Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet View

1958 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan F. Triska ◽  
Robert M. Slusser

Speaking before the American Society of International Law, Aleksandr Troianovski, the first Soviet Ambassador to the United States, summed up his views on the basic sources of order in international relations. He began by rejecting the idea of a “supernational support” for international law, since the source of the rules regulating the relations among nations “lies in the nations, and not in a superforce acting from above the nations.”

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Finch

The founding fifty years ago of a society to promote the establishment of international relations on the basis of law and justice was a step marking the progress that had been made at the beginning of the century in the age-long efforts to find a means of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international controversies. At that time arbitration was generally regarded as the most suitable and acceptable substitute for war. Great Britain and the United States had both heavily contributed to that conviction first by submitting to arbitration under the Jay Treaty of 1794 the numerous misunderstandings that developed in carrying out the provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1783, and then three-quarters of a century later in submitting to arbitration by the Treaty of Washington of 1871 the dangerous Alabama Claims dispute following the American Civil War.


Author(s):  
Robert Vitalis

We now know that the ‘birth of the discipline’ of international relations in the United States is a story about empire. The foundations of early international relations theory are set in not just international law and historical sociology but evolutionary biology and racial anthropology. The problem is the way in which scholars today deal with the place of race in the thought of John Hobson, Paul Reinsch, and virtually all other social scientists of the era. The strand of thought that still resonates in our own time about empire, states, and the like is raised up and depicted as the scientific or theoretical core in the scholars’ work, while the strand that involves now archaic racial constructs is downgraded and treated instead as mere ‘language’, ‘metaphors’, and ‘prejudices’ of the era. To undo this error and recover in full the ideas of early international relations theorists it is necessary to bring the work of historians of conservative and reform Darwinism to bear on the first specialists and foundational texts in international relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
Lori F. Damrosch

Our moderator's questions begin with “in what sense is international law and in what sense isn't it universal?” and continue with whether international law may be “different in different places” and what the implications of such differences may be. I am here to defend the “universalist” perspective, as the immediate past president of the American Society of International Law and before that, editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International Law. Though both the Society and the Journal have “American” in their titles and our geographic headquarters is in the United States, the Society's mission statement commits us to pursue “a just world under law,” which I interpret as a global vision for a universal system of international law.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-559
Author(s):  
William L. Rodgers

At the recent annual dinner of the American Society of International Law I listened with much interest to the eloquent and impassioned address of Judge Florence E. Allen, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that the conservation of peace has not hitherto been, and should be made, the principal objective in the development of international law. I think that her views might be summarized not unfairly in the form of a syllogism. Undeniable is its major premise that war is cruel, costly in life and resources, full of horror—a terrible infliction on those who resort to it. The minor premise is that means exist and others may be discovered whereby disputes may always be settled and peace enforced without recourse to war. And so comes the conclusion that all these means should be sought for, discovered and used, after which war will be unnecessary and will disappear from the world, leaving us under the rule of perpetual physical peace, no matter what may be the mental and emotional differences between nations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 318-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriana Sinclair ◽  
Michael Byers

The term ‘sovereignty’ figures prominently in international affairs and academic analysis. But does ‘sovereignty’ mean the same thing in different countries and political cultures? In this article, we examine conceptions of sovereignty as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international law and those international relations scholars who deal with international law, in order to obtain a clearer picture of what ‘sovereignty’ means in American academic discourse. At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) a statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or undemocratic character; (2) a popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. On closer examination, what seem to be two conceptions are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty which elevates the United States above other countries and protects it against outside influences while concurrently maximising its ability to intervene overseas.


1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
A H Angelo

This article is a book review of Makitaro Hotta Laws and Politics of the International Relations of Japan and the United States (published jointly by the School of International Service, American University, Washington, and the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, 1996) 195 pages. The book is a compendium of documents and materials relating to Japan and United States relations from the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 to the Japan/US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century of 17 April 1996. Angelo praises the book’s versatility, as it can be used for comparative law classes and for international relations programmes, for constitutional law teaching, and for aspects of public international law. 


Author(s):  
Paul B. Stephan

This chapter considers the rise of foreign relations law as a way of thinking about the legal dimensions of international relations. It connects this development to the emergence of comparative international law and anxieties about fragmentation in international law. Each of these fields challenges conventional ways of thinking about international law and thus seems to bolster those who would dismiss international law as irrelevant or ineffectual. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first describes contemporary foreign relations law as a distinct field that emerged in the United States in the late 1990s and developed independently in parts of the British Commonwealth and Europe. It traces the parallels with and differences between foreign relations law and comparative international law. The second section considers the possibility these complementary trends, as well as concerns about fragmentation, pose a threat to international law as conventionally conceived. The third section responds to these concerns.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Dumbauld

The so-called “neutrality laws” of the United States are statutory provisions, a part of the penal law of the United States, and should be clearly distinguished from the obligations imposed upon the United States by interyt national law. They may be regarded as an instance of the enforcement of international law by municipal law in the United States, and originated in the endeavors of the administration of President Washington to discharge the duties owed by the American Government as a neutral nation during the war between England and France in 1793. They punish criminally the commission of acts forbidden by the law of nations. As was well said by the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board in 1916, “The doer of the wrongful act is accountable only to the United States, while the United States is itself accountable to a foreign government for the commission of the act. In this respect the neutrality laws differ from ordinary penal statutes, because the prohibited acts affect the international relations of the United States in addition to any effect they may have upon domestic tranquillity and order.”


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

The American Society of International Law (ASIL), incorporated by Act of Congress in 1950, was founded in 1906 “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international relations on the basis of law and justice.” As we celebrate the centennial of this, the Society’s principal publication, it is appropriate to examine the present and future prospects of this project. Is it still a compelling aspiration in the era of U.S. superpower-dom?The founding of the Society and initiation of the Journal (AJIL) must be seen in the context of the then-prevalent American commitment to the idea that a world of international law and international tribunals would be a natural, even historically inevitable, extrapolation of a good American idea. Speaking in 1890 to the first Pan-American Conference, President Benjamin Harrison congratulated the delegates on formulating a hemispheric arbitration agreement. “We rejoice,” he said, “that you have found in the organization of our Government something suggestive and worthy of imitation.” At The Hague in 1907, Secretary of State Elihu Root, the founding president of the ASIL, called for the creation of an international court “which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of the different States.”


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