The Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Chinese Claims

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 728-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Ford Redick
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The U.S

Before the Peoples Republic of China [PRC] was officially proclaimed on September 21, 1949, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had proclaimed that the acts and foreign agreements of the Republic of China which resulted in the exploitation of China by foreigners were “completely contrary to the will of the Chinese people” and would not be honored. Although certain actions by the Chinese Communists indicated as early as February, 1949 that property owned by the U.S. Government and its nationals would be treated unfavorably by the new regime, no concerted steps were taken by the PRC against U.S. property until the United States had already placed an “embargo” on American trade with China. Only after Chinese troops had entered Korea and the U.S. Government had blocked and frozen all Chinese assets within its jurisdiction did the PRC freeze all public and private property of the United States in the PRC and order that an inventory of it be made. The PRC “assumed control of all U.S. property in China under a decree issued on December 29, 1950. ”

“Imagined Territory: The Republic of China’s 1955 Veto of Mongolian Membership in the United Nations”

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-295
Author(s):  
Keith Allan Clark II
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Sovereign State ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Republic

In 1955, Jiang Tingfu, representing the Republic of China (roc), vetoed Mongolia’s entry into the United Nations. In the 26 years the roc represented China in the United Nations, it only cast this one veto. The roc’s veto was a contentious move because Taipei had recognized Mongolia as a sovereign state in 1946. A majority of the world body, including the United States, favored Mongolia’s admission as part of a deal to end the international organization’s deadlocked-admissions problem. The roc’s veto placed it not only in opposition to the United Nations but also its primary benefactor. This article describes the public and private discourse surrounding this event to analyze how roc representatives portrayed the veto and what they thought Mongolian admission to the United Nations represented. It also examines international reactions to Taipei’s claims and veto. It argues that in 1955 Mongolia became a synecdoche for all of China that Taipei claimed to represent, and therefore roc representatives could not acknowledge it as a sovereign state.

Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 158-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor D. Cha
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
East Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Republic ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Alliance System ◽  
Postwar Planning ◽  
Security Structure ◽  
The U.S

In East Asia the United States cultivated a “hub and spokes” system of discrete, exclusive alliances with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and Japan, a system that was distinct from the multilateral security alliances it preferred in Europe. Bilateralism emerged in East Asia as the dominant security structure because of the “powerplay” rationale behind U.S. postwar planning in the region. “Powerplay” refers to the construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally's actions. The United States created a series of bilateral alliances in East Asia to contain the Soviet threat, but a congruent rationale was to constrain “rogue allies”—that is, rabidly anticommunist dictators who might start wars for reasons of domestic legitimacy and entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory, which held that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. The administrations of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower calculated that they could best restrain East Asia's pro-West dictators through tight bilateral alliances rather than through a regionwide multilateral mechanism. East Asia's security bilateralism today is therefore a historical artifact of this choice.

scholarly journals Activities of the U.S. Special Services in the Republic of China During the Civil War (1927–1950)

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Levin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
White House ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Internal Conflicts ◽  
The Republic Of China ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The U.S

Introduction. The Chinese Civil War was a time of rapprochement between the United States and the Republic of China, but there were enormous difficulties and contradictions between the two countries. Methods and materials. In this regard, it seems that the information of the two main agencies of the U.S. intelligence community is able to significantly supplement the picture of the interaction between the two countries and allows better understanding of why at some point Washington was forced to almost completely abandon its support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The article is based on the principles of historicism and consistency, as well as the methods of historical comparative studies. Analysis and results. The excessive level of corruption, which involved numerous American structures and officials, internal conflicts in the Republic’s government that influenced the situation and the course of the confrontation and were consecrated in FBI and CIA documents, contributed to the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the policy of the unconditional support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime, but the Communist victory and the establishment of the PRC made, in the absence of other real alternatives, it necessary to continue to support the Republic. The new information makes it possible to better understand how the White House treated the leader of “democratic” China and his family, as well as to better understand the role of intelligence and counterintelligence in these processes and the place of Soviet intelligence in the final stages of the heavy civil war in China (1927–1950). The materials presented in the article and their analysis show specifics and differences in approaches of the FBI and CIA on the example of work on China. The article is based on FBI and CIA archives and covers the period from 1943 to 1949.

Negotiating the Cold War: The United States and the Two Koreas

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
South Korean ◽  
Agreed Framework ◽  
Peace Settlement ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.

