Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc.

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 820-824
Author(s):  
Michael R. Calabrese

The former majority shareholders of Industria Nacional de Clavos y Alambres de Puas, S.A. (INCA), a large Nicaraguan steel company, sought to recover from Harlow & Jones, Inc. (H & J), a U.S. steel company, the purchase price of a shipment of undelivered steel billets. Following the Sandinista revolution, the Nicaraguan Government had “intervened” in INCA and it, too, demanded the funds that H & J interpleaded into the court. The district court rejected the claim of the Sandinista Government and allocated the funds to the benefit of all parties who held shares in the company prior to the intervention. On cross-appeals by the claimants, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (per Kaufman, J.) affirmed in part and reversed in part, and held: the act of state doctrine does not bar judicial resolution of the dispute over the funds; the actions of the Sandinista Government amounted to a taking without compensation that will not be enforced by the U.S. courts; and the district court’s allocation of pro rata shares for all of the preintervention stockholders, including minority interests, was equitable.

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 918-923
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Price

In response to a request by Canadian tax authorities under the United States-Canada Double Taxation Convention (Convention), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued summonses to obtain U.S. bank records concerning certain accounts of respondents, Canadian citizens whose Canadian tax liability was under investigation. Respondents sought to quash the summonses, arguing that because under 26 U.S.C. §7609(b) the IRS is prohibited by U.S. law from using its summons authority to obtain information about a U.S. taxpayer once a case is referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, and because the tax investigation of respondents was part of a Canadian criminal investigation, the IRS should be precluded from using its summons authority to honor the Canadian request under the Convention. Unsuccessful in the district court, respondents prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that under the “good faith” standard applicable to enforcement of domestic summonses, the IRS may issue a summons pursuant to a Convention request only if it first determines and makes an affirmative statement to the effect that the Canadian investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. The U.S. Supreme Court (per Brennan, J.) reversed, and held: (1) that if the summons is issued in good faith, it is enforceable regardless of whether the Canadian request is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law; and (2) neither United States law nor anything in the text or the ratification history of the Convention supports the imposition of additional requirements. Justice Kennedy (joined by O’Connor, J.), concurring in part and in the judgment, filed a brief opinion to state his view that it is unnecessary to decide whether Senate preratification materials are authoritative sources for treaty interpretation. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to oppose the use of such materials in treaty construction.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 368-371
Author(s):  
Jerome M. Marcus

In an action brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, plaintiff, the National Petrochemical Co. of Iran (NPC), sought damages against Monnris Enterprises of Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, Rotexchemie Brunst & Co. of Hamburg (Rotex), and Rotex’s Geneva affiliate, Formula S.A., for breach of an agreement to sell chemicals to NPC. Asserting that NPC is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Co., which is in turn owned wholly by the Government of Iran, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the United States does not recognize the Khomeini Government of Iran and, hence, that neither Iran nor its instrumentality NPC has standing to sue in U.S. courts. The district court granted the motion, NPC appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held: (1) that a foreign state may have standing to sue in U.S. courts even if the United States does not recognize its government or have diplomatic relations with it; (2) that an unrecognized government will have standing to sue if the U.S. executive branch has evinced a willingness to permit the plaintiff to litigate its claims in U.S. courts; and (3) that the level of intercourse between the United States and Iran, and a Statement of Interest filed in this case by the United States as amicuš curiae, show that the executive branch is willing to permit NPC to litigate its claims in U.S. courts.


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 828-830
Author(s):  
Edward M. Leigh

Plaintiff Zedan, an American citizen, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for breach of a contract guaranteeing wages and profits. While performance under the contract occurred in Saudi Arabia, plaintiff alleged that the jurisdictional requirements under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) were satisfied by a recruitment call in California from a representative of the royal overseer of a private Saudi company. The district court granted the Saudi motion to dismiss. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (per Silberman, J.) unanimously affirmed and held: (1) that the telephone call did not have the requisite substantiality of contact with the United States; (2) that it was not sufficient to form the basis of a cause of action; and (3) that the alleged breach did not have sufficient direct effect in the United States to satisfy the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94
Author(s):  
Sonya D. Winner

