Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge.

1981 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 630
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Kavka ◽  
Renford Bambrough
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Scepticism

Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge.

1981 ◽  
Vol 31 (123) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield ◽  
Renford Bambrough
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Scepticism

Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge.

Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Douglas C. Long ◽  
Benford Bambrough
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Scepticism

Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge

1981 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-385
Author(s):  
Leonard A. Kennedy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Scepticism

scholarly journals Explaining Moral Knowledge

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uri D. Leibowitz
Keyword(s):  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
To Come ◽  
Moral Scepticism ◽  
Moral Facts

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism.

Moral scepticism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark T. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Existence ◽  
Moral Scepticism

Scepticism in general is the view that we can have little or no knowledge; thus moral scepticism is the view that we can have little or no moral knowledge. Some moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because we cannot get the evidence necessary to justify any moral judgments. More radical moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because in morality there are no truths to be known. These radical sceptics argue either that moral judgments are all false because they erroneously presuppose the real existence of ‘objective values’, or that moral judgments aim to express feelings or influence behaviour instead of stating truths. Critics of moral scepticism, in turn, argue that in at least some cases moral judgments aim to state truths, some of these judgments are in fact true, and we have enough evidence to say that we know these moral truths.

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

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