Weltover, Inc. v. Republic Of Argentina

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 560-564
Author(s):  
Joseph D. Pizzurro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Forum Non Conveniens ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank, brought an action against the Republic of Argentina and Banco Central de la República Argentina (Banco Central) for breach of obligations arising out of the issuance of certain bonds. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1988)) (FSIA). In the alternative, defendants moved for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court denied the motions and held that: (1) the acts of the defendants in issuing, and breaching the payment obligations under, certain bonds were commercial, and the failure to pay on those bonds, which contemplated payment in New York, constituted a direct effect in the United States even though the plaintiffs were non-U.S. entities; (2) the aggregate of the defendants’ contacts with the United States, together with the promise to pay the plaintiffs in New York, satisfied the minimum contacts requirement under the due process clause; and (3) the defendants had not made a sufficient showing to justify a dismissal of the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.

Recent Developments in Health Law: Constitutional Law: Despite Reservations, the Second Circuit Defers to State Court's Determination That a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard is Constitutional for Recommitment of NRRMDD Defendants – Ernst J. v. Stonea

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-828
Author(s):  
Erika Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Mental Disease ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
District Court ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
Court Of Appeals

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Bank of Hawaii v. Balos

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 583-586
Author(s):  
Mark A. Chinen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Pacific Islands ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Marshall Islands ◽  
District Court ◽  
Foreign State ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
The Republic

Plaintiff bank, incorporated under the laws of the state of Hawaii, brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against defendants, residents and citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). One of the defendants, Imata Kabua, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that diversity of citizenship did not exist because defendants were not citizens of a “foreign state” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2). The district court (per King, J.) denied the motion and held that diversity jurisdiction exists because the RMI, although technically retaining membership in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), has de facto become a foreign state.

United States v. Yunis

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynda M. Clarizio
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Independent Basis ◽  
Civil Aircraft ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese resident and citizen, was charged for his alleged involvement in the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian civil aircraft in the Middle East. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that, under general principles of international law, the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a crime committed by a nonresident alien on foreign soil and that federal law provided no independent basis for such jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (per Parker, J.) denied the motion to dismiss in part and granted it in part, and held: (1) that those counts of the indictment charging the defendant with violation of section 32(a) of the Destruction of Aircraft Act (18 U.S.C. §32(a) (1986)) (Aircraft Piracy Act) should be dismissed on the ground that this section provided no jurisdiction over aircraft piracy offenses having no connection to U.S. territory; (2) that traditional principles of international law provided sufficient grounds for asserting both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the other crimes charged; and (3) that the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. §1203 (1986)) (Hostage Taking Act) and section 32(b) of the Aircraft Piracy Act imposed liability for the offenses allegedly committed by the defendant.

Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 828-830
Author(s):  
Edward M. Leigh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Telephone Call ◽  
District Court ◽  
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
American Citizen

Plaintiff Zedan, an American citizen, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for breach of a contract guaranteeing wages and profits. While performance under the contract occurred in Saudi Arabia, plaintiff alleged that the jurisdictional requirements under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) were satisfied by a recruitment call in California from a representative of the royal overseer of a private Saudi company. The district court granted the Saudi motion to dismiss. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (per Silberman, J.) unanimously affirmed and held: (1) that the telephone call did not have the requisite substantiality of contact with the United States; (2) that it was not sufficient to form the basis of a cause of action; and (3) that the alleged breach did not have sufficient direct effect in the United States to satisfy the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.

scholarly journals "Hurricane" Sandy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-192
Author(s):  
Cheryl L. Pollak
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
The United States ◽  
Hurricane Sandy ◽  
Small Business Administration ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
District Court ◽  
Flood Insurance ◽  
Recent Experience

On the evening of October 29, 2012, “Hurricane” Sandy made land- fall on the New York coastline, battering the land with strong winds, torrential rain, and record-breaking storm surges. Homes and commercial structures were destroyed; roads and tunnels were flooded; and more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters, with many others facing weeks without power and electricity. At the time, Sandy was heralded as one of the costliest hurricanes in the his- tory of the United States; the second costliest hurricane only to Katrina, which hit New Orleans in 2005. Unfortunately, recent experience with Hurricanes Florence, Maria, Harvey, and Irma suggest that this pattern of devastating superstorms may become the new norm as climate change produces more extreme and unpredictable weather events. In Sandy’s aftermath, as individuals returned to their homes, or what remained of them, and communities began to rebuild, the true cost of the storm became apparent. A year after the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) estimated that over $1.4 billion in assistance was provided to 182,000 survivors of the dis- aster; another $3.2 billion was provided to state and local governments for debris removal, infrastructure repair, and emergency protective measures. More than $2.4 billion was provided to individuals and businesses in the form of low-interest loans through the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and millions more were spent on grants de- signed to implement mitigation measures in the future and to provide unemployment assistance to survivors. Before the storm, homeowners paid premiums for flood insurance provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), and for homeowner’s insurance provided by dozens of private insurers. In the months following the storm, they began to file claims for assistance in rebuilding their homes. While many such claims were re- solved successfully, many homeowners were unhappy with the settlement amounts offered by their insurance carriers and felt compelled to file lawsuits in the surrounding state and federal courts. Many of those lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”). This case study describes the EDNY’s specifically crafted, unique approach to handling the mass litigation that ensued from Sandy’s devastation, documents some of the problems that the Court faced during that mass litigation, and describes some of the lessons learned from the Court’s experience.

United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-837
Author(s):  
Eric S. Koenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
Southern District ◽  
The Status ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Summary Judgment

Plaintiff, the United States, brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and four individuals seeking an injunction to close the PLO’s Permanent Observer Mission (Mission) to the United Nations as violative of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA). The district court (per Palmieri, J.) entered summary judgment for defendants and held: (1) the ATA does not require the closure of the PLO’s Mission to the United Nations; (2) the status of the PLO’s Mission, an invitee of the United Nations, is protected by the Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (Headquarters Agreement); and (3) Congress did not intend the ATA to supersede the Headquarters Agreement.

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