The “Sanctions” of the International Monetary Fund

1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Gold
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
Special Drawing Rights ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Recent events in the international monetary system culminating in the decision of the United States, announced on August 15, 1971, to suspend the convertibility of the dollar induce the international lawyer to ask once again what contribution sanctions can make to respect for international law and the effectiveness of multilateral treaties. This question has been a practical problem at two stages in the development of the International Monetary Fund. It arose first during the negotiation and drafting of the original Articles of Agreement which were adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The second stage was the negotiation and drafting of the amendment of July 28, 1969, which dealt mainly with the legal structure of special drawing rights as a supplement to existing reserve assets. It is now apparent that there will be a third stage, in which a reform of the international monetary system, perhaps in some of its most fundamental aspects, will lead to a further amendment of the Fund's charter.

Hegemons, IOs, and markets: the case of the substitution account

1984 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Gowa
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Economy ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Special Drawing Rights ◽  
Hegemonic Stability ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

For eighteen months between 1978 and 1980, the International Monetary Fund and IMF members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account. Designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system, the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks, in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights. The collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power. The case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy. However, two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations: the division of power within the United States between Congress and the Executive, and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980.

scholarly journals Un résumé des lignes de force du système monétaire international actuel

2009 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
Vély Leroy
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Present Situation ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

In this paper the author outlines the forces underlying the present international monetary system. Since creation, in Bretton Woods, of the International Monetary Fund, two important amendments have been brought to the statutes of this institution. First, in July 1969, a Special Drawing mechanism was created; second, following the April 1978 amendment, the Special Drawing Right system is no longer based on gold. The fundamental reasons for this evolution and the problems raised by the present situation are emphasized.

International monetary fund after the financial crises of the 1990s

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiří Jonáš
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Policy Strategies ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
The Imf

In this article, I would first discuss briefly what we know about the causes of the recent financial crises, and whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could have done more to prevent them. I will explain what policy strategies the IMF recommended to resolve these crises, why it recommended these policies, and to what extent is the criticism of these recommendations justified. In the second part, I will discuss the lessons which the IMF has drawn from these crises. I will explain how the experience of recent years has changed the thinking about the proper role of the IMF in supporting stable international monetary system. I will focus on two broad areas of changes in the activity of the IMF. First, on measures that are being taken to make the repetition of financial crises less likely; second, on measures to be applied if the prevention fails and if a financial crisis strikes again.

scholarly journals China and Special Drawing Rights—Towards a Better International Monetary System

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harrison ◽  
Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Current Account ◽  
Current System ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Capital Account ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Special Drawing Rights ◽  
Rmb Internationalization

China and the international monetary system need each other. The international monetary system is strained, with crisis just around the corner, yet reform is not on anyone’s agenda. Meanwhile China, deeply invested in the current system, faces narrowing options as trading partners question its moves abroad, debt levels rise at home, and its current account moves from surplus to deficit. RMB internationalization might appear to provide a way out, but the policy has its limits and tends to exacerbate rather than relieve tensions. We argue that a tension-reducing solution is at hand to the problems of both the international monetary system and China—IMF-style Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). If in a unilateral initiative China were to make the SDR central to its next phase of capital account opening, China’s institutions, corporates and individuals—presently restricted in their access to international currency—would likely embrace it. Begun by China, with support from the international community and Hong Kong, promulgation of the SDR would usher in an era of lower tensions, providing space for development and avoidance of conflict within a reordered monetary system in which China would have a more prominent role.

The Case for a General Allocation of SDRs During the Tenth Basic Period

Policy Papers ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (83) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
Periodic Process ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Board Of Governors ◽  
Basic Period ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Special Drawing Rights

This paper is the outcome of a periodic process regarding the allocation (or cancellation) of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and is a report by the Managing Director to the Board of Governors and the Executive Board along with a staff paper that assesses the merits of a general allocation. Following consultations with the Executive Board on the case for a general allocation, the Managing Director decided not to make a proposal for a general SDR allocation at this time. Though there was openness among many Directors to consider a proposal in the upcoming basic period, there was also a widely-shared sense that it would be premature at this stage, owing to ongoing discussions on the role of the SDR in the context of reform of the international monetary system. Decisions by the Fund on a general allocation or cancellation of SDRs take place at regular intervals (or basic periods) of normally five years, with the Managing Director’s report due six months before each new basic period. The tenth basic period begins on January 1, 2012. The report can either propose a general SDR allocation (or cancellation of previous allocations), or conclude that the conditions set out in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement for an allocation or cancellation of SDRs are not currently in place, including broad support among IMF members that participate in the SDR Department. Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreements, the Managing Director may also propose allocations of SDRs at the request of the Board of Governors or the Executive Board. In this regard, an allocation could be considered if there is a long-term global need for reserves that could be usefully filled at least in part by SDRs and if it would not lead to inflationary pressures, assuming there is broad support among IMF members participating in the SDR Department.

scholarly journals The special drawing right: a formal critic to the dollar dominance in the international monetary system

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-416
Author(s):  
ALINE REGINA ALVES MARTINS
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT In the late-1960’s, international discussions over a possible reform of the international monetary system originated the Special Drawing Right (SDR). While they had been created initially to represent an additional asset to complement the existing reserves of U.S. dollars and gold, after the crisis of the Bretton Woods system the SDR was considered a possible substitute of the U.S. dollar. Relying on a consolidated literature, this article aims at demonstrating that the origins of the SDR were not the exclusive result of technical financial negotiations, but of the convergence of higher political interests against the United States and the dollar dominance.

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