The Admission of Judges Ad Hoc In Advisory Proceedings: Some Reflections in the Light of the Namibia Case

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michla Pomerance

In the Namibia case, the International Court of Justice for the first time in its history received an application for the appointment of a judge ad hoc in advisory proceedings. The application was made by South Africa on the basis of Article 83 of the Rules of Court which provides for the possibility of seating judges ad hoc in advisory procedings involving “a legal question actually pending between two or more States.” No state or international organization entitled to appear before the Court opposed the South African request, and no state other than South Africa submitted an application for a judge ad hoc. After an oral hearing (held in camera over strong South African protests 8) in which only South Africa presented argument, the Court, in its Order of January 29, 1971, decided, by a vote of 10 to 5, to reject South Africa's application. The Court offered no explanation for its decision at the time. Of the five dissenting judges, only Judges Onyeama and Dillard appended to the Order the reasons for their dissent. The remaining dissenting judges (and, by implication, the Court itself) feared that early disclosure of the reasons for their stands entailed the risk of prejudging substantive questions in the case. (As will be seen below, Judges Onyeama and Dillard had no cause to entertain similar fears.) With the delivery of the opinion, however, all five dissenting judges voiced strong criticism of the Court's refusal to admit a South African judge ad hoc.

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-603

South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): By an order of February 5, 1963, the President of the International Court of Justice fixed September 30, 1963, as the time limit for the filing of the South African countermemorial in the South West Africa cases. At the request of the government of South Africa, the Court in its order of September 18, 1963, extended this time limit to January 10, 1964. By its order of January 20, 1964, the International Court noted that the South African countermemorial had been filed, and it fixed as time limits June 20, 1964, for the filing of the replies of Ethiopia and Liberia; and November 20, 1964, for the filing of the rejoinder by South Africa


1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 56-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Cottrell

Namibia finally achieved independence on 21 March, 1990, after a long struggle and many false hopes and setbacks. In a nutshell: the territory was colonized by Germany. It was seized by South African forces during the First World War, and then made the subject of a League of Nations Mandate, administered by South Africa, after the war. Following the Second World War, South Africa tried to incorporate the territory, a move resisted by the United Nations. In 1966 the International Court of Justice denied standing to Ethiopia and Liberia to allege breaches of the mandate. However, shortly thereafter the UN voted to terminate the mandate. At about the same time the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) launched its armed struggle. South Africa's response to these developments was to implement plans for the closer integration of the territory into the South African state, and into the system of apartheid. As a result, a system of native authorities, based on ethnicity, was introduced.In 1975 the “Turnhalle” talks were started which, although rejected by most of the black groups, led to the establishment of a constituent Assembly. During the same period, a “Contract Group” of Western Nations began to negotiate with South Africa over a settlement for Namibia. The ultimate proposals were accepted by the UN, SWAPO and South Africa, and the plans were recognized by UN Resolution 435. But immediately thereafter problems began to arise, and talks about implementation stopped and started for a number of years.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 1215-1256
Author(s):  
Theodore Kill

The International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on April 16, 2013, in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), a case submitted by special agreement or compromis and jointly notified to the Court on July 20, 2010. The judgment was unanimous on all holdings in the operative part or dispositif, but nevertheless included a declaration by Judge Bennouna and separate opinions by Judges Cancado Trindade and Yusuf as well as Judges ad hoc Mahiou and Daudet. The judgment set forth the parameters within which the border between Burkina Faso and Niger will be demarcated and, as such, should contribute to peace and stability in the region. This case is also notable for what was not decided; despite a clause in the compromis requesting the Court to “place on record” the parties’ agreement regarding the border in two sectors, the Court declined to include the agreement in the judgment’s dispositif, finding for the first time that a matter submitted to it did not constitute a dispute.


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-871 ◽  

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa): On October 2, 1962, the International Court of Justice held the first of the public hearings on the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, raised by the government of the Republic of South Africa in these cases. After opening the sitting and briefly recalling the stages in the written proceedings covered since the institution of the cases on November 4, 1960, the President of the Court proceeded to the installation of the two judges ad hoc designated by the parties in accordance with Article 31, paragraphs 3 and 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The two judges ad hoc were Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the High Court, Eastern Region of Nigeria, designated by Ethiopia and Liberia acting in concert, and the Honorable Jacques Theodore van Wyk, Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, designated by the government of the Republic of South Africa. The President announced that Judge Córdova was prevented by his health from sitting in the present proceedings.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
James N. Hyde

Litigation of contentious cases before the International Court of Justice has in some instances been a lengthy and comparatively expensive procedure. However, it is not necessarily the Court or its procedure that produces this situation, because governments parties to litigation sometimes feel it is important to retain a number of advocates to plead, and they agree on comparatively long periods for the preparation of written pleadings. Comparing this procedure with ad hoc arbitration before a referee and two arbitrators, the latter looks comparatively swift and inexpensive. However, there are as yet unused possibilities for the International Court to adjudicate cases on a basis comparable in time and expense to ad hoc arbitration. The use of the Court for what might be less important cases would also contribute to its institutional development.


Author(s):  
Amit KUMAR

Abstract The adoption of the Rome Statute is a significant moment for international criminal law. Before its formulation, the criminal law was governed by the sources mentioned in their statute or Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ Statute]. Custom is one of the important sources within the ICJ Statute. The ad hoc tribunals applied custom and even formulated certain customs. The formulation of custom is considered as against the principle of legality. To avoid such criticism, the State Parties inserted Article 21 in the Rome Statute. The provision clarifies the law which the court can apply. The parties chose not to include custom explicitly. However, the wordings of the provision indicate that the custom is still a source for the court. Apart from the wording of Article 21, other provisions of the Statute give ample scope for the application of custom.


Author(s):  
Matthieu Aldjima Namountougou

SummaryAccording to the International Court of Justice, any person through whom an international organization acts is an agent of that organization. However, this definition is too broad. Any participation in the fulfilment of the mission of an international organization does not necessarily make the person an agent of the international organization. After detailing the particularities of the status of international agents, this article considers the issue of accountability for wrongs attributable to them. It recommends in this respect the development of a system of accountability that combines national and international justice responses with priority to the former based on the location of the offence.


Zootaxa ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4577 (2) ◽  
pp. 361
Author(s):  
JIŘÍ JANÁK

A revision of the south African genus Neopimus Özdikmen, Demir & Türkeş, 2008 is presented. Based on revision of the type and additional material, three species are recognised. The genus Neopimus is redescribed and all species are described or redescribed and illustrated, two of them for the first time: Neopimus capensis Janák, sp. nov., from Eastern Cape Province, South Africa and N. zulu Janák, sp. nov., from KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. The distribution of the genus is mapped and a key of species is presented. 


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