Yongping, Li [李永平] (1947--)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Groppe
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Short Stories ◽  
Chinese Language ◽  
Language Education ◽  
The United States ◽  
University Education ◽  
Chinese Language Education ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Literary Fame

Li Yongping is a Taiwan author who rose to literary fame for a collection of interrelated short stories called Retribution: The Jiling Chronicles (吉陵春秋, 1986), considered among the works exemplifying the best of Taiwan modernism. Now a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Li was born in Kuching, a city in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, in northwest Borneo. Sarawak became a British crown colony in 1946, and then joined the independent Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Li left Kuching in 1967 to pursue university education in Taiwan, following a route that was and has remained popular with many Chinese Malaysians who, like Li himself, had received some Chinese-language education in Malaysia. Li graduated from National Taiwan University in 1971 and later received postgraduate degrees in the United States. Li relinquished his Malaysian citizenship in 1987. Over the course of his career, Li has published several long novels and collections of short stories and essays; he has also worked as an editor, translator, and professor.

The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.

Santa Anna and His Legacy

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Fowler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mexican War ◽  
Early National Period ◽  
The Public ◽  
Early National ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Alamo ◽  
The U.S

Antonio López de Santa Anna (b. Xalapa, February 21, 1794; d. Mexico City, June 21, 1876) was one of the most notorious military caudillos of 19th-century Mexico. He was involved in just about every major event of the early national period and served as president on six different occasions (1833–1835, 1839, 1841–1843, 1843–1844, 1846–1847, and 1853–1855). U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary Waddy Thompson during the 1840s would come to the conclusion that: “No history of his country for that period can be written without constant mention of his name.”1 For much of the 1820s to 1850s he proved immensely popular; the public celebrated him as “Liberator of Veracruz,” the “Founder of the Republic,” and the “Hero of Tampico” who repulsed a Spanish attempt to reconquer Mexico in 1829. Even though he lost his leg defending Veracruz from a French incursion in 1838, many still regarded him as the only general who would be able to save Mexico from the U.S. intervention of 1846–1848. However, Mexicans, eventually, would remember him more for his defeats than his victories. Having won the battle of the Alamo, he lost the battle of San Jacinto which resulted in Texas becoming independent from Mexico in 1836. Although he recovered from this setback, many subsequently blamed him for Mexico’s traumatic defeat in the U.S.-Mexican War, which ended with Mexico ceding half of its territory to the United States. His corruption paired with the fact that he aligned himself with competing factions at different junctures contributed to the accusation that he was an unprincipled opportunist. Moreover, because he authorized the sale of La Mesilla Valley to the United States (in present-day southern Arizona) in the 1853 Gadsden Purchase, he was labeled a vendepatrias (“fatherland-seller”). The repressive dictatorship he led donning the title of “His Serene Highness” in 1853–1855, also gave way to him being presented thereafter as a bloodthirsty tyrant, even though his previous terms in office were not dictatorial. Albeit feted as a national hero during much of his lifetime, historians have since depicted Santa Anna as a cynical turncoat, a ruthless dictator, and the traitor who lost the U.S.-Mexican War on purpose. However, recent scholarship has led to a significant revision of this interpretation. The aim of this article is to recast our understanding of Santa Anna and his legacy bearing in mind the latest findings. In the process it demonstrates how important it is to engage with the complexities of the multilayered regional and national contexts of the time in order to understand the politics of Independent Mexico.

“Mourning a Loss: Conservative Support for Ngo Dinh Diem”

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-284
Author(s):  
Seth Offenbach
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conservative Movement ◽  
Great Hope ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Ngo Dinh Diem ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. conservative movement in the mid-20th Century argued that the United States needed to continuously get tougher in the fight against communism worldwide. It remained supportive of U.S. efforts throughout the Vietnam War. However, in the period immediately preceding Americanization of the war in 1965, conservatives were uncertain about the outcome of any fighting in Vietnam. Specifically, they claimed that optimism for the Republic of Vietnam was lost with the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Without Diem, conservatives claimed, the Vietnam War was likely lost before it began. This article discusses how Diem went from a barely talked-about anti-Communist ally prior to his death to becoming posthumously the last great hope for Southeast Asia. Conservatives argued that without Diem, the only way the United States would be able to stop Communist expansion in Indochina would be to engage in a massive aerial bombing campaign and find a regional partner to deploy troops. Had he survived, this might not have been necessary. Learning why and how conservatives supported Diem after his death helps us better understand how conservatives reacted to the Vietnam War once Americanization began in 1965.

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