In 1985 two intelligence agencies of the South Korean Government announced that they had successfully disrupted a North Korean spy ring operating in the United States. Their press release, which was widely publicized in the Korean press, named Chang-Sin Lee as a North Korean agent associated with a spy ring at Western Illinois University, where Lee had been a student. The story was picked up and reported in the United States by six Korean-American newspapers and a public television station. When Lee sued for libel, the defendants relied upon the official report privilege, which gives absolute protection to the accurate republication of official government reports. The district court, holding that the privilege applied and that Lee had not overcome it by showing malice, dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which in a two to one decision reversed (per Ervin, J.) and held: that the official report privilege does not apply to the republication of official reports of foreign governments. Judge Kaufman, sitting by designation, dissented from the majority’s reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-469
Author(s):  
Ashley Clare Hague

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently upheld a United States District Court for the District of Maine Judge's decision to dismiss a Maine plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against a Massachusetts hospital defendant for want of personal jurisdiction over the hospital. The Court of Appeals found it unreasonable to hale hospitals into an out-of-state court merely because they accept out-of-state patients.Plaintiff Danielle Harlow is a Maine resident who suffered a stroke at the age of six while undergoing a medical procedure at Children's Hospital of Boston, Massachusetts (“Children's Hospital”). The stroke, allegedly caused by the Hospital's negligence, led to brain damage resulting in partial paralysis and cognitive and behavioral impairments. The procedure was supposed to treat Harlow's rapid heartbeat, a condition related to her Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome. Harlow's pediatrician in Maine recommended that she visit Children's Hospital in Boston to treat her arrhythmia.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-828
Author(s):  
Erika Wilkinson

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-92

Rio Algom Corporation appeals from an order adjudging it, and its president , George R. Albino , to be in will ful and in excusable civil contempt of court for failing to comply with a discovery order of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. Rio Algom was ordered to pay into the registry of the court the sum of $10,000, per day, until such time as Rio Algom complied with the order. It was further provided that should Rio Algom fail to pay the ordered fine, the United States Marshal was authorized and directed to enter upon the property of Rio Algom at La Sal, Utah and seize "any and all property of Rio Algom of sufficient value to satisfy the above sums." Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that the trial court erred in holding Rio Algom in contempt and in imposing the severe sanction in connection therewith. We therefore reverse.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-573
Author(s):  
Gregory H. Fox

The plaintiff, a Chinese citizen who entered the United States under a nonimmigrant student visa, appealed from a decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deny his request for asylum. Plaintiff claimed that he had a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the prerequisite to attaining “refugee” status under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the Act) and implementing regulations promulgated by the INS. He also claimed that the immigration judge had erred by refusing to obtain a second advisory opinion from the Department of State’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (per Nelson, J.) held that (1) the immigration judge had abused his discretion by not requesting a second advisory opinion from the BHRHA; and (2) the judge had incorrectly applied an objective standard in evaluating plaintiffs asylum request, when credible evidence demonstrated that plaintiff had a subjectively valid fear of persecution if deported to China. The court remanded the case to the immigration judge with instructions to obtain a second opinion from the BHRHA and to consider plaintiffs asylum request on the assumption that he qualified as a “refugee.”


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-202
Author(s):  
Allan Gomes

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled, in United States u. Texus Tech University, 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private citizen from bringing a qui tam action in federal court against a state, absent federal intervention.Intervenor Carol Foulds was a dermatology resident at the Texas Tech Health Services Center. While a resident, Foulds examined patients, made diagnoses, and prescribed treatments for patients. Foulds alleged that she and other residents performed these medical services without the supervision of staff physicians. Foulds further alleged that, after residents performed these services without physician oversight, staff physicians signed charts and Medicare and Medicaid billing forms certifying that they personally performed or supervised the administration of these services. Foulds estimates approximately 500,000 false claims occurred in a span of ten years.In 1995, Foulds filed a qui tam action with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As regulated by the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (West 1998), the complaint remained under seal.


1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 783-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl M. Meessen

When, on October 24, 1983, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California handed down its decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America and denied U.S. jurisdiction out of regard for the Honduran “system of justice,” there may have been some surprise that the case was still pending. The Timberlane decision of 1976 of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the matter to the district court, had already become a classic, even though it was preceded by the 1968 decision in United States v. First National City Bank on the production of documents located abroad. The Timberlane approach outlined by Judge Choy, under which the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction has to be restrained by a case-by-case analysis of various factors, was widely discussed (and usually praised) in legal writing, and was also followed by federal courts of the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.


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