The Right to Fortify the Panama Canal

1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Wambaugh

As a canal is part of the territory of the country through which it passes, the general principle of sovereignty gives to that country, and to that country alone, the right of fortification. This general principle is capable of modification by treaty. Thus, as the Suez Canal is wholly in Egypt, a right of fortification resided with Egypt, or with its suzerain, Turkey; and, in order to destroy the right, there had to be express provisions in the Constantinople Convention of 1888 — “ respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal ” — to which Turkey was a party. In that treaty as to Suez, there was ample recognition of the prima facie right and duty of the local country to protect the canal. Similarly, the right to fortify the Panama Canal would still reside with the Republic of Panama, and not with the United States, if the convention of 1903 with Panama did not grant to the United States control of the Canal Zone, with all the rights which the United States would possess if it were the sovereign, and “ to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights.” The treaty specifically adds that “ the United States shall have the right * * * to establish fortifications.”

1977 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-521
Author(s):  
Alfred E. Osborne

Negotiating a treaty between two sovereign nations is no simple matter. Even when there is consensus that a new accord is long overdue, a solution acceptable to both governments and their most vocal constituencies is most elusive and often difficult to conclude within a reasonable period of time. This is especially true when there is strong popular opinion aroused on both sides. Discussions usually drag on, and while diplomats publicly agree that “progress is being made,” there are significant political and economic benefits unrealized by either or both countries involved in the negotiation proceedings (Lopez Guevara, 1976).The present treaty negotiations between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America is a case in point. That Panamanian public opinion is aroused on the Canal issue is indicated by the 1964 Canal Zone border incidents in which twenty-one Panamanians and three Americans died and by subsequent demonstrations.


Author(s):  
Joel Gordon

This chapter examines the Free Officers' relations with Britain and the United States, particularly in light of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations regarding the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. In the aftermath of the March crisis, the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR) trained its sights on an evacuation agreement with the British. Both Washington and London felt that the officers shared common strategic and objective aims with the West. The chapter first considers the extent and nature of U.S. and British roles in the consolidation of military rule in Egypt before discussing the Anglo-Egyptian relations in the context of Anglo-American alliance politics. It also explores the question of the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone, along with the U.S. and British response to the Free Officers' coup d'etat of 1952. Finally, it looks at the signing of the Suez accord between Egypt and Britain in October 1954.


1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-637
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

The rights secured by the United States through the conclusion of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and the Hay-Varilla Convention afforded the United States legal bases upon which to embark upon the excavation, construction, operation and protection of an interoceanic canal in the Isthmus of Panama. They formed a foundation for the erection of a vast edifice of powers and jurisdiction over the Panama Canal, the Canal Zone, and over vessels and persons in and about the Canal.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 367-370
Author(s):  
Cesar Von Chong ◽  
John C. Jordan ◽  
Ricardo Gutierrez

ABSTRACT The second largest recorded oil spill to occur in the waters of the Panama Canal happened on June 7, 1980. The 39,366 deadweight ton (dwt) United States tanker Texaco Connecticut, while on a northbound transit and laden with Alaskan crude, struck the east bank of Gaillard Cut, ripping its number 1 and 2 cargo tanks. In a period of approximately six hours, from the time the tanker struck the bank of the canal until it was anchored for repairs at Limon Bay, the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal, an estimated 4,000 barrels (bbl) of crude were spilled in a distance of approximately 35 miles. A multi-agency effort was deployed immediately. The Panama Canal Commission's own pollution control forces, in close working coordination with other units of the commission, the United States Army and the Government of the Republic of Panama were able to recover a total of 1,361 bbl of crude. Manual and mechanical methods of oil recovery were used during 27 days in which an estimated total of 29,396 man-hours were used at a total cost of approximately $800,000. The environmental impact of the spill was observed by Panama Canal Commission biologists as well as by the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute (STRI). Although no baseline data exists for comparison, it is apparent that no far reaching negative effects were imposed on the fauna and flora of Gatun Lake.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Donoghue

The United States’ construction and operation of the Panama Canal began as an idea and developed into a reality after prolonged diplomatic machinations to acquire the rights to build the waterway. Once the canal was excavated, a century-long struggle ensued to hold it in the face of Panamanian nationalism. Washington used considerable negotiation and finally gunboat diplomacy to achieve its acquisition of the Canal. The construction of the channel proved a titanic effort with large regional, global, and cultural ramifications. The importance of the Canal as a geostrategic and economic asset was magnified during the two world wars. But rising Panamanian frustration over the U.S. creation of a state-within-a-state via the Canal Zone, one with a discriminatory racial structure, fomented a local movement to wrest control of the Canal from the Americans. The explosion of the 1964 anti-American uprising drove this process forward toward the 1977 Carter-Torrijos treaties that established a blueprint for eventual U.S. retreat and transfer of the channel to Panama at the century’s end. But before that historic handover, the Noriega crisis and the 1989 U.S. invasion nearly upended the projected transition of U.S. retreat from the management and control of the Canal. Early historians emphasized high politics, economics, and military considerations in the U.S. acquisition of the Canal. They concentrated on high-status actors, economic indices, and major political contingencies in establishing the U.S. colonial order on the isthmus. Panamanian scholars brought a legalistic and nationalist critique, stressing that Washington did not create Panama and that local voices in the historical debate have largely been ignored in the grand narrative of the Canal as a great act of progressive civilization. More recent U.S. scholarship has focused on American imperialism in Panama, on the role of race, culture, labor, and gender as major factors that shaped the U.S. presence, the structure of the Canal Zone, as well as Panamanian resistance to its occupation. The role of historical memory, of globalization, representation, and how the Canal fits into notions of U.S. empire have also figured more prominently in recent scholarly examination of this relationship. Contemporary research on the Panama Canal has been supported by numerous archives in the United States and Panama, as well as a variety of newspapers, magazines, novels, and films.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
O. Davydov

The advancement and promoting by the United States of its concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has shaped many of political discussions in Asian countries in recent years. The Republic of Korea is no exception. From this perspective, the article reviews the basic aspects of the evolution of South Korea’s foreign policy course as well as new priorities in that area which have been forged with the advent of President Moon Jae-in administration. The paper shows that the complex fluctuations of the South Korea’s external policy have been defined by the need to maintain the focus on the United States, on one side, and desire to nurture strategic partnership with China, on the other side. However, finding the right balance in that political equation has been significantly complicated due to the growing confrontation between the two global powers. Special attention is given to the role and place of South Korea in the U. S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. The article examines the main directions, some of the outcomes and the prospects of cooperation between Washington and Seoul aimed at harmonizing their regional strategies in view of the factors facilitating those interactions as well as those hampering them. President Trump highlighted that the United States – the Republic of Korea alliance remains a linchpin for security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, the dialogue between the two partners has not revealed the willingness of South Korea to collaborate with the United States on that theme beyond a narrow framework of purely economic coordination. Particularly, South Korea has consistently rejected the attempts of its ally to involve the country into the activities of Quad for fear of a possible adverse effect for the Korea–China relationships. All of those questions are examined in the article in linkage with a number of bilateral problems prevailing in the ROK–USA alliance which have complicated the collaboration between the two countries on regional issues in recent times.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document