WTO Dispute Settlement Body—Article XX environmental exceptions to GATT—national treatment—consistency urith GATT of U.S. rules regarding imports of reformulated gasoline

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Hippler Bello ◽  
Maury D. Shenk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Clean Air ◽  
Gatt 1994

United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. 35ILM 603 (1996).World Trade Organization Appellate Body, April 29, 1996.In United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body in its first decision addressed one of the most difficult contemporary issues in international trade— the tension between the growth of international trade and the protection of the global environment. The Appellate Body decided that rules regarding standards for cleanliness of gasoline (Gasoline Rule) adopted under the Clean Air Act by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which required importers of gasoline to meet different standards from those required of domestic refiners, were not justifiable restrictions on trade under the environmental exceptions of Article XX of GATT 1994 (GATT).

International trade—WTO—quantitative restrictions—environmental protection—endangered species—U.S. import ban on shrimp

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 507-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Gregory Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Endangered Species ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Turtle Species ◽  
Wild Fauna ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Gatt 1994

United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, October 12, 1998.In May 1996, the United States effectively prohibited imports of shrimp and shrimp products from all countries that do not require commercial shrimp trawlers to use turtle-excluder devices (TEDs) to permit endangered species of sea turtles to escape from trawling nets to avoid drowning. In January 1997, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand requested that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel to determine whether this import ban, among other things, violates the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article XI of GATT (1994). The United States maintained that its import ban was permitted under the exceptions set forth in paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT Article XX. Four turtle species that migrate in and out of waters subject to the complaining parties’ jurisdiction are listed as endangered under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and are covered by the relevant U.S. regulation.

scholarly journals The Impending Dejudicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones—nontariff trade barriers—control of food additives—scientific basis for restrictions—WTO dispute settlement mechanisms—scope of review

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
David A. Wirth
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Food Additives ◽  
Meat Products ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement

European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R.World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.

scholarly journals THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
The Public ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.

WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Schoenbaum
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Appeal Process

We have now had three years' experience with the dispute-settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on 1 January 1995. By any objective standard, this system of dispute settlement is a resounding success. Well over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and, as at the end of 1997,25cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 were under consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal process. The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, the quality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO are complying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.

scholarly journals A RELAÇÃO ENTRE ESTADO E AS ENTIDADES PRIVADAS NA REGULAÇÃO DO COMÉRCIO INTERNACIONAL POR MEIO DOS REGULAMENTOS E PADRÕES PRIVADOS

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Patricia Yurie Dias
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
International Law ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Private Standards ◽  
Complementary Role ◽  
The World

RESUMOO trabalho analisa o papel complementar dos regulamentos e padrões privados dos Estados e das entidades não estatais às regras da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) com o intuito de gerar maior segurança e qualidade para os produtos no âmbito do comércio internacional. A OMC visa promover a liberalização e eliminação da discriminação do comércio internacional. Dessa forma, por meio do estudo de alguns casos submetidos ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC, em que pese a maioria dos casos submetidos ao OSC terem tido desfechos distintos, constatou-se que os padrões privados podem complementar as regras da OMC, desde que não sejam medidas protecionistas  disfarçadas de barreiras não tarifárias ao comércio internacional.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Internacional; Jurisdição Internacional; Padrões privados; Comércio Internacional; OMC.ABSTRACTThe paper examines the complementary role of the private regulations and standards of States and non-state entities to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to promote safety and quality for products in the scope of international trade. The WTO aims to promote the liberalization and elimination of discrimination in international trade. Thus, through the study of some cases submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), despite the fact that most cases submitted to the DSB had different conclusions, it was found that private standards can complement the rules of the WTO, if they are not protectionist measures disguised as non-tariff barriers to international trade.KEYWORDS: International Law; International Jurisdiction; Private Standards; International Trade; WTO.

Diplomacy and the Settlement of International Trade Disputes

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1358-1389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Philip Potter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact

How do countries settle disputes in the shadow of the law? Even in the presence of legalized dispute settlement, countries still rely on diplomatic channels to resolve conflicts. But it can be difficult to assess diplomacy’s impact on dispute resolution because those channels tend to be opaque. We present both an original theory of the impact of diplomacy on dispute resolution and a novel measure of diplomacy. If countries with close or, conversely, distant relationships use legal channels for dispute resolution, diplomacy will have little impact on dispute settlement; resorting to legal recourse among friends or adversaries likely means that the dispute is intractable. However, diplomacy can increase the chances of settlement between countries with moderate levels of affinity. We test this argument using a protocol-based proxy for diplomatic interactions—gifts given at the occasion of meetings between diplomatic counterparts—that would otherwise be difficult to observe. Using the case of the United States and its disputes in the World Trade Organization, we find support for our argument. This suggests that even when countries resort to legalized methods of dispute settlement, bilateral dealmaking still plays an important role.

