Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations

1965 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 834-856 ◽  
Author(s):  
Egon Schwelb

The student of the constitutional development of the United Nations has certainly had no reason so far to complain of a scarcity of serious problems and dangerous crises claiming his attention: from Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal of 1960 to abolish the office of the Secretary General and to replace it by an executive organ consisting of three persons representing the Western Powers, the socialist states and the neutralist countries, to the long drawn-out and, at the time of this writing, still unresolved conflict concerning “certain expenses of the United Nations,” the application of Article 19 of the Charter and “the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.” It therefore comes as a pleasant change if, for once, he can address himself to a development of the constitutional law of the Organization which is clearly of a non-revolutionary character and is being brought about by applying the very procedure which is laid down in the Charter for changes of this kind: the increase, by the procedure regulated in Article 108 of the Charter, of the number of nonpermanent Members of the Security Council from six to ten and the increase of the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. This was done by amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter, which were adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963, and which, by August 31, 1965, were ratified by 93 Members, i.e., a number exceeding two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council. The amendments entered into force on August 31, 1965. While the changes thus made in the Charter have not brought about fundamental modifications in the structure of the Organization, they are of considerable political importance. Moreover, they are the first amendments in the text of the San Francisco Charter and, in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, “this is enough by itself to endow the event with considerable significance.”

Author(s):  
Higgins Dame Rosalyn, DBE, QC ◽  
Webb Philippa ◽  
Akande Dapo ◽  
Sivakumaran Sandesh ◽  
Sloan James

This chapter discusses the regular budget of the UN. The UN’s regular budget includes the expenses of its principal organs—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat—as well as subsidiary bodies. From tens of millions in the early years of the organization, the regular budget has grown to billions of dollars. It is composed of various parts, sections, and programmes. No funds may be transferred between different appropriation sections without the authorization of the General Assembly. The remainder of the chapter covers the authorization of programmes; formulation and examination of estimates; approval and appropriation; implementation and the Contingency Fund; audit; the Working Capital Fund; financing of peacekeeping; international tribunals; voluntary contributions; self-support; apportionment of expenses of the organization; and administrative and budgetary coordination between the UN and specialized agencies.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Korbel

During the last two years, the major organs of the United Nations have shown an increasing tendency to attempt the solution of international problems through the employment of special bodies and committees, rather than trying directly to resolve the myriad problems of each dispute. The General Assembly has established special groups on the Balkans, Korea and Palestine and has turned a number of questions over to its Interim Committee, while both the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council have often worked through ad hoc bodies. The Security Council has also delegated its powers under the Charter on a number of occasions. While retaining general supervision, and requiring that final results be subject to its approval, the Security Council in the case of Indonesia, Palestine and Greece, for example, has created sub-groups possessing a wide latitude of action operating under rather general instructions. Since this procedure enables a subordinate group to concentrate on the problem in hand – and since the creation of such a group may well be undertaken as a means of circumventing the Council's unanimity principle in voting – a study of the subsidiary commissions is of some interest. The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan is a good case in point.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis B. Sohn

In the last few years, many proposals have been made requiring either changes in the administration and financing of the United Nations or a revision of the Charter of the United Nations. While some progress has been made in the first category of problems, to the extent that they require primarily changes in the working of the United Nations Secretariat, it became quite obvious that a revision of the Charter is not likely to be made in the near future. It may be possible, however, to achieve important changes in the functioning of the principal organs of the United Nations—the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice—without revision. Pending a change in the international situation, various steps can be taken in the interim that would considerably improve the functioning of these organs, and achieve some of the desirable goals by measures that, while not ideal, will provide practical solutions for a few important problems. Several such solutions are investigated in the three sections of this essay.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-431

Amendments to Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963, came into force on August 31, 1965. The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The amendment to Article 61 enlarges the membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from eighteen to 27.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Finkelstein

“We do not want to entrust to five great Powers or to two great Powers the task of deciding … what our common destiny will be…”.To anyone who attended the great assemblage gathered at San Francisco in 1945 to write the Charter for the United Nations, these words have a familiar ring. Indeed, they might have been uttered (and no doubt were ad nauseam) by small-power representatives during the seemingly interminable debates over the rule of unanimity—the veto—in the Security Council. In fact, these words were spoken in February 1965 by the Mauritanian delegate explaining, on the final day of the “abortive” nineteenth session of the General Assembly, why he voted with Albania in protest against the “basis of consensus” which had governed the session.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Baker Fox

Organized international intervention in colonial affairs has never found favor in the eyes of the European colonial powers. It did not at San Francisco when they sought to restrict the United Nations role in non-self-governing territories. It was not well received when the Security Council dealt with Indonesia nor were its results favored when the General Assembly disposed of the Italian empire. It does not please them, now, when the focus of public attention is on the political, economic, and social development of the colonies.


Author(s):  
Higgins Dame Rosalyn, DBE, QC ◽  
Webb Philippa ◽  
Akande Dapo ◽  
Sivakumaran Sandesh ◽  
Sloan James

This chapter discusses voting in the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Voting has become a more complex, politically charged practice with the growth in the membership of the UN and the expanding range of activities undertaken by the organization. These phenomena have also encouraged the trend of adopting decisions by consensus. The majority of resolutions in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ECOSOC are adopted without a vote. The veto, however, remains highly controversial in the Security Council. The discussions cover the General Assembly’s right to vote and equality of votes; methods of taking decisions; voting conduct and elections; the Security Council’s procedural and non-procedural matters; veto; abstention; non-participation and absence; statements before and after the vote; announcement of vote results; adoption of resolutions and decisions by consensus and elections and the ECOSOC’s right to vote and equality of votes; and decision-making by commissions.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 506-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

The provisions relating to the Security Council in the United Nations Charter of 1995 do not look much different from those in the Charter of 1945. Articles 23 and 27 were amended in 1965 to increase the membership of the Security Council from its original eleven to its present fifteen, with a corresponding change from seven to nine votes for the adoption of resolutions. No change was made in the five permanent members’ veto power over substantive matters. Article 109 was amended in 1968 to increase from seven to nine the number of votes in the Security Council needed to complement a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for the convening of a Charter review conference. Otherwise, c’est la même chose.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert W. Briggs

The state of China — a nation of possibly 460,000,000 people — has been a Member of the United Nations since the foundation of that organization in 1945. As a Member, China is legally entitled to representation in United Nations organs unless and until, pursuant to preventive or enforcement action taken by the Security Council, the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership may be suspended by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. The representatives of China in United Nations organs from 1945 to the present have been accredited by the National Government of the Republic of China. By the end of 1949 control over the mainland of China and over perhaps 450,000,000 people had passed from the National Government to the (communist) “Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China,” the effective control of the National Government having been reduced largely to the island of Formosa.


1966 ◽  
Vol 6 (63) ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Albert Verdoodt

On the 10th December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which had been drawn up by a series of meetings of the Commission of Human Rights and the Commission on the Condition of Women as well as major discussions which took place during the first seven sessions of the Economic and Social Council. The General Assembly presented this Declaration “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education … and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance …”


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