Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Instalment 3: Use of Force, War and Neutrality. Peace Treaties (A-M). Pp. xv, 299. 1982. Instalment 4: Use of Force, War and Neutrality. Peace Treaties (N-Z). Pp. xv, 377. 1982. Instalment 5: International Organizations in General. Universal International Organizations and Cooperation. Pp. xv, 427. 1983. Edited by Rudolf Bernhardt. Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 476-479
Author(s):  
Alberto R. Coll
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 275-278
Author(s):  
José E. Alvarez

The rules international organizations (IOs) make deviate considerably from the traditional sources of international law in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Statute and the ways those are understood: as generated, enforced, and interpreted by states based on their consent. As this panel demonstrates, IO “rules” take various forms—e.g., guidelines, recommendations, and standards—and are promulgated by not only traditional interstate organizations but public/private hybrids, transnational networks involving agencies inside states, private associations of industry or other experts, or subsidiary committees of the parties (COPs) or meetings of the parties (MOPs). These rules enjoy varying degrees of authoritativeness, often purport to have some impact on state and non-state actors, and depart, sometimes quite openly, from reliance on state consent. And even when IOs turn to the traditional sources—treaties, custom, general principles—these take untraditional forms that blur distinctions between binding and non-binding law. Whether these governance efforts are described as systems of “global administrative law,” “global constitutionalism,” or “transnational legal orders” or as new forms of “international public law,” they are certainly different from your grandmother's public international law. Like “soft” law before it, these governance efforts have drawn the ire of legal positivists who ask, with some justice, what is meant by “law” if everyone (public, private, and in-between) is a potential “lawmaker” and no one can be certain about whether their efforts entail legal responsibility and, if so, for whom.


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