International Law as Applied by England in the War

1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-44
Author(s):  
E. Grey ◽  
Norman Bentwich

International law is at once on its trial and in the moulding as it has never been before. It is just a hundred years since the last world-wide war was fought; and to that period one must go back to trace the source of the principal rules and practices of the law of war, and especially of maritime warfare. In the interval, the form of international law and much of its substance have been entirely changed. From indefinite practice and varying usage, imperfectly systematized by text writers, it has passed into the condition of definite rules and uniform law, formulated by international conventions. But most of this definite law has not yet stood the test of practice. So far as the rules of maritime warfare are concerned, it is largely consolidated in conventions made at international conferences during the last seven years. These conventions have indeed been already applied in the war of Italy and the Balkan Powers against Turkey, but they were not searchingly tried in those contests, which were determined by land operations. Strictly, the conventions are not binding in this war, because they are intended to apply only in wars in which all the belligerents are parties, and Servia and Montenegro have not ratified any of the 1907 agreements; but, in fact, the great Powers are professing* to act according to the international legislation.

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. P. Trainin

The history of war knows no such brigandage, fanaticism, or such craftiness as the German fascist usurpers practiced from the moment of their attack upon the peoples of other states. The rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, recognized by all civilized peoples, were rejected and trampled under foot by these usurpers. These rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, put together in the course of many centuries, have received the title “the law of war” and constitute an inseparable part of international law.


Author(s):  
Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik

Abstract The article explores the current stagnation in multilateral law-making based on an analysis of recent treaty attempts across various subfields of international law. It further examines why the law of the sea has continued to evolve despite this trend. The article demonstrates that states still regularly seek multilateral treaties to address new challenges. While there is some evidence of general treaty saturation, it is the current inability of traditional great powers to negotiate new binding norms which is the most constraining factor on multilateral law-making. This in turn is related to deeper geopolitical shifts by which traditional great powers, notably the United States and its allies, have seen their relative influence decline. Until the current great power competition ends or settles into a new mode of international co-operation, new multilateral treaties with actual regulatory effect will rarely emerge. The law of the sea has avoided the current trend of stagnation for primarily three reasons (i) a global commitment to the basic tenets of the law of the sea; (ii) a legal framework that affords rights and obligations somewhat evenly disbursed, allowing less powerful states to use their collective leverage to advance multilateral negotiations, despite intermittent great power opposition; and (iii) the avoidance of entrenched multilateral forums where decisions are reached by consensus only.


Author(s):  
Dominique Gaurier

This chapter observes that early writers on the law of war or on the law of peace offered their contributions in an intellectual context that was very different from our own. They were attempting to provide explanations for the questions related to war and peace, and in doing so drew upon interesting elements in Roman or canon law. Yet, none of the sources available to them were sufficient to offer a comprehensive response to related legal issues. Although these authors were all largely relying on the Bible and on ancient or contemporaneous history, some also drew information from their own life experiences. The majority, however, built their theories on the basis of their own readings and legal knowledge. Furthermore, only very few authors addressed the question of the sources of international law.


Author(s):  
Peter Huber

The story of comparative law in the field of sales contracts is inextricably linked to Ernst Rabel. Rabel not only prepared the basis for any comparative study of the modern law of sales in his epochal treatise Das Recht des Warenkaufs, but also initiated the process of world-wide harmonization of the law of international sales. The close interrelation between comparative law and uniform law is also apparent in the life and the work of Ernst Rabel as his treatise on the law of sales developed from the preparatory work he had done for the UNIDROIT project to create a uniform law for international sales in the 1930s. The second section of this article outlines the most important projects in this area and their interaction with comparative law. The third section discusses selected characteristic features of the law of sales which are interesting from a comparative point of view.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
BLAISE BACHOFEN

In theSocial Contract, Rousseau declares that he has given up the idea of discussing the “external relations” of states. Yet numerous texts—including a recently reconstituted work about the law of war—show that he thought very seriously about the question of the nature and origin of war and of the possibility of making war subject to the rule of law. Rousseau, in contrast to Hobbes, links war's appearance to that of the sovereign states; the state of war is therefore the necessary result of international relations. Moreover, he considers the international law as chimerical. How can he then conceive a non-utopian theory of “just war”? My hypothesis is that his conception of the law of war is deduced from principles of internal political law and arises from pragmatic necessity. The state that discredits itself in its manner of waging war weakens itself while believing that it is reinforcing itself.


1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schwarzenberger Georg

The traditional system of international law is based on the distinction between the law of peace and the law of war. In the formative period of international law, thinkers were fully aware of the problems hidden behind this classification. Positivist writers took over these conceptions, framed against the background of a philosophical vista of society. Yet in their hands these terms lost their original significance. It is the purpose of this investigation to throw light on this process and to consider the relevance of this dichotomy into peace and war for the positivist and sociological approaches to international law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel G. Walker

The international law of war limits the use of violence, largely through protections afforded to civilians. However, the law provides no principled limit on the taking ofcombatantlife — soldiers may be killed even if to do so would contribute absolutely no military advantage. This permissive approach to unnecessary killing has deep historical roots in the philosophy of the law of war. Three justifications for unnecessary killing have been advanced: a robust notion of sovereignty that views the soldier as a disposable molecule of a greater being; the idea that soldiers are ‘guilty’ and deserve what befalls them in war; and a pragmatic approach holding that limits on gratuitous violence are both impossible to implement in practice as well as harmful. None of these arguments are persuasive in light of the contemporary consensus that there is a human right to life that ought to be respected at all times, even in war. A rule of “combatant proportionality” should therefore be formally incorporated into the law of war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 187-204
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow

The complexity of cross-domain deterrence is a major barrier to establishing coordinated expectations about violations and consequences. For a system of cross-domain deterrence to work, actors must understand what actions will trigger a response, what the response is likely to be, and how willing the respondent is to act. Any such system is likely to be less robust than Cold War nuclear deterrence because of the number of domains involved, constraints on revealing secret capabilities or even the identity of the challenger, and a propensity for provocations that fall below the established threshold of response. This chapter recommends using an analogy to the law of war rather than to nuclear deterrence to understand the possibilities of setting up a workable regime of cross-domain deterrence, even as the author is pessimistic about the ability of any collective regime to adequately manage the complexity of cross-domain deterrence.


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