Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

The International Court of Justice formed its first Chamber for dealing with a particular case in 1982; its second, in 1985; and, in 1987, its third and fourth ad hoc Chambers. This article examines what appears to be an accelerating trend toward recourse to ad hoc Chambers in the light of the provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court and of its pertinent practice to date. The discussion seeks to elucidate four principal questions: •What is the subject matter that such a Chamber may properly dispose of?•Must such a Chamber be representative of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world?•How many judges shall constitute an ad hoc Chamber?•Shall the parties to the case have a voice in determining the composition of the Chamber as well as in the number of judges constituting it? Finally, this article appraises the record and potential of recourse to Chambers for dealing with a particular case.

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D Evans

On 16 March 2001 the International Court of Justice gave judgment in what was then its most longrunning case. It was in 1987 that Qatar and Bahrain had begun a process of attempting to agree upon the submission of their differences to the Court, but although they were able to agree upon the subject matter in dispute, they could not agree upon its legal characterization and the manner in which the dispute should be placed before the Court. That notwithstanding, and basing itself upon the agreed minutes of a meeting held at Doha in December 1990, Qatar unilaterally instituted proceedings against Bahrain on 8 July 1991. Bahrain raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the case which were first addressed by the Court in its judgment of July 19941 and, following a reformulation of elements of the Qatari application in November 1994, the application was declared admissible in February 1995.2 During the course of the subsequent written pleadings a further dispute arose concerning the authenticity of 82 documents annexed to the Qatar Memorial and, following exchanges on the matter, Qatar announced that it would not rely on the disputed documents.3 Oral hearings were held in May 2000 and judgment given some ten months later. The two principal elements of the case concern, first, the disputed title to, and status of, a number of islands, maritime features and a portion of the Qatar peninsula and, secondly, the course of the maritime boundaries between them. The case was extremely complex, with disputed characterizations of the physical and legal


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Thirlway

The provisions of the ICJ Rules of Court concerning counter-claims have fallen to be applied in two recent cases, in circumstances such the Court has had to examine the nature of a counter-claim and the conditions for its admission as such, and in particular the nature of the ‘direct connection’ with the subject-matter of the application, required by the Rules. In each case the counter-claim was admitted, over the dissent of some judges: these decisions are probably justified, even though some aspects of the reasoning may be criticised.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
James N. Hyde

Litigation of contentious cases before the International Court of Justice has in some instances been a lengthy and comparatively expensive procedure. However, it is not necessarily the Court or its procedure that produces this situation, because governments parties to litigation sometimes feel it is important to retain a number of advocates to plead, and they agree on comparatively long periods for the preparation of written pleadings. Comparing this procedure with ad hoc arbitration before a referee and two arbitrators, the latter looks comparatively swift and inexpensive. However, there are as yet unused possibilities for the International Court to adjudicate cases on a basis comparable in time and expense to ad hoc arbitration. The use of the Court for what might be less important cases would also contribute to its institutional development.


Author(s):  
Amit KUMAR

Abstract The adoption of the Rome Statute is a significant moment for international criminal law. Before its formulation, the criminal law was governed by the sources mentioned in their statute or Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ Statute]. Custom is one of the important sources within the ICJ Statute. The ad hoc tribunals applied custom and even formulated certain customs. The formulation of custom is considered as against the principle of legality. To avoid such criticism, the State Parties inserted Article 21 in the Rome Statute. The provision clarifies the law which the court can apply. The parties chose not to include custom explicitly. However, the wordings of the provision indicate that the custom is still a source for the court. Apart from the wording of Article 21, other provisions of the Statute give ample scope for the application of custom.


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