International Lawlessness in Grenada

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-175
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle ◽  
Abram Chayes ◽  
Isaak Dore ◽  
Richard Falk ◽  
Martin Feinrider ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
American People ◽  
Military Operation ◽  
Independent State ◽  
Medical College ◽  
American States ◽  
Domestic Affairs ◽  
The U.S

The Reagan administration’s arguments purporting to justify the invasion of Grenada under international law must not be allowed to inveigle the American people into supporting this violent intervention into the domestic affairs of another independent state. Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. Government has routinely concocted evanescent threats to the lives and property of U.S. nationals as pretexts to justify armed interventions into sister American states. The transparency of these pretexts was just as obvious then as it is now. The Reagan administration has not established by means of clear and convincing evidence that there did in fact exist an immediate threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Grenada. Even then, such a threat could have justified only a limited military operation along the lines of the Israeli raid at Entebbe for the sole purpose of evacuating the major concentration of U.S. nationals at the medical college.

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Nash
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Special Session ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
American States ◽  
Contemporary Practice ◽  
The U.S

On June 20, 1994, Ambassador Harriet C. Babbit, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, deposited on behalf of the U.S. Government the instrument of ratification of the “Protocol of Washington,” adopted on December 14, 1992, by the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States and signed by the United States on January 23, 1993, and the “Protocol of Managua,” adopted by the Nineteenth Special Session of the OAS General Assembly on June 10, 1993, and signed that day by the United States. The U.S. Senate had given its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocols on May 17, 1994, with two-thirds of the Senators present and concurring.

The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
International Level ◽  
Military Operation ◽  
Constitutional Level ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The U.S

The U.S.-led military operation in Haiti has unfolded with minimal violence and few casualties so far. That factual proposition—which is necessarily subject to revision—has important ramifications under both U.S. constitutional law and international law. On the constitutional level, the avoidance of hostilities defused what was poised to become a serious confrontation between the President and the Congress. On the international level, doubts in some quarters about the legitimacy of a forcible intervention, although not entirely allayed, were somewhat quieted with the achievement of a negotiated solution, which enabled U.S. troops to bring about the return to power of President Aristide without having to shoot their way into Haiti.

Coalition Procurement for the Reconstruction of Iraq in the Crosshairs of WTO Law: The Obligations of the United States under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-282
Author(s):  
Dirk Pulkowski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Economic Reason ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Basic Infrastructure ◽  
The U.S

Investigating the legality? Ha ha ha! That cracks me up. There is no international law that would prohibit this action by the Defense Department, nor is there any international court that France may appeal to. I of course think that this is the correct decision. Those countries who did not help win the war – who did not pay the price in blood – have no claim to the postwar profits. – Mike, Why I'm Right, Internet ForumDuring the Reagan administration, I helped negotiate … the “GATT Government Procurement Code”, later incorporated into the World Trade Organization's legal framework. The U.S. was the primary force behind this legal agreement. It was not motivated by altruism, but out of a belief that all signatory governments … and their respective tax payers would benefit from basing practices on economic factors rather than national favoritism. - Gene Tuttle, in responseInfrastructure in Iraq lies in tatters. Unscrupulous exploitation by Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime, burdensome economic sanctions and massive destruction during the U.S.-led military operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ have turned Iraq into one of the world's most destitute countries. On the UN Human Poverty Index for 2003, Iraq ranks seventy-first out of ninety-six developing nations. The reconstruction of basic infrastructure is but one first step towards development and economic growth. Rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, however, involves substantial economic interests. After all, the cake to be distributed for rebuilding Iraq is expected to exceed $100 billion. Some companies see on the horizon one of the most rewarding business opportunities “undertaken in over 50 years” At the same time, there is a growing suspicion that political or even personal biases of the United States' administration have a bigger role to play than economic reason when it comes to sharing the cake. In December 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, announced that some of America's trading partners, among them Canada, France, Germany and Russia, would be altogether excluded from competition for major reconstruction projects in Iraq. Public opinion in Europe was quick to brand the United States an international law-breaker. Can one State simply reserve to itself the final word on the Iraqi reconstruction money?

Fake It “Till You Make It”: Debunking Fake News in a Post-Truth America

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-133
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Discourse ◽  
Cutting Edge ◽  
American People ◽  
Fake News ◽  
News Sources ◽  
The Media ◽  
The U.S

Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, attacks on the media have been relentless. “Fake news” has become a household term, and repeated attempts to break the trust between reporters and the American people have threatened the validity of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In this article, the authors trace the development of fake news and its impact on contemporary political discourse. They also outline cutting-edge pedagogies designed to assist students in critically evaluating the veracity of various news sources and social media sites.

Substantive Right to Life Obligations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Park
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Military Operation ◽  
General Terms ◽  
The Right

There is a difference between a State’s substantive and procedural right to life obligations. This chapter explores what amount to a state’s substantive right to life obligations with reference to Article 2, ECHR and Article 6, ICCPR. The respective provisions are analysed to determine the extent of a state’s substantive right to life obligations during armed conflict and then a comparison between the two international law instruments is undertaken. In order to undertake such a comparison, the exceptions to the right to life in both the ECHR and ICCPR are examined. Once determined, the planning and conduct of a military operation are considered, to assess the extent to which, in general terms, right to life obligations are considered in these areas.

The Crisis of the Ryukyus (1877–82)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Sze-lok Leung ◽  
Anthony Carty
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Colonial Power ◽  
Independent State ◽  
The People ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
Historical Viewpoint

Okinawa is now considered as Japanese territory, without challenge from most world powers. However, this is debatable from a historical viewpoint. The Ryukyu Kingdom which dominated the islands was integrated into Japan in 1879. The transformation is seen by Wang Hui as a process of modernization. This chapter argues the issue from an international law perspective. It shows that Ryukyu was an independent State as demonstrated by the 1854 Ryukyu–US Treaty, although it sent regular tributes to China. The Japanese integration by coercion is not justifiable. The people of Ryukyu were willing to continue being a tributary State rather than part of Japan. Britain, as the greatest colonial power, did not object. China and the US attempted to intervene in this affair, but no treaty has so far been concluded. Therefore, the status of Ryukyu/Okinawa remains unresolved and may need to be revisited, while putting the history context into consideration.

Foreign Relations Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Karen Knop
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The U.S

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.

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