The Obligation to Ratify Treaties

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Eugene Harley

One of the earliest examples of a sort of ratification is found in the treaty between Justinian and the Persian King, Chosroes, in 561 A. D. In this case the sovereigns agreed to accept that which their plenipotentiaries had promised and agreed upon. The French-Swiss alliance of May 28, 1777, was sanctioned by solemn oaths. It was the custom in earlier times to take hostages to insure ratification; this Grotius believed entirely proper. The oath gave way to a mere act or declaration of ratification.Grotius likened a plenipotentiary to a mandatory, holding that all agreements reached by him were binding upon the sovereign from the time of signature, unless the secret instructions were transcended. Thus he regarded ratification as a mere form, not affecting the validity of the treaty. Likewise Martens, writing in 1789 at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, believed that if a mandatory had not exceeded his secret instructions, all that he agreed to was binding upon the state represented, and that the law of nations required no particular ratification (ratification particulière). Pufendorf regarded treaties valid from signature and thought ratification superfluous.

1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (290) ◽  
pp. 446-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Valencia Villa

Over the years the Americas have made significant contributions to the development of international humanitarian law. These include three nineteenth-century texts which constitute the earliest modern foundations of the law of armed conflict. The first is a treaty, signed on 26 November 1820 by the liberator Simón Bolívar and the peacemaker Pablo Morillo, which applied the rules of international conflict to a civil war. The second is a Spanish-American work entitled Principios de Derecho de Genres (Principles of the Law of Nations), which was published in 1832 by Andrés Bello. This work dealt systematically with the various aspects and consequences of war. The third is a legal instrument, signed on 24 April 1863 by United States President Abraham Lincoln, which codified the first body of law on internal conflict under the heading “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (General Orders No. 100). This instrument, known as the Lieber Code, was adopted as the new code of conduct for the armies of the Union during the American Civil War.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Tomlins

Over the last fifteen years, legal historians have been exploring conceptualizations of the state and state capacity as phenomena of police. In this essay, I offer a genealogy of police in nineteenth-century American constitutional law. I examine relationships among several distinct strands of development: domestic regulatory law, notably the commerce power; the law of indigenous peoples and immigrants; and the law of territorial acquisition. I show that in state and federal juridical discourse, police expresses unrestricted and undefined powers of governance rooted in a discourse of sovereign inheritance and state necessity, culminating in the increasingly pointed claim that as a nation-state the United States possesses limitless capacity “to do all acts and things which independent states may of right do.”


Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen

This chapter aims to explain why considering Vattel as a founding father of positivism rests on a misunderstanding. Despite the continuous attention Vattel received in the scholarly literature as well as in the diplomatic and juridical practice, especially in the United States, his legacy remained highly contested ever since his treatise The Law of Nations was first published in 1758. One reason is its indebtedness to the modern natural law tradition but also to Vattel’s originality, mainly due to the significance he attributed to the sovereign state as a free and independent member of the society of nations. Vattel established many dualisms to develop his very broad notion of the law of nations: he applied the law of nations to the ‘political system’ of Europe, which he considered a kind of republic instituted for maintaining order and liberty and founded on the scheme of the balance of power.


1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. W. Willoughby

Political scientists make a sharp distinction between the terms “State” and “Government.” A State is a group of individuals viewed as a politically organized unit. In the eyes of the law it appears as a corporate being possessing supreme authority and issuing commands in the form of laws addressed to those over whom it claims authority. A Government is the machinery or complexus of organs through which this state-being formulates, expresses, and enforces its will.In my preceding paper I dealt wholly with the Prussian conception of the State and had nothing to say regarding Prussian conceptions of Government. In this paper I shall have little to say regarding the Prussian theory of the State and shall devote myself almost wholly to a consideration of the Prussian governmental system. Of this system, however, I shall speak of but one of its features, namely, its strong monarchical character. In result there should appear what justification there is for the demand of the United States and of the Entente Powers for a modification of the Prussian system.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
Jurg Gerber ◽  
Kate Angulski

We examine in this article the legal status of foreign prisoners in the United States in general, and in the State of Texas in particular. With few exceptions, the law does not distinguish between domestic and foreign prisoners, granting similar rights and obligations to each. We conclude this article by examining current controversies in the treatment of foreign prisoners in the United States. Issues examined include dietary restrictions, use of languages other than English, length of hair, and mandatory and indefinite detention of aliens.


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