scholarly journals U.S. Refusal to Appoint Members Renders WTO Appellate Body Unable to Hear New Appeals

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.

scholarly journals PROTEKSIONISME SENGKETA DAGANG DALAM PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL: PENDEKATAN NEGOSIASI STUDI KASUS: PROTEKSIONISME AS TERHADAP IMPOR DAGING KANADA

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Laode Muhamad Fathun
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Free Market ◽  
The United States ◽  
Domestic Market ◽  
Macro Scale

This paper will explain the problem of dispute in international trade and the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a mediator in the dispute. Economic globalization in the form of international trade relations through free market slogan has a positive and negative impact. That condition’s are the consequences of countries that become members of the WTO to create a competitive market. Trade protectionism is an unfair form of anti-free market policy in the international market. This policy is done to protect a country’s domestic market but on the other hand reduces the spirit of the free market. Protection is often done by taking into account administrative documents, quota counts, product certification, health aspect, labor protection as a way where the state protects its domestic market. One of the policy examples has been made by the United States in practice of importing meat from Canada where WTO as a mediator and international trade regime becomes the dominant actor in the negotiation process. As a result, the United States cannot prove the state's allegation against Canadian meat imports after a special panel was conducted in a session at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Therefore the protectionist policy must be rational and accountable so that no country will be harmed by its impact either in the micro scale (consumer) or the macro scale (country). Keywords: Economic Development, Trade Globalization, Free Trade, Trade Barriers, Protectionism, WTO.   Abstrak   Makalah ini akan menjelaskan masalah perselisihan dalam perdagangan internasional dan peran World Trade Organization (WTO) sebagai mediator dalam perselisihan tersebut. Globalisasi ekonomi dalam bentuk hubungan perdagangan internasional melalui slogan pasar bebas telah memberikan dampak positif maupun negatif. Kondisi itu merupakan konsekuensi dari negara-negara yang menjadi anggota WTO untuk menciptakan pasar yang kompetitif. Proteksionisme perdagangan merupakan bentuk kebijakan anti-pasar bebas yang tidak adil dalam pasar internasional. Kebijakan ini dilakukan untuk melindungi pasar dalam negeri yang di lain pihak mengurangi semangat pasar bebas. Perlindungan sering dilakukan dengan menerapkan aturan dokumen administrasi, jumlah kuota, sertifikasi produk, aspek kesehatan, proteksi tenaga kerja sebagai cara negara melindungi pasar domestiknya. Salah satu contoh adalah kebijakan yang pernah dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat terhadap impor daging dari Kanada dimana WTO sebagai mediator dan rezim perdagangan internasional menjadi aktor dominan dalam proses negosiasi. Hasilnya Amerika Serikat tidak bisa membuktikan tuduhan terhadap impor daging Kanada setelah dilakukan panel khusus dalam sidang di Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) atau Badan Penyelesaian Persengketaan WTO. Jadi kebijakan proteksionis harus rasional dan bisa dipertanggungjawabkan sehingga tidak ada satu negara pun yang dirugikan oleh dampak kebijakan tersebut baik pada skala mikro (konsumen) maupun skala makro (negara). Kata kunci: Perkembangan Ekonomi, Globalisasi Perdagangan, Perdagangan Bebas, Hambatan Perdagangan, Proteksionisme, WTO

scholarly journals Addressing (or Not) Widespread Concerns with the WTO

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 321-322
Author(s):  
Terence P. Stewart
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Advisory Opinions

The United States for at least sixteen years has had serious concerns with whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was operating according to the terms upon which WTO Members had agreed. While the United States has been a major supporter of the WTO system and the dispute settlement system generally, concerns about sovereignty and the proper functioning of the system have been important since at least 2002, reflected in U.S. legislation and actions by three administrations. Concerns have existed on (1) whether panels and the Appellate Body have honored the limitations contained in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) not to create rights or obligations; (2) the issuance of advisory opinions on issues not raised or not necessary to the resolution of the dispute; (3) actions of the Appellate Body that permit deviation from the DSU without affirmative authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and, former Appellate Body members continuing to be involved in cases after their term has expired (failure to complete appeals in the DSU required maximum time of ninety days). These are all issues that have concerned the United States for years but also have been raised by other members.

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