Future International Laws of War

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. Rodgers

Undoubtedly the generally recognized rules governing the exertion of military force at any given period are the outcome of social and economic conditions as well as of the development of new modes of attack upon life and property. Yet many believe that new forms of the exertion of military strength may be restrained by international agreement made in time of peace and in the name of humanity. Although such agreements have been made in the past, such as the Hague agreements of 1899 and 1907, not all have been viable. It is doubtful if effective ways of striking down the enemy will be limited by the bare plea of “humanity”. Restraint on the exercise of belligerent force for the sole reason that the sufferings of war are great and cruel is instinctive but not logical, for war is death and injury of persons and destruction of property by which the enemy is forced to submit. As to this matter Oppenheim says in his International Law: … First is the principle that a belligerent should be justified in applying any amount and any kind of force which is necessary for the realization of the purpose of the war—namely, the overpowering of the opponent. Secondly, the principle of humanity is at work, which says that all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the enemy should not be permitted to the belligerent.

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Howland

The Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), recently commemorated with several international conference volumes, is identified by a majority of contributors as the first modern, global war. In making such a judgment, these scholars note its scale, its nationalism, its colonialism and geopolitical repercussions. What is surprising, however, is that no one has remarked on another significance: it was the first war in which both belligerents pledged to adhere to the international laws of war. In that regard, the Russo–Japanese War marks a culmination of the tireless international diplomacy to secure legal limitations on warfare in the nineteenth century. In 1904, both Russia and Japan justified their operations according to international law, for the benefit of an international audience who had five years earlier celebrated some progress with the signing of The Hague Conventions in 1899.


2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Benvenisti

The contemporary international law of occupation, which regulates the conduct of occupying forces during wartime, was framed over the course of deliberations among European governments during the second half of the nineteenth century. The debates between representatives of strong and weak powers on this matter dominated the conferences in Brussels (1874) and The Hague (1899), whose goal was to formulate the laws of war through an international agreement. The outcome, enshrined in what is known as the Hague Regulations of 1899,1 represented a delicate balance that both provided protection for a civilian population brought under the control of an occupant and safeguarded the interests of the ousted government for the duration of the occupation. Occupation was conceived of as a temporary regime existing until the conclusion of a peace agreement between the enemy sides (unless the defeated party ceased to exist as a result of the war, a situation referred to as debellatio). The evolution of the law of occupation in the nineteenth century was a gradual process, shaped by changing conceptions about war and sovereignty, as well as by the balance of power emerging in Europe.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-103
Author(s):  
Komang Sukaniasa

International agreements are agreements between international subjects that give rise to binding obligations in international rights, which can be bilateral or multilateral. Based on these opinions, an understanding can be taken that international treaties are agreements or agreements entered into by two or more countries as subjects of international law that aim to cause certain legal consequences. International agreements, whether ratified or through approval or acceptance or accession, or other methods that are permitted, have the same binding force as ratified international treaties established in the Ratification Law of International Treaties. Once again, it is equally valid and binding on the state. Therefore, the authors consider that the position of international treaties are not made in the form of the Ratification Act of the International Agreement but are binding and apply to Indonesia. Then Damos Dumoli Agusman argues that ratification originates from the conception of international treaty law which is interpreted as an act of confirmation from a country of the legal acts of its envoys or representatives who have signed an agreement as a sign of agreement to be bound by the agreement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 365-388
Author(s):  
Pablo Kalmanovitz

Abstract Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this “anti-impunity turn” in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.


2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Valentino ◽  
Paul Huth ◽  
Sarah Croco

Do the international laws of war effectively protect civilian populations from deliberate attack? In a statistical analysis of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003 the authors find no evidence that signatories of The Hague or Geneva Conventions intentionally kill fewer civilians during war than do nonsignatories. This result holds for democratic signatories and for wars in which both sides are parties to the treaty. Nor do they find evidence that a state's regime type or the existence of ethnic or religious differences between combatants explains the variation in civilian targeting. They find strong support, however, for their theoretical framework, which suggests that combatants seek to kill enemy civilians when they believe that doing so will coerce their adversaries into early surrender or undermine their adversaries' war-related domestic production. The authors find that states fighting wars of attrition or counterinsurgency, states fighting for expansive war aims, and states fighting wars of long duration kill significantly more civilians than states in other kinds of wars.


