The Central American Policy of Non-Recognition

1925 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandler P. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Central American ◽  
American Policy

The Dual Strategy Myth in Central American Policy

1984 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Vanderlaan
Keyword(s):  
Central America ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Central American ◽  
White House ◽  
Dual Strategy ◽  
American Policy ◽  
Mixed Messages

The Reagan administration is sending mixed messages on its policy in Central America, leading some observers to label the policy “schizoid” and influencing yet others to give the president the benefit of the doubt until policy implications become clearer or unavoidable. Commenting in July on White House policy as it has been iterated in the first half of 1983, Senator Christopher Dodd (1983), a leading administration critic, asserted that “there is total confusion in Washington as to what the administration's policies are, and there is a total confusion in Central America as to what U.S. intentions are.” Similar charges have been made from both sides of the aisle in Congress.Almost sadly, these charges are not part of an opposition's political ploy, but in fact are rooted in speeches, position papers, and actions formulated by the president and his Central America policy team.

Dollar Diplomacy in the Light of the Guatemalan Loan Project, 1909-1913

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. H. Dinwoodie
Keyword(s):  
Financial Structure ◽  
State Department ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Central American ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
American Policy ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Strategic Interest

While historians have shown unusual agreement in their critical assessment of the results of Philander Knox's Central American policy, they have frequently disagreed on the reasons for this failure, as well as on the goals of the Secretary of State. An examination of one of Knox's loan projects — the Guatemalan refunding scheme — throws light on these two issues. The record of this futile four-year attempt to reorganize the country's financial structure reveals a State Department approach relying eventually on the use of coercive diplomatic methods. These techniques were resourceful, but ineffectual, and contributed to an unproductive and acrimonious diversion with the British Foreign Office. The negotiations suggest that the Secretary and other Department officers sought goals broader in nature than national economic or strategic interest. The extent of their objectives may have contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome of the case.

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