The rules international organizations (IOs) make deviate considerably
from the traditional sources of international law in Article 38 of the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Statute and the ways those are
understood: as generated, enforced, and interpreted by states based on their
consent. As this panel demonstrates, IO “rules” take various forms—e.g.,
guidelines, recommendations, and standards—and are promulgated by not only
traditional interstate organizations but public/private hybrids,
transnational networks involving agencies inside states, private
associations of industry or other experts, or subsidiary committees of the
parties (COPs) or meetings of the parties (MOPs). These rules enjoy varying
degrees of authoritativeness, often purport to have some impact on state
and non-state actors, and depart, sometimes
quite openly, from reliance on state consent. And even when IOs turn to the
traditional sources—treaties, custom, general principles—these take
untraditional forms that blur distinctions between binding and non-binding
law. Whether these governance efforts are described as systems of “global
administrative law,” “global constitutionalism,” or “transnational legal
orders” or as new forms of “international public law,” they are certainly
different from your grandmother's public international law. Like “soft” law
before it, these governance efforts have drawn the ire of legal positivists
who ask, with some justice, what is meant by “law” if everyone (public,
private, and in-between) is a potential “lawmaker” and no one can be certain
about whether their efforts entail legal responsibility and, if so, for
whom.