Author(s):  
Cupido Robin

This chapter discusses Mauritian perspectives on the Hague Principles. The Code Civile Mauricien (Mauritian Civil Code) governs most private and commercial law matters and is thus one of the main sources of Mauritian law. Another main source is the Constitution of Mauritius 1968. It is important to note that there is no constitutional imperative for courts to consider international law when interpreting legislation, which could be a contributing factor to the lack of development of a cohesive private international law regime in Mauritius. The Law Reform Commission of Mauritius has thus been reviewing the status of private international law in Mauritius over the past five years and has issued several reports and studies on the matter. The chapter then investigates the extent to which Mauritian private international law already reflects the content of the Hague Principles and how this set of principles could influence the future development of the conflict of laws in Mauritius.


1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-486
Author(s):  
Celia Wasserstein Fassberg

The aim of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is to work towards international unification of the rules in this area. Its hundred years of activity, and particularly the past forty years, have been devoted to producing conventions unifying the rules of law in the three central issues of private international law: jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments. These three distinct issues correspond to three distinct stages of litigation. The rules of jurisdiction answer the question, which state's courts have jurisdiction to decide a case or, from the perspective of any given state: does its courts have jurisdiction over the case? Choice-of-law rules, in contrast, answer the question, which law should govern the case, irrespective of where it is being adjudicated? Finally, the rules relating to foreign judgments define the terms on which a decision given in one state will be recognised and enforced in another.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Aldrich ◽  
Christine M. Chinkin

On May 18, 1899, die first Hague Peace Conference was convened in the House in the Woods provided by the Dutch royal family. It was attended by invitation by representatives of twenty-six of the fifty-nine governments that then claimed sovereignty. The hundred delegates included diplomats, statesmen (no stateswomen!), publicists, lawyers, and technical and scientific experts. Unlike earlier peace conferences, which were convened to terminate ongoing armed conflicts, the Hague Conference met in peacetime for the purpose of making law. The conference was called at the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia with the intentions principally to seek agreements to limit armaments and their consequent financial burdens, and secondarily to improve the prospects for the peaceful setdement of international disputes and to codify the laws of war. Doubtiess, the tsar’s initiative was inspired in part by his grandfather’s earlier success in obtaining the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which prohibited, for humanitarian reasons, the use of explosive projectiles weighing less than four hundred grams. In any event, the Hague Peace Conference pursued a much broader agenda than the meetings at St. Petersburg and was able to draw upon certain preparatory work on the laws of war, including the Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded in Armies in the Field of 1864, the draft Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War produced by the Brussels Conference of 1874, and the Oxford Manual on the laws of war of 1880, which had been adopted unanimously by the Institute of International Law.


Author(s):  
Mason W. Moseley

This initial chapter presents a telling anecdote from the #8N protests in Argentina in 2012. It then introduces the overarching argument of the book: the rise of protest in certain Latin American regimes can be explained by the interaction of two specific phenomena in recent history: (1) the significant socioeconomic gains made in the region during the past decade, which in turn have produced the most politically “engaged” citizenries—via social media, community organizations, and professional or educational networks—in Latin American history; and (2) the persistence of weak political institutions and waning political legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Thus, rather than emphasizing how worsening economic conditions and mounting grievances fuel protest, this theoretical approach attributes rising contention to the improvement of economic conditions amid low-quality political institutions.


First Monday ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Braman

>The Tallinn Manual of 2013 and its second edition, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 of 2017, are NATO-funded analyses of how existing international laws of war apply to cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. The difficulties faced by the groups of legal experts who produced these works often involve fundamental aspects of what it is to be a state altogether, challenging the survival of the state as a dominant political form altogether. These developments, in turn, provide significant challenges to the survival of the Westphalian system within which states have been defined for almost 500 years. This article thinks through the Tallinn manuals from the lens of what debates over the appropriate legal treatment of cyber operations under international law tells us about how the state is being experienced and understood in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Comparative analysis of the first and second editions of the Manual shows that just what the informational state is, what it can do, and what it should be allowed to do is becoming less clear, not more, over time.


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