An Act to Punish Acts of Interference with the Foreign Relations, The Neutrality, and The Foreign Commerce of the United States, to Punish Espionage, and Better to Enforce The Criminal Laws of the United States, and for Other Purposes

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.

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Foreign Relations Law

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190653330.013.3 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 43-61

Author(s):

Karen Knop

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

International Law ◽

Foreign Relations ◽

Comparative Law ◽

The United States ◽

Legal Systems ◽

The U.S

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.

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