The United States and the Permanent Court of International Justice

1927 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright

On August 15, 1921, the Secretary of State of the United States acknowledged receipt from the Secretary General of the League of Nations of a certified copy of the protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice opened for signature on December 16, 1920, by members of the League and states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant. On February 24, 1923, President Harding submitted the protocol and the accompanying statute to the Senate with a request for its consent to American adhesion with four “ conditions and understandings” explained in an attached letter from Secretary of State Hughes, dated February 17, 1923. President Harding continued to speak for the court until his death, and on December 6, 1923, President Coolidge commended the proposal to the Senate. Resolutions on the subject were introduced in the Senate by Senators Lenroot of Wisconsin (December 10, 1923), Pepper of Pennsylvania (April 7, 1924), Lodge of Massachusetts (May 5, 1924), Swanson of Virginia (May 5, 1924), King of Utah (May 20, 1924), and on May 26, 1924, Senator Pepper submitted a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations endorsing his proposal for Senate consent with radical amendments to the statute.

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-106
Author(s):  
Khaled Elgindy

This essay looks at the hearing held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 1922 on the subject of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as well as the broader congressional debate over the Balfour Declaration at that crucial time. The landmark hearing, which took place against the backdrop of growing unrest in Palestine and just prior to the League of Nations' formal approval of Britain's Mandate over Palestine, offers a glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time as well as the ways in which the political discourse in the United States has, or has not, changed since then. Despite the overwhelming support for the Zionist project in Congress, which unanimously endorsed Balfour in September 1922, the hearing examined all aspects of the issue and included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints, including both anti-Zionist Jewish and Palestinian Arab voices.


Author(s):  
C. L. Mowat

The examination of historical works, and especially school textbooks on history, for evidence of national bias, is nothing new. Between the wars the focus was on British and German histories, which were an object of concern to the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. Since the Second World War the subject of national bias in historical works has been taken up by the Council of Europe and UNESCO. A recent study has been concerned with current British and American textbooks, which have been examined for evidences of bias against the United States and Britain respectively.


1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 495-522
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam

The prestigious American Law Institute is in the process of promulgating a revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The present Restatement on the subject was adopted in 1962 and finally promulgated with revisions in 1965. Work on a revised restatement began in the late 1970s and the first tentative draft was submitted to the Institute in 1980. Thus far, five tentative drafts have been presented to the members of the Institute for their consideration and the Restatement as a whole is scheduled for consideration by the members of the Institute at its annual meeting in May 1985.The American Law Institute is a private organization of jurists, not a legislative body, and the Restatements are not official codifications. However, since the Institute membership includes some of the most noted scholars, judges and practitioners in the United States, the Restatements carry great weight and are often cited by United States courts in their decisions.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 697-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denys P. Myers

The Senate on March 16, 1961, by a vote of 72 to 18, advised and consented to the ratification of the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and its three protocols signed at Paris December 14, 1960. The Organization is a consultative forum capable of initiating agreements on the use and development of economic resources, on removing obstacles to trade and current payments, on liberalization of capital movements, on the flow of capital to less developed countries. The 20 signatories are the industrialized states of Europe, Canada and the United States. A vociferous opposition to the convention by interests that erroneously thought it might reduce tariffs was heard by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Whether on that account or because they realized the importance of the convention itself, members of that committee in two executive sessions carefully probed official spokesmen to satisfy themselves that the convention did not affect the powers of the President or Congress. As a consequence, the resolution approving the convention took this unusual form: Having regard to and in reliance on the statement in the letter of January 16, 1961, from Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower and transmitted by him to the Senate on January 17, 1961, that “the U. S. representative will not have any additional powers in substantive matters to bind the United States after the convention enters into force than now exist in the Executive, but that any act of the Organization outside the power of the Executive will require action by Congress or the Senate, as the case may be, before the United States can be bound,” and having regard to and in reliance on the testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and Under Secretary of State Ball in behalf of the administration, and having regard to and in reliance on the Opinion of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State dated March 6, 1961, and quoted in the committee report of this convention:Resolved (Two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, together with two protocols relating thereto, signed at Paris on December 14, 1960, by representatives of the United States of America, Canada, and the 18 member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (Executive E, 87th Congress, 1st session), with the interpretation and explanation of the intent of the Senate that nothing in the convention, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, confers any power on the Executive to bind the United States in substantive matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to bind the United States without compliance with applicable procedures imposed by domestic law, or confers any power on the Congress to take action in fields previously beyond the authority of Congress, or limits Congress in the exercise of any power it now has.


1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-259
Author(s):  
Howard B. Calderwood

The guarantee clause of the Polish Minorities Treaty, which is the model for the treaties signed by eight other states, is as follows: “Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Poland agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between the Polish government and any one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decisions of the Permanent Court shall be final, and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.”


Author(s):  
Udi Greenberg

This chapter focuses on theories of Hans J. Morgenthau, a German émigré specialist on foreign relations. In the years immediately after World War II, Morgenthau emerged as the highest intellectual authority on international relations in the United States. His theory, which became known as “realism,” explained why the United States had no choice but to oppose the Soviet Union and China and prevent them from expanding their power in Europe and East Asia. However, Morgenthau also opposed U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. This dual position marked both the high point of the German–American symbiosis and the moment of its crisis.


Author(s):  
Sarah B. Snyder

In its formulation of foreign policy, the United States takes account of many priorities and factors, including national security concerns, economic interests, and alliance relationships. An additional factor with significance that has risen and fallen over time is human rights, or more specifically violations of human rights. The extent to which the United States should consider such abuses or seek to moderate them has been and continues to be the subject of considerable debate.


1923 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-437
Author(s):  
Eugène Borel

From the day on which the United States of America declared that it would not become a party to the League of Nations, the thoughts of many people have naturally turned to the situation created by this abstention, the seriousness of which was necessarily clear to everyone.Some think that the matter should be taken lightly. In their opinion the attitude of the United States can only be transitory and at some future time, which may, however, be still far distant, the country will modify its decision and make up its mind to occupy the place reserved for it in the League of Nations. Others allow themselves to be misguided by a different hope. According to them the League of Nations cannot live and will sooner or later disappear to make place for another grouping of nations which would win the approval and adhesion of the American Republic. Between these extreme views there lie the proposals of those who seek relief in the present situation, basing their expectations either upon such a revision of the Covenant as would satisfy the United States or upon the creation of a world association which would join the United States, the present League of Nations and other states not yet belonging thereto into one great group.


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