Colonial Clauses and Federal Clauses in United Nations Multilateral Instruments

1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuen-li Liang
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Controversial Subject ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The United Nations

The question of including in an international multilateral instrument provisions defining the application of the instrument to the dependent territories of the contracting states has been a controversial subject in the United Nations. Such provisions, generally known as “colonial clauses,” may take one of three forms. They may provide for the optional application of an instrument to the dependent territories of the contracting states, so that the instrument does not apply to the dependent territories of any contracting state unless the latter chooses to extend the application of the instrument to all or any of its dependent territories. On the other hand, they may provide for the optional exclusion from the application of the instrument of the dependent territories of the contracting states, so that the instrument applies to the dependent territories unless a contracting state chooses to exclude from the application of the instrument all or any of its dependent territories. A third type of colonial clauses may provide for the automatic application of the instrument to the dependent territories of all contracting states. However, there are instruments, notably the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which do not contain any reference at all with respect to their application to dependent territories. In such cases, the general rule seems to be that, subject to express or implied provisions to the contrary, the instruments apply to all the territories of the contracting states, including their dependent territories. The following is an account of the developments in connection with several multilateral instruments considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations or concluded under the auspices of the United Nations.

Part II Commentaries to Typical Sofa Rules, 9 Civilian Components

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muñoz-Mosquera Andrés ◽  
Chalanouli Nikoleta
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Effective Performance ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Common Understanding

This chapter addresses the civilian components accompanying Visiting Forces. For these components, the privileges and immunities of the UN and those specific of the mission apply. This mission immunity is essential for an impartial and effective performance of the specific UN mandate, which is ‘a prerequisite for the success of the mission’. The legal framework for these privileges and immunities has to be sought in Art. 105 of the UN Charter, which consecrates the principle that the UN officials shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of UN purposes in order to be independent in the exercise of their functions. On the other hand, the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations has not come to bring a common understanding on to whom it applies when peacekeepers are involved.

scholarly journals Editor's Note

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. v-vii ◽  
Author(s):  
Harlan Koff ◽  
Carmen Maganda
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Millennium Development Goals ◽  
Statistical Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Consciousness ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Political Program ◽  
Development Goals ◽  
The United Nations

Much debate has swirled around the United Nations’ (UN) 2000–2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). On one hand, the MDGs established the fight against poverty in the global political consciousness. On the other hand, they maintained a traditional statistical approach to “development” that focused on indicators more than transformation. Critics (such as Blanco Sío-López, 2015; Martens, 2015) have contended that the MDGs reinforced power imbalances and the indicators included in the political program were unattainable by many developing states since the beginning.

UNESCO and the ‘right’ kind of culture: Bureaucratic production and articulation

2011 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 273-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjarke Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Everyday Practice ◽  
Ethnographic Fieldwork ◽  
Institutional Authority ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Social ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

There has been much debate on ‘culturespeak’ and the politics of culture, but the bureaucratic articulation of specific representations of culture has not received much attention. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this article presents a double take on bureaucracy. On the one hand, I focus on the outcome of UNESCO’s bureaucracy: UNESCO promotes an all-inclusive culture perspective for ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, but there are limits to tolerance in this culture ideology. On the other hand, I focus on the social and pragmatic adaptation to the bureaucratic field and towards UNESCO’s keywords, as they are embedded with institutional authority in everyday practice. In conclusion, I briefly situate UNESCO’s culture ideology in relation to questions of recognition and redistribution.

The Question of the establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 478-486
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Plenary Meeting ◽  
Criminal Jurisdiction ◽  
The United Nations

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 179th plenary meeting on December 9, 1948, unanimously approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and proposed it for signature and ratification or accession in accordance with Article XI thereof. Article I of the Convention provides that “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law.” Article V stipulates that the Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutions, the necessary legislation to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts made punishable under the Convention. Such persons are to be tried, according to Article VI, “by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” The Convention thus envisages the possible creation of an international penal tribunal.

scholarly journals United Nations Convention Against Corruption dalam Sistem Hukum Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Eddy Omar Sharif Hiariej
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations

The Indonesian government had ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption [’UNCAC’] through Act No. 7 of 2006. However, the Indonesian Act on Anti-Corruption has yet to be synchronized with UNCAC. On one hand, corruption has become a massive issue in Indonesia, but on the other hand, the existing Anti-Corruption Act has yet to be in compliance with the relevant international instrument. Therefore, the implementation of UNCAC has become more urgent. Aside from the need to counter corruption efficiently and effectively, UNCAC calls upon the need for international cooperation against corruption.

Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Remarks on the Applicability and Scope of the Reciprocal ‘Due Regard’ Duties of Coastal and Third States

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
Ioannis Prezas
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Exclusive Economic Zone ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Economic Zone ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Law

Abstract This study examines the applicability and scope of the reciprocal ‘due regard’ duties imposed upon coastal and third states by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the field of military activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The applicability of these duties depends on the existence of a right of third states to conduct military activities in the EEZ of another state. Still, this preliminary issue remains extremely controversial because the rules established by the Convention do not offer any clear guidance. On the other hand, if such a right is recognized in abstracto and thus the applicability of the ‘due regard’ duties is triggered, an enquiry into the potential procedural and substantive scope of these duties is necessary to understand how conflicts between this right and coastal states’ rights and jurisdiction should be resolved in concreto.

SCOTT PEGG, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishers, 1988).

2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-470
Author(s):  
MONTE PALMER
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Society ◽  
International System ◽  
International Community ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Movement ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Substantial Control

The objective of Scott Pegg's book is to examine the role of the de facto state in the international system. The book begins with a description of quasi-states, entities defined as ineffective states that possess internationally recognized sovereignty as indicated by membership in the United Nations. The de facto state, by contrast, is a political movement that possesses substantial control over a specified territory and population but lacks recognition of its sovereignty by the international community. As expressed by Pegg, “The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. . . . The de facto state, on the other hand, is a functioning reality that is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society” (p. 5).

2. An impossible hybrid: the structure of the United Nations

2015 ◽  
pp. 26-49
Author(s):  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Social Council ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Central Organ

‘An impossible hybrid: the structure of the United Nations’ explains the various functions of the conglomeration of organizations, divisions, bodies, and secretariats that make up the UN. The Security Council is the central organ of the UN system and has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly is the forum where the 193 member states can make their cases heard. The UN Secretariat serves the other principal organs of the UN and administers the programs and policies laid down by them, with the Secretary-General at its head. The roles of the Economic and Social Council, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization are also described.

Part 2 The United Nations: What it is, 5 The Economic and Social Council

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Higgins Dame Rosalyn, DBE, QC ◽  
Webb Philippa ◽  
Akande Dapo ◽  
Sivakumaran Sandesh ◽  
Sloan James
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Work Relationships ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Social Activities ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Social Council ◽  
Subject Areas ◽  
The United Nations

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the UN’s six principal organs. More than any other principal organ, it has been the object of relentless criticism and attempts at reform. Among the impediments to its successful functioning have been its size (considered by some to be too large and by others not to be large enough); its ambiguous relationship with the General Assembly (including an overlapping of subject areas); and the fact that, as regards its activities in relation to economics, it operates in the shadow of the powerful institutions created at Bretton Woods and certain aspects of its social activities are dealt with by other international organizations or specialized agencies. This chapter discusses the ECOSOC’s membership, procedure, and voting; functions; meetings and programme of work; relationships with the other principal organs; areas of competence; and reform.

Sizing up the Opposition

2018 ◽  
pp. 328-351
Author(s):  
Amita Dhanda
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
People With Disabilities ◽  
The Other ◽  
Disability Rights ◽  
Institutional Integrity ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Treaty Body ◽  
The United Nations

This chapter presents that the case for a Comprehensive Disability Rights Convention (CRPD) was accepted because it was realized that the United Nations Human Rights Conventions, before the CRPD, did not look at disability rights from the perspective of people with disabilities. CRPD, on the other hand, was totally informed by the participation credo of nothing about us without us. Thus, the chapter sets up a comparison between the CRPD Treaty Body and the other human rights monitoring bodies to assess whether the various monitoring bodies undertake their oversight tasks in harmony with each other. Is their institutional integrity in the manner in which the world body seeks accountability from states or inadvertently or otherwise the states have been provided pick and choose space between various human rights bodies of the United Nations?

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