary, the linear explanation is fundamentally dependent on a structural explication of the genesis of the basic terms it assumes as ‘given’. A possible reason for the pervasiveness of the linear explanation (besides, perhaps, the success of causality-oriented natural sciences) is that discursive language is linear and our lived experience in time is linear. Thus, a structural explication will inherently appear less intuitive, and maybe also less ‘satisfying’, than a linear explanation. Finally, I also bring the distinction between the linear and the structural to bear on Robert Brandom's normative pragmatist reading of Hegel's ‘semantic holism’.


Synthese ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mack Harrell

Philosophia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam C. Podlaskowski
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document